

Bono's Politics: The Future of Celebrity Political Activism

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Section I

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

It is absurd if not obscene that celebrity is a door that such serious issues need to pass through before politicians take note. But there it is. Jubilee can't get into some of the offices and I can. But the idea has a kind of force of its own. I'm just making it louder. And, you know, making noise is a job description really for a rock star.

- Bono as Quoted by Neil McCormick in 'Killing Bono' (2004, 327)

Bono brought much needed glamour to a worthy campaign when he took up debt relief in 1999. Since then he has pioneered a new model of how celebrities can use their power. What marks him out is how he is reinventing how rock stars do politics.

- The Guardian, 'A Day with Bono,' 16 June 2005.

He's been called a "lobbyist for the world's poor" and dubbed "the Statesman," but is known better by the singular nickname received as a teen – Bono (pronounced BAH'-noh).¹ The Irish-mega celebrity and charismatic front man of famed rock n' roll group U2 was originally christened Paul Hewson by his Catholic father and Protestant mother in suburban Dublin in 1960. The young Bono's mixed religious heritage was a rare and controversial distinction in a sectarian Ireland where the Troubles raged – the three precariously violent decades during the Anglo-Irish struggle over the political fate of Northern Ireland. Bono's early experience of seeing the grey that straddled these two competing ideologies no doubt had its influence on his eventual political bent – the leftward humanity-over-ideology type

¹ Donna Cassata. "Bono Doubles as Lobbyist for the World's Poor," San Francisco Chronicle, 7 June 2005; James Traub "The Statesman," *The New York Times Magazine*, 18 September 2005.

that led to his current and unprecedented celebrity campaign for the African poor – or as he is fond of reminding the public, "representing the poorest and most vulnerable people."² Perhaps because of his Irish background Bono has embraced a type of political activism that is non-partisan and inclusive. Political Scientist John Street supports this notion by explaining that there is an intimate connection between why and how an artist becomes political.³

Bono's recent crusade for the African continent is best surmised by the dual-acronym of his US based think-tank and lobbying firm founded in 2002, DATA, which stands for *Debt-AIDS-Trade-Africa* and *Democracy-Accountability-Transparency-Africa*. These terms represent complex and interwoven issues, but more importantly, they have been linked to one overarching goal by Bono and DATA: to bring the African continent out of abject poverty. Bono has been an ardent crusader for the African continent since a 1985 visit to famine-stricken Ethiopia after his rock band U2's participation in the Live Aid concert spectacular, which raised over £60 million for Africa.⁴

As brand U2 increased in world stature, so has Bono's political involvement. U2 has steadily built an international fan base since the late 1970s that has made them one the most successful rock bands of all time. They have sold over 130 million albums worldwide, grossed nearly a billion dollars in concert sales, received 21 Grammy awards, and are card-

² Jann S. Wenner. "Bono: The Rolling Stone Interview," *Rolling Stone*, 3 November 2005, 67.

³ John Street, "Bob, Bono and Tony B: The Popular Artist as Politician," *Media, Culture and Society* 24 (2002): 433-441.

⁴ Mick Wall, *Bono: In the Name of Love*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2005, 126.

carrying members of the Rock n' Roll Hall of Fame.⁵ Bono is the face of this colossal music empire, and a face that is recognizable throughout most of the Western world. As the group's lead singer and resident extrovert, it is fitting that he is also the face for many of U2's political and social forays, sometimes to the dismay of his three U2 band-mates and management partner Paul McGuinness.

The purpose of this work is to historically analyze and explain the new model of celebrity political activism pioneered by Bono, which has eclipsed all previous celebrity political endeavors, particularly in the United States. This model will be hereafter referred to as the "Bono-model" and relates directly to the unique methods Bono has used to succeed in his political activities. This work demonstrates how Bono, through these unique methods, has secured considerable political achievements as defined by a measurable policy change and/or enactment, or as represented by a demonstrated shift from a political actor such as a world leader or an American Senator. The Bono-model of celebrity political activism provides a blueprint for future celebrity activists who wish to make the greatest impact for their said cause without becoming a politician.

Parts One and Two of this work will historically analyze Bono's political activities from the beginning of his career as U2 front-man, through the final months of 2005, as de facto leader of the transnational campaign to end abject poverty in Africa. The historical

⁵ *Supergroup U2 Talks with 'GMA' on What Keeps Them Going After 25 Years Together*, ABC News Online, 20 May 2005: <http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/print?id=775034>; Cassata, 2005; *Bono and the Christian Right*, CBS News Online, 20 November 2005: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/17/60minutes/main1053542.shtml> ; Ben Wener, *U2 is the 'One'*, Orange County Register, 9 February 2006.

portion of this work seeks to document and validate the political achievements that have occurred as a result of Bono's methods, through a detailed analysis of the available historical facts. Several of the events analyzed exhibit significant correlations between Bono and a political shift or decision, but in many cases it is difficult to completely credit the rock star. In fact, one of the limitations of this work is the difficulty in completely crediting Bono, as in most cases other forces were at work beyond his efforts. When possible, this work will investigate alternate explanations for Bono's ostensible political achievements. This work concludes it is doubtful that most political situations in this work would have developed and occurred in the same manner without Bono's involvement. It may be helpful when reading the historical sections to imagine the situations counterfactually – or how they would have transpired in a world in which Bono did not exist.

Given the assertion that Bono has indeed created a new model for celebrity political activism, the next question must explore the reasons for his political success, or more specifically, how has the Bono-model worked? This work contends that Bono's methods involves three key elements, encased within an evolving global polity, which explains how this rock star has rewritten the blueprint for celebrity political activism and has reached the pinnacle of celebrity political power. These factors will be briefly discussed and then further examined and explained theoretically in the final section of this work. The first piece of the Bono-model is the easiest to explain and certainly the most obvious. It relates simply to Bono being Bono, or his celebrity status, which is also attached to his humanitarian reputation. Bono gained his initial inordinate political access through his celebrity status as

front man and persona grata of the internationally renowned and socially conscious rock group U2. Bono's fame as a humanitarian rock star created the initial conditions that eventually opened the right doors. This manifested itself through his connection to U.S. political insider Bobby Shriver, who introduced him to key American politicians merely because he was Bono of U2.

But political access does not guarantee success. Many of the politicians that Bono met were initially reluctant to meet the rock star and some were very skeptical. But something unique seemed to recur each time Bono met with politicians, regardless of what ideological stripe or flag was represented. Scheduled meet-and-greets would overrun by a half-hour, an hour, or two hours. In virtually all documented cases, politicians walked away extremely impressed with Bono, and were especially struck by his knowledge of the issues. This leads to the second piece of the Bono-model – charisma. This includes a blend of Bono's magnetic personality flanked by a detailed knowledge of the political issues, or expertise. This charisma, along with his exceptional issue-knowledge, conferred legitimacy in the minds of the politicians.

The final step in the Bono-model is the political strategy of nonpartisanship and inclusion, or coalition-building. Bono deliberately sought to influence those who would oppose him, including the political and religious right in the United States. It is difficult to imagine Bono enjoying the same political achievements without the help of these groups, especially in the United States. Bono's charisma contributed to his success in convincing the

political opposition to support his plight, but it is also probable that political expediency on the part of nervous politicians who feared constituent backlash played a role as well.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, these three factors have been encased within a structural shift in global politics during the 1980s - 2000s, which has enabled transnational civil society to have more relative power and influence in the realm of international politics, of which Bono's political campaigns have been a part. This structural situation no doubt helped to advance his agenda.

1. Celebrity Activism in the United States

The author contends that Bono's political successes have surpassed all previous celebrity political endeavors, and to test this notion, it is essential to include a brief overview of celebrity political activism in the United States. It is first helpful to provide a theoretical contrast to celebrity activism before examining it thoroughly, which will be accomplished by presenting two traditional political science theories that have attempted to explain American political access and participation. In other words, how do average Americans outside of celebrities acquire political access?

Group theory, or pluralism, is one popular explanation. This theory was developed from the writings of Arthur Bentley and David Truman, who both "placed groups at the heart of politics and policymaking in a complex, large, and increasingly specialized governmental system."⁶ Groups are formed from substantial cleavages among citizens, which has also been encouraged by an American melting pot culture that has created a cultural, ethnic and religiously diverse nation. America's constitutional design also spurs group development, which "Guarantees free speech, association, and the right to petition government for the redress of grievances..." In addition, the decentralized power structure of the US Government provides multiple access points for groups. Political scientists Loomis and Cigler note that "political organization often parallels government structure..."⁷

⁶ Burdett A. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler. "Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics," in *Interest Group Politics*, ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002, 4-5.

⁷ Ibid, 6

Clearly these groups form in the United States for common political, material, or social representation. This common representation is what celebrities can sometimes bypass. Bono did not need an initial group affiliation to gain an audience of American politicians. It is an odd reality to consider that an Irish citizen has more political access than the average American citizen because of his celebrity status.

Another explanation is elite theory, which according to Dye posits public policy as "the preferences and values of a governing elite."⁸ Elites are "not typical of the masses," and draw "disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society." Elite theory assumes that the masses are apathetic and uninformed about public policy, and that elites shape mass opinion on policy more than masses shape elite opinion. Elites hold a tight reign over whom and when new individuals are accepted in to the governing circles, which occurs through a "slow and continuous process to maintain stability and avoid revolution." Dye further notes that new elites must accept the basic elite consensus, which includes the sanctity of private property, limited government, and individual liberty.⁹ Elite theory also claims that policy change is incremental, which reflects the elites desire to preserve the system. Elites are not hostile toward mass welfare, and actually bear mass responsibility as a form of enlightened self-interest, or self-protection. Elite theory believes that American democratic institutions such as elections and parties "are important only for their symbolic value," and that at most the masses have "only an indirect influence over the decision-making behavior of elites." If one accepts the tenets of the elite theory, Bono would not be

⁸ Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002, 23.

⁹ Ibid, 24

considered an elite. He does have elite political access, but unless he is pursuing his humanitarian concerns for the sole purpose of enlightened self-interest, and starts favoring incremental change over his revolutionary calls to end poverty, then he cannot be considered an elite in the theoretical political science sense. Bono's celebrity status would likely fall in the middle of a linear continuum between group and elite theory.

Celebrity activism rarely extends beyond public support of the said political cause, but can include the occasional support of a political candidate or the questionable "expert" Congressional testimony. It is these kinds of trite political tokens that have muddied the image of celebrity political activism. Even more rare are celebrities who become politicians. It is important to differentiate those celebrities turned politicians with celebrity political activism. There are several cases of modern celebrity musicians and movie stars turned politicians, perhaps Ronald Reagan being the most famous. But there is a clear political difference between actually becoming a politician and remaining within the celebrity realm. Meyer and Gamson explicitly divorce traditional celebrity status from formal, institutional power and note that they are "distinguished by their *autonomy* [emphasis added] from state institutions."¹⁰

A review of the history of celebrity activism in the United States shows there are no documented cases of celebrity political impact similar to Bono's, whether domestic or international, while still remaining a celebrity. In fact, there are no documented cases of celebrities who have used the methods that Bono has pioneered – namely the incessant

¹⁰ David S. Meyer, and Joshua Gamson, "The Challenge of Cultural Elites: Celebrities and Social Movements." *Sociological Inquiry* 65, no 2 (1995), 183-184.

lobbying of politicians and the creation of a successful think tank/lobbying firm, both of which are flanked by a burgeoning grassroots organization, and connected to a transnational coalition. In addition, the uniqueness of this new model partially reflects Bono's actual involvement with the political system without leaving his entertainer-celebrity post. It could be argued that Bono would actually lose political power and influence were he to assume a traditional political post such as Irish Prime Minister, Ambassador, or even World Bank President.

Meyer and Gamson help demonstrate the progressive nature of the Bono-model as they stress the celebrity tendency to avoid seeking any kind of structural change, and note that the "appeal for generosity, but not reform... is a well-established tradition of celebrity activism."¹¹ Marshall comments on the typical mobilizing ineffectiveness of traditional celebrity activity by concluding, "The agency of celebrity is more often reduced to a privatized, psychological representation of activity and transformation – it rarely moves into a clear social movement."¹² It may be premature to call Bono's African campaign a social movement, but it is not unimaginable to speculate that this end may indeed materialize.

Corner and Pels in *Media and the Restyling of Politics* provide an excellent description of the current notion of celebrity:¹³

¹¹ Meyer and Gamson, 1995, 190.

¹² David P. Marshall, *Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 244.

¹³ John Corner and Dick Pels, Eds. *Media and the Restyling of Politics: Consumerism, Celebrity and Cynicism*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2003, 6.

Forms of celebrity, involving sustained performance within conditions of expanded media visibility and, quite often, vigorous media scrutiny, are major features of contemporary culture. Alongside the more established 'public figures,' a whole new range of people from television, sport, popular music and other areas of entertainment have become, if only temporarily, members of a celebrity system that extends to the international level.

Bono is clearly a part of this "celebrity system that extends to the international level," but his celebrity is limited to a predominantly Western audience, as his anonymity on the very continent he campaigns for was evident during his 2002 African trip with U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill.

Sociologist C. Wright Mills was a pioneer in the study of the modern celebrity, and asked in 1956, "But what are the celebrities?" His answer perhaps provides the most gripping, timeless definition of the term:

The celebrities are The Names that need no further identification. Those who know them so far exceed those of whom they know as to require no exact computation. Wherever the celebrities go, they are recognized, and moreover recognized with some excitement and awe. Whatever they do has publicity value. More or less continuously, over a period of time, they are the material for the media of communication and entertainment. And, when that time ends – as it must – and the celebrity still lives – as he may – from time to time it may be asked, 'Remember him?' That is what celebrity means.

In 1961 historian Daniel Boorstin defined celebrity simply as "a person who is known for his well-knownness."¹⁴ Marshall presents an updated analysis of the celebrity concept, and defines the term within its historical context, explaining that the resulting "intense focus on the public personality" is a "peculiarly modern phenomenon," and traces its birth "from the twinned discourses of modernity: democracy and capitalism."¹⁵ Marshall admits that "the ubiquity of celebrities, as well as their intangible nature, makes them difficult to define..."¹⁶ Marshall does make a definitional attempt and notes that the term itself, celebrity, developed in the nineteenth century and carried an original "affinity with piety and religion," and has "become a term that announces a vulgar sense of notoriety." Marshall further claims that celebrity "describes a type of value that can be articulated through an individual and celebrated publicly as important and significant."¹⁷ Marshall also attributes the development of celebrities in the realm of popular music, of which Bono belongs, to the mass reproduction of music, a technological result of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that began with the advent of sheet music production and distribution, and led to the creation of "the singing star."¹⁸

In *Celebrity Politics*, West and Orman discuss the rise of modern celebrity politics and credit several factors for its emergence in 20th century America including technological factors such as radio and television, which contributed to what Leo Braudy called the

¹⁴ Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. New York: Vintage Books, 1987, 57.

¹⁵ Marshall, 1997, 4

¹⁶ Ibid, 243.

¹⁷ Ibid, 7.

¹⁸ Ibid, 150.

"democratization of fame," and journalistic shifts such as gossip journalism.¹⁹ Mills also pointed to the rise of mass communication, which is the "prime means of acclaim and even a creator of those acclaimed."²⁰ Because of these technological shifts, ordinary people were propelled into the spotlight with the advent of movies, recorded music, television, and radio. Mills pronounced that this new media system has placed celebrities in a spotlight "such as no higher circles of any nation in world history have ever had upon them."²¹

West and Orman also detail the history of modern celebrity politics in the United States and categorize the numerous ways that celebrities have become integrally involved in political activities including electioneering, campaigning, fund-raising, political endorsement, and lobbying. West and Orman note a special power that celebrities possess resulting from their "centrality in the mobilization of interests and recruitment of candidates," and add "They are able to position themselves in ways that enhance their overall influence."²² Meyer and Gamson discuss the resources celebrities can bring to social movements, many of which overlap West and Orman, and cite their chief asset as "the visibility that comes along with their participation."²³ Also noted is the celebrity's ability to (2) draw in other participants and potential supporters, (3) make attendance more attractive to potential supporters, (4) provide critical fund-raising support to help social movement organizations, (5) the lure of celebrity contact, which is powerful for politicians and

¹⁹ Darrell M. West and John Orman, *Celebrity Politics*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003, 7-8.

²⁰ C. Wright. Mills, *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 85.

²¹ Ibid, 84.

²² West and Orman, 2003, 6.

²³ Meyer and Gamson, 1995, 185-6.

policymakers. Street concurs and simply explains, "Celebrities legitimate political causes and political movements by lending their credibility and popularity to them."²⁴ Meyer and Gamsom further note that "celebrities can open doors for movement activists," and demonstrate how celebrities have special political access that eclipses that of the general public.²⁵ This celebrity ability to open doors has been shamelessly used by Bono, and was the first step utilized in his recent political ascent.

Another political arena in which celebrities engage is the ever-present political fundraising battles, where "celebrities are adept at raising money and attracting media attention to particular candidates and highlighting the importance of pressing causes."²⁶ In addition, celebrities are significant financial contributors to political campaigns themselves. Celebrity musicians have also donated their songs to political campaigns; such as Ronald Reagan's reliance on Lee Greenwood's song *I'm Proud to be an American*.²⁷ Street expands on this notion explaining that musical celebrities in particular command audiences who pay for their CDs, videos, and concerts, and "people respond differently" to the musicians because of what they do.²⁸

Perhaps the most pervasive way in which celebrities become political is through their activism. West and Orman discuss the myriad of entertainers who have engaged in celebrity activism including actors Marlon Brando and Jane Fonda who took part in the civil rights

²⁴ Street, 2002, 437.

²⁵ Meyer and Gamson, 1995, 186.

²⁶ West and Orman, 2003, 33.

²⁷ Ibid, 61.

²⁸ Street, 2002, 434.

struggles, primarily by participating in demonstrations.²⁹ In the 1960s Brando also helped raise money for famine relief in India, and in the 1970s helped the American Indian Movement with a brilliant publicity stunt that sent Native American Sasheen Littlefeather to the 1973 Oscar's ceremony as a stand-in for Brando, who was nominated as best actor for his role in *The Godfather*. Charlton Heston raised the stakes for celebrity political activism when he assumed the presidency of the National Rifle Association (NRA) – a move that is somewhat similar to Bono's founding of DATA and the ONE Campaign. Heston frequently spoke on behalf of the NRA to raise publicity and money, and has engaged in get-out-the-vote drives to rally pro-gun voters against gun-control candidates. Similarly, actors Audrey Hepburn, Danny Kaye, and now Angelina Jolie, have represented the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF).³⁰

Paul Newman has been what West and Orman call one "of the most consistently principled celebrity politicians," as he "raises funds for candidates... educates the public about various issues, and acts as media spokesperson for various political issues."³¹ Newman also created his own fine food label called *Newman's Own*, which has donated \$175 million in profits to various charities.³² The Creative Coalition is another example of celebrities attempting to educate the public, and may have lent to the formation of Bono's strategies as it is considered a political interest group. It was founded in 1989 by a Hollywood group led

²⁹ West and Orman, 2003, 62-74.

³⁰ Jonathan Curiel, "Star Power: When Celebrities Support Causes, Who Really Winds Up Benefiting?" *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 5 June 2005.

³¹ West and Orman, 2003, 66.

³² Taken from Newman's Own website: <http://www.newmansown.com/ourstory.cfm>

by actor/director Ron Silver and pursues a mission to "better inform and influence the community and nation" on a wide range of political issues including education policy, violence in America, the role of the media, campaign finance reform, First Amendment rights, public funding for the arts, and arts education in the public schools.³³ The Creative Coalition's website explains that the organization "Testifies before Congress, sponsors awareness-building events, actively participates in the Democratic and Republican conventions, and plays an assertive role in presenting the creative community's views on these issues."

West and Orman also discuss the politics of rock stars including 1960s and 70s folk singers such as Arlo Guthrie, Phil Ochs, and Joan Baez who played social and political benefit concerts.³⁴ There have also been highly publicized benefit concerts that take the form of the modern mega-concert. George Harrison was the first to organize such an event with his 1971 *Concert for Bangladesh*, which raised \$240,000 for the UN Children's Fund for Relief to Refugee Children of Bangladesh. West and Orman also cite musician and world hunger activist Harry Chapin, who they claim has "one of the most remarkable records of achievement by a politico pop star in the 1970s," and who may have also helped partially pioneer some of Bono's methods.³⁵ West and Orman note that Chapin "became a full-fledged food activist and lobbyist on Capitol Hill as he appeared before Congressional hearings and on Congressional doorsteps," and that "Chapin and other activists put enough

³³ Taken from the Creative Coalition Website: <http://www.thecreativecoalition.org/about/mission.html>

³⁴ West and Orman, 2003, 70.

³⁵ Ibid.

pressure on the appropriate power points in Washington to get Congress to call for the establishment of a presidential Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition."³⁶ Chapin also helped raise about \$500,000 per year from 1973-1981 for world hunger. It would be an injustice to neglect the efforts of Bob Geldof, Bono's buddy in campaigning for the African continent, who was also a political trailblazer when he conceptualized the first mega-concert, *Live Aid* in 1985, and for his efforts was knighted in England and was the first rock star nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. Geldof has also met with several world leaders including members of the US Congress, the British Parliament, U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Mother Theresa.

From the previous brief analysis of modern celebrity political activism, it is apparent that Bono has borrowed some of tactics of his predecessors, including his political partner Bob Geldof, but this work contends his activism has substantially eclipsed his predecessors in both scope and method. Bono has met with the leaders of virtually every Western nation and achieved substantial political results both domestically and internationally. In the process Bono has become perhaps the first transnational celebrity political activist. He is the first celebrity to create his own think tank/lobbying firm and grassroots political interest group. Meyer and Gamson noted "The resources that celebrities bring to bear in social movement struggles do not generally include citizen education or detailed political analysis," which confirms the uniqueness of Bono's tactics.³⁷ As will be demonstrated, Bono has exceeded both citizen education and detailed political analysis. It will also be shown that

³⁶ Ibid, 71.

³⁷ Meyer and Gamson, 1995, 202.

Bono is the first celebrity to reach across the partisan divide and unite people around a cause instead of divide. In addition, Bono still uses the traditional methods enabled by his celebrity musician status including the mobilization of the U2 fan base at concerts, which Bono now uses as a forum to gather supporters for his grassroots political organization the ONE Campaign.

Section II

EVOLUTION

You know, celebrity is ridiculous. It's silly, but it's a kind of currency, and you have to spend it wisely. And I've learnt that much.

- Bono in interview with Michka Assayas (2005, 93)

Politics matters. We grew up in a generation where we were told it didn't, and we were bored: 'No matter who you vote for, the government always gets in.' That's wrong. We have to puncture that.

- Bono in interview with Michka Assayas (2005, 188)

Section Two exhibits the development of Bono's coexisting celebrity and humanitarian status through his role as front man for the world's most popular rock n' roll band. The resulting celebrity, or fame, enwrapped within Bono's humanitarian reputation, is the first piece to the Bono-model. In addition, Bono's social and political activities have been both consistent and evolving throughout his celebrity career, which have also aided his humanitarian reputation. This evolution is imperative in understanding how Bono's methods were developed; as they are a function of agency, in the person of Bono; and the structure in which they resided – in this case a shifting global polity that has enabled more relative power for transnational advocacy groups.

It is no coincidence that the strategy behind Bono's political activism has developed parallel to an emerging global transnational civil society. The political causes in which Bono

has been involved have been directly linked to these developing transnational movements. Section Two also seeks to establish Bono's long-term commitment to humanitarian and political issues, something that is rare among most politically engaged celebrities. This long-term commitment has also lent to Bono's legitimacy as a political actor, and led directly to the eventual elevation of his celebrity political status. In addition, it will be demonstrated that U2 and Bono's early forays with political and social causes primarily used their popular music as a protest tool, which as Pratt explains has limited political influence. Pratt explains the political limitations of popular music: "Although numerous efforts to fuse music and politics have arisen, their relation to any more fundamental movements for change remains problematic, given the weakness of such movements as perceived realistic alternatives to existing institutional politics."³⁸

Pratt also claims that instead of creating real institutional change, "the most important function of music has always been in expressing and reinforcing elements of existing, broadly oppositional political culture and attitudes, thus facilitating ongoing struggles and resistance..."³⁹ Marshall presents a similar view noting that, "Occasionally, the social power that has congealed in popular music has facilitated the organizations of social movements opposed to the general organization of the social structure."⁴⁰ Pratt further explains that this "oppositional consciousness does not imply transformative movements embodying affirmative challenge and change," but acknowledges that "these forms at least

³⁸ Ray Pratt, *Rhythm and Resistance: The Political Uses of American Popular Music*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994, 207.

³⁹ Ibid, 209.

⁴⁰ Marshall, 1997, 164.

establish the groundwork that make such movements possible."⁴¹ Pratt then categorizes political popular music within Antonio Gramsci's war of position, which challenges the structure of social power. Pratt claims that these positional challenges are "necessary and prior to fundamental shifts in the scope of public programs" in "the supposedly open and democratic systems of Western liberal capitalism." Pratt concludes that "In this sense music may function as a material force with significant political potential," but "What people will make of that potential remains an open question." Bono has pushed the boundaries of which Pratt speaks and has rewritten the rules of celebrity political activism.

Pratt discusses the potential actual impacts of political popular music and cites R. Serge Denisoff's eight political functions of music:

- *Solicit or arouse support for a movement*
- *Reinforce the value structure of individuals*
- *Create cohesion, solidarity and morale*
- *Recruit individuals into a specific movement*
- *Evoke solutions to a social problem via action*
- *Describe a social problem in emotional terms*
- *Divide supporters from the world around them*
- *Counteract despair in social reformers, when hoped for change does not materialize*

⁴¹ Pratt, 1994, 211.

U2's music has touched all of these functions at different points in their career, yet at some point Bono realized these methods alone would not create significant and lasting social and institutional change, a finding echoed by Pratt. Bono's strategy radically changed in the late 1990s as he used his celebrity to become a campaigner-activist, strolling the halls of power instead of as he notes, "throwing rocks at the obvious symbols of power."⁴² Pratt provides an example of why popular music has political limitations, even in its most bombastic form. He cites the 1980s activist mega-concerts, which includes the 1985 *Live Aid* concert for Africa in which U2 was instrumental.⁴³ Pratt notes that the money these mega-concerts provided were just "small portions of the vast sums needed to make a transforming impact on any of the problems addressed." Pratt admitted their "main positive effects have been to raise public consciousness..." Bono knew that to truly transform Africa he had to move beyond merely raising public consciousness.

⁴² Bono quoted in Michka Assayas, *Bono in Conversation with Michka Assayas*. New York: Riverhead Books, 2005, 95.

⁴³ Pratt, 1994, 212.

2. Bono's Early Political Ventures – Contraception, Sexism and the Taoiseach

1978 marked U2's first adventure in political activism when they played a Dublin show to protest Ireland's anti-contraception laws.⁴⁴ Having perhaps enjoyed the taste of rebellion, U2 quickly played another Dublin protest gig – but this time it was to fight sexism.⁴⁵ There were early indications of Bono's charismatic appeal as Jackson notes that he was a natural magnet for journalists – always loquacious and never limiting his discussions to musical topics.⁴⁶ A 1980 interview offered a portent of his future activism when he blasted governments for their hypocrisy in "promoting a healthy lifestyle...while at the same time making a mint from alcohol and tax revenue."⁴⁷

A chance 1982 Heathrow airport meeting brought Bono face-to-face with the leader of Ireland's Fine Gael party, Garret FitzGerald, who was running for re-election as Taoiseach (the Irish-Gaelic term for Prime Minister). Jackson notes that "Bono had promptly buttonholed the senior Irish Politician and held him in close conversation about Ireland's various problems... a conversation that carried on throughout the entire flight to Dublin."⁴⁸ Bono later confessed that his approach towards the politician was arrogant.⁴⁹ Employing the nonpartisan strategy that would define his African campaign twenty years later, Bono quickly distanced himself from party politics, noting that he liked "FitzGerald as

⁴⁴ Mick Wall, *Bono: In the Name of Love*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2005, 234.

⁴⁵ Laura Jackson, *Bono: His Life, Music, and Passions*. New York: Citadel Press, 2001, 18.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 29

⁴⁷ Bono quoted in Jackson, 2001, 29.

⁴⁸ Jackson, 2001, 42.

⁴⁹ Bono quoted in Robin Denselow *When the Music's Over: The Story of Political Pop*. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1989, 168.

a person, not a politician," and claimed his party "is just as bad as the others."⁵⁰ FitzGerald found Bono "interesting... with a good mind, a serious person who is interested in politics and all kinds of issues," which also provided a small glimpse of Bono's future academic interest in the issues.⁵¹

Bono subsequently invited FitzGerald to the U2 recording studio, an invitation that happened to be on the last day of the Irish leader's political campaign. FitzGerald accepted, and the resulting visit was "the main campaign story of the day, and featured heavily in the Irish press."⁵² The next week FitzGerald was re-elected, and the Fine Gael party scored "their best vote ever." Denselow concludes that the visit was not the deciding factor in the campaign, but lent heavily to the progressive image FitzGerald was trying to project.⁵³ FitzGerald gave Bono partial credit in assisting the campaign: "Bono spoke favorably about my party during the election and that was politically helpful."⁵⁴

The re-elected Taoiseach sought to continue his newfound political relationship with the budding rock star and invited Bono to sit on a government panel formed to examine youth problems and unemployment. Bono accepted the invitation, which required some introspection regarding his own political role:⁵⁵

I was faced with a question that I hadn't got a real answer to. If a performer is singing about someone not feeding their bellies, when his is full, what is his duty? Is

⁵⁰ Ibid, 168.

⁵¹ Jackson, 2001, 42.

⁵² Ibid, 168.

⁵³ Denselow, 1989, 168.

⁵⁴ Garret Fitzgerald quoted in Jackson, 2001, 42

⁵⁵ Bono quoted in Denselow, 1989, 169.

his music just a soundtrack to change, or does he himself change? Does he involve himself in the process of change?

This episode exposes a seemingly pivotal point in Bono's political involvement. Would the young artist engage in the political process, or just simply sing the soundtrack of change?

Bono accepted the role on the committee, but was quickly frustrated. Jackson explains that Bono wanted to take a hands-on approach and work directly with the community to investigate their problems, an idea which met "concerted resistance" from the committee.⁵⁶

This resistance along with Bono's frustration with the "committee speak" employed by the bureaucrats led him to resign.⁵⁷ It is noteworthy that after this initial bureaucratic stumble, Bono would not return to institutional politics (through his lobbying efforts with the transnational nongovernmental organization *Jubilee 2000*) until the late 1990s. One could speculate that this early negative experience with bureaucracy kept him away.

⁵⁶ Jackson, 2001, 43.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 169.

3. Irish Politics and The Troubles

After the FitzGerald episode, it seemed inevitable that Bono and U2 would involve themselves with the volatile Northern Ireland situation – although both sides of the conflict were probably shocked at the young group's decided stance. 1983 was a watershed year for the burgeoning activists and U2's music began to reflect their socially conscious mood. Their third record *War* included the controversial track *Sunday Bloody Sunday*, an oft misunderstood song that immediately enmeshed them within the Irish political debate. *Sunday Bloody Sunday*'s title referenced two particularly gruesome events from Irish political history, the first being 1920's *Bloody Sunday* in Dublin's Croke Park where the British Black and Tans massacred 13 Irish innocents in retaliation for a Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) action that had left 14 British officers dead earlier that day.⁵⁸ More than fifty years later on another *Bloody Sunday*, 13 more innocent civilians were killed by the British Army's Parachute Regiment during a 1972 riot.⁵⁹ Given the Republican sentiment that surrounds these events, it is understandable how the Irish public could misunderstand *Sunday Bloody Sunday*'s intended message.

Bono hurriedly tried to explain the song's intended meaning before it was hijacked by rebel sympathizers. He called U2's new record *War* "the first apolitical political record" and described *Sunday Bloody Sunday* as a song about

⁵⁸ Eamon Dunphy, *Unforgettable Fire: Past, Present, and the Future –The Definitive Biography of U2*. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1987, 205.

⁵⁹ Jackson, 2001, 44.

"...the idea of aggressive pacifism and the principles of surrender... the situation [in Ireland] is stuck because people on both sides believe they are right and are sticking to their principles. Real love means backing off your own opinions, just for the sake of the movement... people have got to learn to step down, to surrender. I wanted to write something that wasn't a rebel song, but which said, we're sick of it".⁶⁰

In another interview Bono noted that

"*Sunday Bloody Sunday* is a day that no Irishman can forget, but should forget, which is what we are saying – 'How long must we sing this song?' When I introduce it I say, 'This isn't a rebel song'. The name comes up all the time and we're saying 'How long must we have songs called *Sunday Bloody Sunday*?'"⁶¹

To emphasize its pacific theme, Bono would enwrap himself in a white flag during U2's performance of the song.⁶² The pacific ideas that peppered U2's newest music were of direct import from America. Bono frequently referenced the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King's nonviolence strategy when discussing the ideology behind *Sunday Bloody Sunday*.⁶³ This newfound reverence for Dr. King and his strategy of nonviolence would emanate profusely from U2's future records.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Ibid, 169-170.

⁶¹ Interview with Liam Mackey in *Hot Press* as taken from Dunphy, 1987, 207.

⁶² Jackson, 2001, 48.

⁶³ In an interview with Michka Assayas Bono explained the meaning of 'Sunday Bloody Sunday': "We became students of nonviolence, of Martin Luther King's thinking. Then we wrote 'Sunday Bloody Sunday' as a way of refuting the armed struggle. The irony was that a lot of people thought 'Sunday Bloody Sunday' was a call to arms, a rebel song for a united Ireland. It was about unity, but not in the geographical sense." In Assayas, 2005, 170.

⁶⁴ Bono discussed Martin Luther King's inspiration in a discussion with Bill Flanagan noting: "I was very inspired by Martin Luther King. He was a character in the middle of a very dangerous situation – civil rights for African Americans in the sixties. It could have gone very wrong... The word *peace* is like bullshit a lot of the time, it's like flowers-in-the-hair hippie talk, but he held on to a much stronger idea, a much more concrete

When the political arm of the Irish Republican Army, Sinn Féin, learned the true meaning of *Sunday Bloody Sunday*, their leader Gerry Adams removed the U2 poster in their Dublin office, and during a subsequent interview called Bono a little shit. Bono explained diplomatically: "It's not helpful when the leader of an armed struggle who has support in every working class neighborhood, and a lot of maniacs, calls you a 'little shit.'"⁶⁵ Bono recalls other incidents in which the *Sunday Bloody Sunday* controversy entangled U2 with IRA supporters, including one kidnapping threat that the "head of the Special Branch was taking very seriously," and another episode in which U2's "car was surrounded by a bunch of Provo supporters," who were threatening violence.⁶⁶ U2 and Bono were now more controversial than ever, and Bono wasn't even sitting on a governmental committee.

In 1984 U2 released their fourth full length record, *the Unforgettable Fire*, whose title mirrored that of a Chicago Peace Museum art exhibit that was created by survivors of the World War II nuclear attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁶⁷ During the record's supporting tour, U2 displayed the *Unforgettable Fire* art exhibit and another dedicated to the life of Dr. Martin Luther King at their various concert venues. U2's latest record also contained two tributes to Dr. Martin Luther King, *Pride (In the name of love)* and *MLK*. It was now clear that Bono and U2 were using their music as a means of promoting social awareness.

idea about peace and respect, and he just kept on to it, he just kept pummeling it. The idea was that he'd live for his country but he didn't want to die for it and he would never kill for it. And he did die for it. It's a hard thing to hold on to." In Bill Flanagan, *U2 at the End of the World*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1995, 277.

⁶⁵ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 172.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 'Provo' is Irish slang for the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

⁶⁷ Denselow, 1989, 171 and Dunphy, 1987, 235.

4. Live Aid

Bono and U2 knew that they could offer more than just political songs, and yet without having to join the governmental process. 1984 marked their first involvement with African issues, and perhaps unknowingly, world politics in general. In November, The Boomtown Rats lead singer Bob Geldof, another Irish band, was deeply moved by a BBC documentary about the Ethiopian famine.⁶⁸ He was inspired to produce an all-star charity single that would benefit famine victims. Thus the plan for Band-Aid was hastily created, and within two-weeks Geldof had enticed 36 popular musicians including Bono and U2 bassist Adam Clayton to lend their talents. The resulting single, '*Do They Know It's Christmas?*' sold nearly ten million copies and raised almost £8 million for Ethiopian famine relief.⁶⁹

Geldof was not satisfied with limiting his African relief efforts to the Band Aid single, and he soon began planning the concert extravaganza Live Aid – two simultaneous mega-concerts that were held on July 13, 1985 at Philadelphia's JFK stadium and London's Wembley Stadium. Each concert was broadcast live via satellite to televisions across the world. The 20th Century media-spectacle required precise timing – when one performance finished, another would begin immediately across the Atlantic at the other Live Aid location.

⁶⁸ Jackson, 2001, 60.

⁶⁹ Stan Rijven, "Rock for Ethiopia," in *World Music, Politics and Social Change*, ed. Simon Frith. New York: Manchester University Press, 1989, 199.

Phil Collins was the only musician to perform both Live Aid venues that day, as he used the supersonic Concorde Jet to make the cross-Atlantic trip in three hours.

Live Aid and a mutual concern for Africa helped create a friendship and strategic partnership between Bono and Bob Geldof, which has kept them working together on the issues for more than twenty years, and also helped cement Bono's reputation as a humanitarian. U2 was a Live Aid headliner at Wembley Stadium, and their performance was arguably the most riveting of the day. During U2's second song, *MLK*, Bono leapt from the stage, ran through the Wembley masses, and brought an unsuspecting female fan onstage for a not-so-private dance with the extroverted front man. The seemingly foolish venture swept away U2's allotted performance time, requiring them to axe their last song. The gamble was rewarded as U2's performance is still remembered as one of Live Aid's best, and helped propel the ascending band in to rock n' roll superstardom. Wall notes that "many thousands of people... went into record shops over the following days and weeks asking for something by 'the singer that danced with the girl at Live Aid.'"⁷⁰

Live Aid was declared a phenomenal success as it was beamed to a worldwide television audience of 1.5 billion in over 150 countries, and raised over £60 million for Africa.⁷¹ As Garofalo notes, "not even the producers understood the power of what they were dealing with."⁷² Bob Geldof was less impressed with his own creation when he noted,⁷³

⁷⁰ Wall, 2005, 12.

⁷¹ Ibid, 126.

⁷² Reebee, Garofalo, *Rockin' the Boat: Mass Music and Mass Movements*. Boston: South End Press, 1992, 27.

⁷³ Geldof quoted in Garofalo, 1992, 35.

[W]e've used the spurious glamour of pop music to draw attention to a situation, and we've overloaded the thing with symbolism to make it reach people. But people get bored easily. People may have been profoundly affected by the Live Aid day – some were shattered by it – but that does not translate into a massive change in consciousness.

Geldof's frustration and discontent pointed to his future African political adventures with Bono.

Something about Live Aid and the Ethiopian plight also affected Bono, and within months he took an unpublicized trip to an Ethiopian refugee camp with wife Ali Hewson. The six week trip profoundly influenced Bono and he often refers to the time as a defining experience. Bono explained that while watching on television the image of a starving child trying to stand up, he wondered how "In a world where there is so much, in a world where there's plenty, in a world of unimaginable prosperity, a child can die of starvation!"⁷⁴ Once in Africa, Bono realized that "the images weren't pictures, they were children standing right before me, or at least trying to stand before me." It was then that Bono decided he would be part of the solution: "I don't want to be, I will not be, in a world where that continues to be true." After the 1985 Ethiopian visit, Bono did not return to the Africa continent for more than a decade, until a March 16, 1998 U2 performance in Cape Town, South Africa.⁷⁵ As Assayas notes, "the truth is, for twelve years, before he received a phone call from someone

⁷⁴ Assayas, 2005, 215.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 258.

trying to find a worthy champion for the Jubilee 2000 campaign, Bono had very little to say or do about Africa publicly."

But Live Aid was only the beginning of Bono and U2's increased public affiliation with political and social causes. Shortly after Bono's six-week excursion to Ethiopia he helped the Artists United Against Apartheid movement for South Africa by contributing to the *Sun City* single – a star-laden effort bringing awareness to South African Apartheid. Bono also lent the U2 song *Silver and Gold* to the coordinating *Sun City* record, a tune that appeared on their 1988 album *Rattle and Hum*. Bono used the 1988 Grammy Awards to deliver an anti-Apartheid message to the 50 million television viewers, but pulled back when his words received a "polite, but distinctly tepid response..."⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Jackson, 2001, 94-95.

5. Amnesty International Benefit and Latin America

In August 1985 U2 were involved with Amnesty International's twenty-fifth anniversary concert series, which evolved into a mini-tour of sorts called *Conspiracy of Hope*. The June 1986 two-week concert series included celebrity musicians Sting, Peter Gabriel, Joan Baez, the Neville Brothers, and Jackson Browne. The seven engagements in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Atlanta, Chicago, and New York raised \$4 million for Amnesty International while tripling its membership.⁷⁷ Bono's political involvement was beginning to mirror the success of his burgeoning band.

In 1986 Bono became interested in the Latin American Civil Wars occurring in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The liberation theology aspect of this people's movement is what inspired his curiosity. Bono notes, "...I became fascinated with [the Sandinistas] modus operandi, because here was liberation theology in action...I was shocked to see how much the people's religion had inspired their revolt." But Bono is quick to mention his aversion to the violence that accompanied these ideas, and recalled a comment he made to Ernesto Cardenal, then Nicaragua's minister of culture and liberation theology guru: "there's nothing glorious about people losing their lives..."⁷⁸ As with Africa, this newfound political interest led Bono and wife Ali to travel, this time to El Salvador with a refugee organization called *Sanctuary*. The Central American experience inspired two songs on U2's 1987 album *The Joshua Tree* including *Mothers of the Disappeared* and *Bullet the Blue Sky*, the former of

⁷⁷ Dunphy, 1987; 259, 263.

⁷⁸ Assayas, 2005, 176.

which spoke about those in South and Central American opposition movements who had disappeared while in custody of the government police, and were presumably murdered.⁷⁹

Bullet the Blue Sky was about "the terror America's presence inflicts on the people of Nicaragua."⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Ibid; 187, 277.

⁸⁰ Murphy, 1987, 278.

6. U2 vs. Arizona

Bono and U2's loyalty to philosophical mentor Martin Luther King – the subject of no fewer than two U2 songs including *MLK* and *Pride (In the Name of Love)* – was tested on their 1987 North American tour. The tour opener was scheduled in Tempe, Arizona, and unbeknownst to the band, they were stepping right into political controversy. While reading a local Arizona newspaper, U2's guitarist Dave "the Edge" Evans discovered that the Doobie Brothers had recently cancelled an Arizona concert to protest Arizona governor Evan Mecham's decision rescinding the Martin Luther King Jr. state holiday. Evans was shocked and the rest of the band was appalled.⁸¹ U2 felt it was too late to cancel the three scheduled Arizona shows, and wanted to use the concerts to publicize the controversy. U2 immediately released a statement which they also read to their Arizona audiences: "We were outraged when we arrived in Arizona last weekend and discovered the climate created by Governor Meacham's rescission of the holiday honoring Dr. Martin Luther King Jr." Each sentence that Bono read from the statement was met with thunderous cheers and applause.⁸² U2 also donated an undisclosed sum to a Meacham recall committee, and called him an "embarrassment to the people of Arizona."⁸³ Meacham's press secretary Ron Bellus responded by accusing the band of meddling in Arizona politics and tried to defuse the

⁸¹ Robert Palmer, "U2 Starts National Tour on a Political Note," *New York Times*, 4 April 1987.

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Robert Hilburn, "U2 Shows Grace Under Pressure at Tour Opener," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 April 1987.

controversy by calling it a legal-technical matter.⁸⁴ Regardless, U2's complaints did not sway the governor, as Arizona's Martin Luther King Holiday was not implemented until a 1992 statewide ballot initiative was passed.⁸⁵

The late 80s and early 90s were a quiet time for both Bono and U2, with the exception of a 1989 German trip to join the Berlin Wall festivities. This quietude was spurred by U2's first major brush with negative criticism when their 1988 album *Rattle and Hum* was "savaged by the press," and U2 jokes began to circulate the music industry.⁸⁶ The band was reacting to press reports about conceited artistic explanations for *Rattle and Hum*'s roots-inspired content, so the band intentionally spent the next year out of the public eye.⁸⁷ 1991 saw Bono and U2 return to the public realm both as musicians and activists. U2 released their seventh studio album in 1992, the critically acclaimed *Achtung Baby*. They also returned to political activism when U2 offered to pay a £500 (Irish) fine for the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA), which the organization received for illegally selling condoms at a Dublin Virgin Records store.⁸⁸ U2's payment provided the IFPA with some "much-needed publicity," and the band explained its actions in a press release: "...we feel the IFPA have much more important things to be doing than turning up in court.

⁸⁴ Bellus Quoted in Palmer, 1987.

⁸⁵ Nicholas O. Alozie, "Political Intolerance Hypotheses and White Opposition to a Martin Luther King Holiday in Arizona," *Social Science Journal*, 1995, 32 (1), 1-15.

⁸⁶ Flanagan 1995, 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 4-5.

⁸⁸ Jackson, 2001, 111.

Furthermore, the group fully supports the IFPA's call for condom law in Ireland to be changed."⁸⁹

These last two episodes highlight U2 and Bono's growing political sophistication. Whereby U2's early social and political involvement involved the use of their music, such as using the stage as a protest platform, the IFPA incident was U2's first political outlet that did not use their music, but instead involved a financial contribution and a coordinating press release. This simple political act may have set the stage for their boldest political move yet.

⁸⁹ Press Release quoted in Wall, 2005, 235.

7. Sellafield Greenpeace Incident

1992 was politically a landmark year for Bono and U2, as they pulled off a risky Greenpeace activism stunt, and made an important political contact in American presidential candidate Bill Clinton. The Greenpeace maneuver was a response to the English government's Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at the Sellafield Nuclear Processing Plant, which was located just across the Irish Sea from Ireland. The expanded collection point for deadly waste would "substantially increase the radioactive pollution of the Irish Sea and the nearby countryside" at what Greenpeace already considered one of the most dangerous plutonium plants in the world, and had already created a Sellafield leukemia rate that was three times the national average.⁹⁰

The English activist group Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE) initially planned a protest rally on land near the plant, which was owned by parent company British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). CORE was also working with Greenpeace, who pitched the idea of a U2 performance at the protest. When U2 officially accepted and were added to the bill, the size of the expected crowd inflated to 20,000. The original agreement permitted only a few hundred people.⁹¹ BNFL learned of the new protest plan and panicked – they withdrew the protest permit and cited concerns about public safety, order,

⁹⁰ Jackson, 2001, 119 and Flanagan, 1995, 68-69.

⁹¹ Jackson, 2001, 120.

and health.⁹² Greenpeace and CORE responded by taking the order to an English High Court in London, which upheld BNFL's injunction.

The activist network remained undeterred and rescheduled the U2 protest performance to a nearby Manchester, England arena, and added Public Enemy, B.A.D. II, and Kraftwerk to the set. The bands played to a sell-out crowd of 10,000, and Bono taunted the English authorities from stage:

They've cancelled a peaceful demonstration on the grounds of public safety! These people are responsible for the death of innocent children, for God's sake! Public safety doesn't come anywhere near them! Don't let them gag you! We only live 130 miles from Sellafield. So do you in Manchester. It's a lot further to Number Ten Downing Street!

The protest gig was no different than many of Bono and U2's past political performances, except for what happened next. Immediately after their Manchester concert, Bono and U2 boarded a bus that transported them to the Greenpeace ship *Solo*, where they rendezvoused with other activists and were ferried to a beach not owned by BNFL and located directly opposite the Sellafield nuclear plant.⁹³ The plan was hatched by both U2 and Greenpeace; a sleuth mission that involved boarding dinghies and floating to the beach at high tide, where the activists then calmly walked on shore and deposited several barrels of radioactive sand from the Irish coast that was presumably radiated by the Sellafield plant. The protesters brought giant posters that read 'No Freedom of Speech Beyond This Point' and 'Warning!

⁹² Ibid, 121.

⁹³ Ibid, 124.

Radioactive Facility Sellafield.⁹⁴ The Press Corps were also waiting and took pictures of U2 in their full-body anti-radiation suits – photos that looked like U2 on Mars.

Jackson notes that the worldwide news coverage of the protest scored a triumph for Greenpeace and caused the nuclear industry some embarrassment.⁹⁵ Bono said: "I suppose it's a token gesture. We've given one day in a year. It's not much. [If it means] that people who were interested in the band then become focused on such important issues then it was worth it."⁹⁶ The protest maneuver was a first for Bono and U2, and demonstrated another step in their evolution from performing benefit concerts to becoming intimately involved with the issues. In addition, this evolution was strategic and did not occur accidentally. As U2's drummer Larry Mullen Jr. noted:

After we did the Amnesty International tour and Live Aid and a lot of benefit concerts, Bono and I sat down and talked about how we were going to approach the future. We came to the conclusion that maybe the best thing to do was leave Amnesty – continue to support them, obviously, but doing more concerts may be a mistake for now – let's do something for Greenpeace. We've donated to them for a long time, we've done gigs with them, but we've never actually been involved in an action. When this came up it was an opportunity.

U2's Sellafield stunt may have lathered the nuclear facility in bad publicity, but ultimately it did not stop BNFL from operating the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant. After the protest, Greenpeace and the Lancashire County Council united and petitioned for a

⁹⁴ Ibid, 124.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 125.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 126.

British High Court hearing on THORP, which delayed plant operations until 1994 when the High Court eventually ruled in favor of BNFL.⁹⁷ THORP was temporarily shut down several times over the following years for safety violations, and in August 2003 BNFL announced THORP would close permanently in 2010.⁹⁸ It is difficult to ascertain if the publicity garnered by U2 gave Greenpeace the exposure to get the High Court hearing. It is known that the Irish government lobbied for years against THORP, and the Clinton Administration warned the British government against approving THORP – and both of these diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful.⁹⁹ Considering the British government ignored Irish and American diplomatic pleas, it is unrealistic to conclude that a rock band deterred the Brits.

⁹⁷ *High Court Attempts to Block Thorp Plant Fails*, The Irish Times, 5 March 1994.

⁹⁸ *End of the Road is in Sight for Thorp Plant*, The Irish Times, 26 August 2003.

⁹⁹ Ibid and Colin Brown, "Peace Campaigners Join Fight Against Nuclear Site," *The Independent (London)*, 7 February 1994.

8. Schmoozing with Clinton

Soon after the Sellafeld stunt, Bono and U2 were back in the United States for the third leg of their *Zoo TV* tour in support of the *Achtung Baby* album. While appearing on the nationally syndicated radio program *Rockline*, "Bill from Little Rock" called to speak with U2.¹⁰⁰ It was August 1992, and the U.S. presidential race between Bill Clinton and George Bush was in its final weeks. Clinton and Bono first traded lighthearted quips during their *Rockline* conversation, but Clinton turned serious, and commended U2's efforts in the *Rock the Vote* campaign – a nonpartisan voter awareness campaign created by a music industry group designed to increase youth involvement in the political process. Bono told Clinton "that it was not his, nor U2's, intention to try and steer young voters in any specific direction," but then assured the future president that he certainly sounded presidential.¹⁰¹ Bono also "intelligently quizzed Bill Clinton on a range of political issues," offering a glimpse of Bono's future interactions with world leaders. Bono was also walking the nonpartisanship line, a hallmark of the Bono-model.

Only two weeks later, U2 and Bill Clinton were unexpectedly bunking at the same Chicago Ritz-Carlton Hotel, which resulted in an early morning breakfast rendezvous. Their discussions ranged from the general corruption of the system to U.S. visa policy for the Irish, and ended with Clinton inviting U2 to play at the presidential inauguration.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Flanagan, 1995, 95.

¹⁰¹ Jackson, 2001, 129.

¹⁰² Flanagan, 1995, 98-99.

Incumbent George Bush used the U2 meeting as a political dagger, and chided Clinton's foreign policy inexperience, claiming that Clinton was in "Hollywood seeking foreign policy advice from the rock grop [sic] U2".¹⁰³ Bush further noted (emphasis added to illustrate Bush's pun):

I have nothing against U2. You may not know this, but they try to call me every night during the concert! But the next time we face a foreign policy crisis, I will work with John Major and Boris Yeltsin, and Bill Clinton can consult with Boy George! ...if Clinton is elected *you, too*, will have higher inflation, *you, too*, will have higher taxes. *You, too! You, too!*¹⁰⁴

Bono was confused about Bush's apparent misunderstanding over the personal identity of the U2 front man. Boy George Bono was not, but Bush's comment may have been payback for Bono's nightly phone calls that the rock star had been making during U2 concerts. Bono would repeatedly phoned the White House from stage during U2's *Zoo TV* tour, but operators never connected him with the President. Bush was not the only world leader Bono harassed from stage, as he also called German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during U2 German performances, and the Pope during Italian performances.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the Bono/George Bush verbal feud is stunningly ironic considering that one decade later George Bush's son, George W. Bush, would directly consult with Bono on African foreign policy issues as President of the United States, the result of a persistent lobbying effort by Bono and his think tank/lobbying firm DATA.

¹⁰³ George Bush quoted in Flanagan, 1995, 99.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Flanagan, 1995, 267, 279.

Bill Clinton was elected in November 1992 and promptly invited Bono and U2 to the January 1993 inauguration. U2 didn't feel comfortable accepting a band invitation to the gala, so only drummer Larry Mullen Jr. and bassist Adam Clayton attended, while Bono watched it on TV. Bono was hoping to hear excerpts from a letter he had sent Clinton that urged the newly elected president to make a speech of expiation.¹⁰⁶ Clinton aides had mentioned that the president "had loved the letter and might want to quote from it," but Bono's words were not used.¹⁰⁷

Bill Clinton met Ireland's Prime Minister Albert Reynolds at the inauguration, and confided in the Taoiseach that U2 played a big part in getting him elected, a comment which later startled Bono.¹⁰⁸ U2 had not been this close to a politician since the Garret FitzGerald episode in Ireland more than a decade earlier. U2 was once again being hailed as instrumental in a political election, and this time it wasn't even in their own country. Drummer Larry Mullen Jr. discussed his ambiguous feelings about U2's pro-Clinton stance and constant mockery of incumbent George Bush:¹⁰⁹

I wasn't sure if it [the election] was something we should be involved with. There were differing opinions in the band about being involved at all, about using George Bush. I was a little concerned about that. I'm naturally cautious. I'm still unsure whether it was the right thing to do. I enjoyed the ride - it was very interesting to see it from a different perspective. Meeting Bill Clinton was good. He came across like

¹⁰⁶ Presumably for the sins of America's past social injustices.

¹⁰⁷ Flanagan, 1995, 166.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 172-3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 167.

he still comes across. He seems to be an all right guy. But I'm not living in America. I don't have to live under his administration's policies. That's why I was worried about it. We don't live here. Are we endorsing him? What exactly are we doing? And the truth is – it was an ambiguous gesture. We weren't officially endorsing him and yet on the other hand we were saying, 'yeah, he's all right.'

These ambiguous feelings by Mullen Jr. may help explain why in the coming years Bono would become more politically involved on an individual level, predominantly using his own celebrity status instead of that of his band U2.

1992 also provided Bono what was possibly his most important political contact when he met JFK's sister Eunice Shriver Kennedy in March. Bono was ecstatic by the meeting with whom he calls "the most extraordinary woman in the world."¹¹⁰ During Bono's Jubilee 2000 Campaign involvement he decided to go straight to the decision-makers or "at the very least the people who knew the decision makers." This led Bono to call Kennedy – which according to Bono was the best phone call he ever made. Kennedy promptly connected him with her son Bobby Shriver, a record producer and ally of fellow U2 music industry friends Jimmy Iovine and Ted Fields. Shriver also happened to be a noted Democratic power broker and brother-in-law of celebrity-cum-California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Flanagan, 1995, 64 and Assayas, 2005, 89.

¹¹¹ Flanagan, 1995, 64 and Assayas, 2005, 89.

9. Satellite Sarajevo

May 1993 marked the beginning of the U2's second European leg of the *Zoo TV* tour, newly renamed *Zooropa* to reflect the title of their latest album, which had they recorded between tour legs.¹¹² U2 also started funding Bosnian relief efforts in the war-torn former Yugoslavian state, both for humanitarian reasons and to bring publicity to the situation.¹¹³ The Sarajevo-focused Bosnian-Serb War had exploded a year earlier, and in May 1993 Europe rejected U.S. efforts to intervene with NATO. This exasperated the already desperate conflict, which was characterized by daily fighting and atrocities on all sides.¹¹⁴ U2 received a July fax from a Bosnian television station, Radio Televizija Bosne I Hercegovina, which requested an interview during a tour stop in Verona, Italy. Due to Serbian travel restrictions placed upon the Bosnians, their foreign associate Bill Carter would be sent.¹¹⁵ Carter was an aspiring American filmmaker who landed in Sarajevo when he volunteered for a relief mission, and decided to stay and make a documentary about the war.

The Verona interview with Carter went as planned, and afterwards the filmmaker asked Bono to visit Sarajevo. Bono's response was hesitant: "I think I would... I'd love to go there."¹¹⁶ Bono initially convinced the entire band to make the Sarajevo trip and play in

¹¹² Jackson, 2001, 136 and Wall, 2005, 187.

¹¹³ Taken from conversation with U2 bassist Adam Clayton in Flanagan, 1995, 201.

¹¹⁴ Flanagan, 1995, 285.

¹¹⁵ Flanagan, 1995, 277.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 278.

the bunker where Bill Carter and his Bosnian friends hid and kept the music cranked to drown out the sounds of the war. Bono explained his rationale: "Even if all we get is some extra attention for Bosnia on MTV, that's something."¹¹⁷ The Sarajevo concert idea created a debate within U2 management regarding the wisdom of Bono's latest idea. U2 manager Paul McGuinness thought the idea was foolhardy and vain. He explained that U2 had previously decided that "the duty of the artist is to illustrate contradictions and to point a finger at things that are wrong and terrible without the responsibility of having to resolve them." He further noted: "U2's effort to discuss any humanitarian issue have sometimes been accompanied by a false instinct that U2 is also obliged to resolve that issue. Going to Sarajevo seems to me to fall into that category. I think it would endanger the people we go with, endanger the tour, and endanger the band. I think it's grandstanding."¹¹⁸ McGuinness' statement concerning the duty of the artist is clearly different from Bono's current view in his position as an African activist.

Regardless of McGuinness' feelings, Bono was still resolute about Sarajevo until he received a fax from Bill Carter requesting otherwise. It seems that Carter shared some of McGuinness' concerns, noting that U2 would not only endanger their own lives, but the lives of the people of Sarajevo, as they would have to publicly congregate at the U2 show. Carter instead requested that U2 link with Sarajevo via satellite feed each night on the *Zoo TV* tour, so the rock n' roll audience would witness "the insanity, the surrealness, the survival" that was occurring in Bosnia. Carter's fax continued: "The audience if anything would realize,

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 287.

¹¹⁸ McGuinness in a conversation with Bill Flanagan in Flanagan, 1995, 294.

Jesus, lucky I'm here enjoying this concert and not in Sarajevo. Maybe they will think about not letting it happen in their country, their city, their house..."¹¹⁹

U2 agreed to air the Bosnian satellite feeds, the first of which was set for a July 17 show in Bologna, Italy. U2's management company Principle helped Bill Carter pay the European Broadcast Union (EBU) for the use of their satellite feeds, a deal in which Principle made payments to the satellite pool covering the war. In order for Carter to connect the EBU feeds, he and two Bosnian friends had to sneak through the dangerous Sarajevo night for the relative safety of the EBU building – a journey which required passing through an area dubbed Sniper's Alley. Once safe at EBU, Carter and company had to operate under the cover of darkness, as light would attract bombings.¹²⁰ Carter made this arduous journey over ten times throughout the next month, broadcasting nightly to unsuspecting European audiences.

The satellite broadcasts were different each night, but always featured Carter communicating the desperation that characterized the Bosnian situation. Carter brought Sarajevo citizens from all sides of the conflict that told of the organized rape and systematic torture that was occurring.¹²¹ The live confessions were difficult and uncomfortable for both U2 and their audience. As one British press review reported, "the sudden switch from

¹¹⁹ Flanagan, 1995, 300.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 302-304.

¹²¹ Jackson, 2001, 139.

deafening rock to beleaguered Bosnians is genuinely shocking."¹²² Bono confided that the broadcasts were the most excruciating thing U2 has ever been through.¹²³

U2 ended the Sarajevo broadcasts in August 1993 partially because "by coincidence or indirect effect, Sarajevo [had] gone from being virtually unmentioned in the press three weeks earlier to dominating the front pages of the British papers every day."¹²⁴ The increased British press did not correlate with the U2 broadcasts though. A LexisNexis 1993 news search for the terms *Bosnia*, *Sarajevo* and *War* in the four leading British newspapers (*The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times*) returned 657 articles, 271 or 41% of which were published before U2's first Sarajevo satellite connection with Bill Carter on July 17, 1993.¹²⁵ This would support Jackson's notion that the British media was already extensively covering the conflict when U2 started the Sarajevo broadcasts.¹²⁶ But there is no doubt that U2 helped expose the desperation of the Bosnian situation to its fans and perhaps indirectly to the British public.

Bono eventually went to Sarajevo in December 1995 when the Bosnian conflict was ending. He went as a guest of the Bosnian government, arriving with his wife Ali on a United Nations aid flight. Bono held a press conference upon arrival, which provoked a stampede of various media outlets. Accompanied by Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohammed Sacirbey, Bono "expressed his respect and admiration for the enduring courage of

¹²² Ben Thompson, "The Medium and the Message," *The Independent (London)*, 15 August 2003.

¹²³ Bono to Bill Flanagan in Flanagan, 1995, 307.

¹²⁴ Flanagan, 1995, 307.

¹²⁵ LexisNexis™ is a leading academic research and information provider.

¹²⁶ Jackson, 2001, 139.

Sarajevo's people."¹²⁷ U2 eventually performed in the war-torn Bosnian capital at the Kosovo Olympic Stadium in September 1997, and were greeted by another politician, Bosnia and Herzegovina president Alija Izetbegovic. U2 posters that advertised the gig were hung over weathered pictures of indicted war criminal and former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. U2 donated the proceeds from the Sarajevo concert to a local hospital rebuilding program.¹²⁸

U2 also used the 1993 *Zooropa* leg of the *Zoo TV tour* to surprise the world. Bono placed a phone call to author in-hiding Salman Rushdie at a London Wembley Stadium concert. Rushdie had written the controversial 1987 novel *The Satanic Verses*, which resulted in a fatwa, or an Islamic death sentence, placed upon him by the Ayatollah Khomeini.¹²⁹ Salman answered Bono's phone call, and then shocked the audience when he walked out and joined U2 onstage – his first public appearance since the fatwa was proclaimed five years earlier. Several Muslim countries were upset by U2's affiliation with the author, and several Islamic radio stations cancelled a planned broadcast of an upcoming U2 concert.¹³⁰ The episode also unleashed a tirade of bad press for the band, which accused U2 of exploiting the author's situation. Rushdie countered noting that:

...in a way [I was] exploiting their global audience, to get people to pay attention to another kind of important message... We live in an age when people want to reinvent a whole bunch of demarcation lines and say 'If you're a rock band don't

¹²⁷ Ibid, 151.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 162-3.

¹²⁹ Flanagan, 1995, 308.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 327.

step across the line into news coverage.' I haven't responded to a rock group as strongly as this for a very long time, because I think people have been so cautious. And here's a rock group taking a fantastic risk of itself. I like it when people go over the edge and invite you to go with them. In this case, people have.

10. Irish Politics Revisited

In 1994 Bono returned to addressing Irish politics through music when he collaborated with fellow Irish musician Christy Moore on the Irish anthem *North and South of the River*, which expressed “regret for the past and hope for a reconciliation.”¹³¹ Four years later Bono and U2 would find themselves in the middle of the historic Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), which was intended to unite the differing political opinions in Ireland and usher an era of lasting peace by creating a power-sharing executive of unionists and nationalists.¹³² The agreement would only be ratified if the Irish public voted for a joint referendum found on ballots in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Jackson notes that in the weeks before the vote opinion polls showed that public support for the peace deal might be faltering.¹³³ Looking for ways to garner votes, campaign worker Tim Attwood of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) proposed the idea of organizing a free concert for peace. Attwood was aware of the long-standing friendship between SDLP leader John Hume and Bono, and used the Hume connection to request a last minute performance from the band. U2 did not hesitate to accept despite the short notice,

¹³¹ Jackson, 2001, 146.

¹³² Ibid, 173.

¹³³ 2003, 174; This claim can be debated as an *Irish Times/Market Research Bureau of Ireland (MRBI)* poll published one week before the vote on May 15, 1998, shows 72% of the Irish Republic planned to vote for the Belfast Agreement, while the number of opposition voters had dropped to 5%, which was down from 20% four weeks earlier. The number of undecided voters was 23%. The poll did reveal that only 55% of potential voters, a 2% decrease from four weeks previous, believe ‘the agreement offers a strong chance of lasting peace’. Taken from Geraldine Kennedy, "Accord Support Growing but Optimism Slips - Large Majority in Republic to Vote Yes but Electorate Less Hopeful of Peace," *The Irish Times*, 15 May 1998, 6.

and the concert was hurriedly scheduled for the next day, on May 19, at Belfast's Waterfront Hall. U2 were still very cognizant of their past reputation as a protest band, and had been careful not to lend their influence to extraneous issues, but the Irish peace concert was an exception, and an obvious cause for the Irish band to promote. Guitarist Dave "the Edge" Evans mentioned his concern with the danger of U2 "being overwhelmingly associated with benefit gigs, to the detriment of the career as a rock band," and not wanting U2 "to be viewed as the 'Batman and Robin' of the rock scene."¹³⁴

As expected, the Irish peace concert brought a flood of media interest in the event. Seeking to capitalize on the newfound publicity, campaigners requested Irish political rivals who represented both sides of the conflict – John Hume and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble – make a joint appearance at the gig. A press conference was held before the concert that included Bono, the Edge, rock band Ash's lead singer Tim Wheeler (the Northern Ireland band also played the concert, a symbolic gesture that featured two united bands from each side of the border), and politicians John Hume and David Trimble. Bono pled with voters, and urged them to vote for the referendum. The rival politicians also appeared onstage during with U2, where Bono lifted David Trimble's left arm and John Hume's right arm in a salute.¹³⁵ The pair then shook hands, which led to a standing ovation from the crowd. Both politicians gave brief speeches, as David Trimble pled with the Irish

¹³⁴ Jackson, 2001, 159.

¹³⁵ Jackson, 2001, 176.

to be an optimistic and forward-looking people, and John Hume asked them to vote for their children, grandchildren, and future generations.¹³⁶

The referendum was held Friday, May 22, 1998 and the Belfast Agreement passed in a landslide with votes of 94% in the Irish Republic and 71% in Northern Ireland. The referendum did not end the peace process however. As Jackson notes: "Three years later the relevant parties were still trying to make it work. But the Peace gig came to be seen as one of the critical moves made in the closing stages of electioneering, and U2 had been proud to play a small, but vital, part in the process."¹³⁷ Bono himself remembers:¹³⁸

...I [had] the greatest honor of my life in Ireland when U2 played in support of the Good Friday Peace Agreement in the Waterfront Hall in Belfast in 1998. We got John Hume and David Trimble, the two opposing leaders in the conflict, to shake hands onstage in front of U2 and Ash audiences. People tell me that rock concert and that staged photograph pushed the people into ratifying the peace agreement. I'd like to think that's true.

Garret FitzGerald, former Irish Taoiseach and Bono-buddy remembers:¹³⁹

When Bono brought out John Hume and David Trimble together it was very striking. That was a very dramatic moment. But Bono has that strong commitment to issues in Northern Ireland and to other issues more globally. And he has used his considerable influence, derived from his popularity, very constructively.

¹³⁶ Hume and Trimble quoted in Suzanne Breen, "Bono's Unusual Support Act -Unlikely Rockers Shake on it at 'Good but Weird' Belfast Billovation," *The Irish Times*, 20 May 1998, 1.

¹³⁷ Jackson, 2001, 176.

¹³⁸ Bono in interview with Michka Assayas; Assayas, 2005, 172-3.

¹³⁹ Fitzgerald in interview with Laura Jackson; Jackson, 2001, 176.

FitzGerald mentions several characteristics that have become part of the Bono-model, namely a sustained commitment to humanitarian and political issues from Bono, which was initially afforded through his celebrity or as FitzGerald notes, his popularity, and has given Bono the platform from which to exercise his considerable influence.

As previously mentioned, 1998 also marked Bono's first return to Africa since his 1985 Ethiopian visit. The occasion was a March 16 U2 concert in Cape Town, South Africa at the Green Point Stadium during the *Pop Mart* tour. While in Africa, Bono met with anti-Apartheid activist and Noble Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was then the Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa. The Committee allowed people freedom from prosecution if they admitted to their crimes under Apartheid, "...whatever crimes were committed." Bono explained, "Archbishop Tutu felt the country needed to come clean if it was going to go forward, that it needed to repent, and maybe prosecution is not as important as that."¹⁴⁰ He further discussed the philosophy backing the Committee: "sometimes truth is more important than justice." Archbishop Tutu remembers the meeting with U2 and confessed, "one has to be very, very impressed with their social consciousness. They were strongly aware of the anti-apartheid struggles, which they supported and this is something that thrilled us."¹⁴¹ Bono's return to Africa was a harbinger of the near future, when in 1999, through the Jubilee 2000 campaign; he began devoting an increased amount of his energies to Africa's political and social ills.

¹⁴⁰ Bono in interview with Michka Assayas; Assayas, 2005, 271-2.

¹⁴¹ Archbishop Desmond Tutu in interview with Laura Jackson; Jackson, 2001, 171.

This section has sought to illustrate that Bono, both individually and through his rock band U2, has been actively engaged in various political and social causes throughout the first years of his celebrity career. Even early in his career, Bono had eclipsed most other celebrity political efforts, but had not yet fully developed his unique approach. In addition, an evolution in strategy occurred, whereby in the earlier years of U2, Bono and the band would seemingly lend their platform to any worthy cause. As U2's popularity grew, it became obvious that a more selective approach would be necessary when supporting various causes. The band also realized that benefit concerts were not always the best strategy to address issues, which led to their publicity stunt with Greenpeace.

These efforts helped create Bono's humanitarian reputation and legitimized his status as a politically aware and capable celebrity, which brought the Jubilee 2000 campaign to his doorstep. In addition, Bono and U2 have always been careful to support nonpartisanship by avoiding outright endorsements of any particular political parties, although this has not stopped politicians from seeking them. It is also clear through Bono's interactions with Garret FitzGerald and Bill Clinton that he is generally well-liked by politicians, which probably results from his charisma. Finally, by reflecting on the events that have been discussed in this section, one can almost feel the world getting smaller through headways in technology and communication as evidenced by the first mega-concert *Live Aid*, the Berlin Wall coming down, and through U2's satellite feeds of the Bosnian war. As will be seen, these technological advancements are some of the same factors that have helped advance the

role of transnational civil society in the world, which has been an essential component of Bono's African efforts.

Section III

ARRIVAL

What is going on in Africa defies all concepts that we hold to be true: our concept of neighbor, our concept of civilization, our concept of equality, of love...

- Bono in Interview with Michka Assayas (2005, 189)

A prominent head of state said to me if we really believed these people in the developing world were equal, there is no way we would allow 3,000 Africans, mostly children, to die everyday from mosquito bites while we have the medicines and technologies that could save their lives. It's as absurd as separate drinking fountains for blacks in the 1950s. It's racism disguised by distance. Our audience agrees with us, and history will, too.

*- Bono in Interview with Jann Wenner of Rolling Stone,
'The Rolling Stone Interview' (2005, 62)*

Section Three will analyze Bono's political involvement as an activist for the African continent from the late 1990s through 2005. The primary purpose of this section is to highlight Bono's success as an activist through his political achievements. These achievements are typified by measurable political actions such as a policy change or political commitments, but also include Bono's role in the abstract political formulation of agenda setting, whereby he has helped place the issues both in the public consciousness and on to the political agenda. It will become clear that Bono has indeed surpassed previous celebrity political efforts. Section Three also exhibits the eventual arrival Bono's evolved approach, or the Bono-model, and explores its characteristics as embodied through the last

steps in his activist evolution. The first step of this evolution was presented in section one. Section Three examines the next steps, which has included an intense political lobbying campaign followed by the eventual formation of a policy think tank and lobbying firm, and lastly featured the founding of a grassroots political organization that is affiliated with a transnational anti-poverty coalition. These methods contrast with his earlier approaches whereby protest-oriented songs, benefit concerts, public pronouncements, and minor political involvement – not actual political lobbying – were used as political ammunition.¹⁴²

The story of Bono's ascent from socially conscious rock star to international political lobbyist is a fascinating tale that includes politicians, businessmen, academics, and clergy at the highest levels of power in the world. Bono has consistently befriended these power brokers with his charisma, but more importantly, has impressed them with his knowledge of the issues. Bono has also been extremely adept at coalition building, which has been vital to his political success. This is characterized by a deliberate strategy of nonpartisanship that includes conservative groups including Evangelical Christians and Republican politicians – groups with whom a left-leaning rock star does not normally associate. It will be seen that these groups have been deliberately targeted and drawn in to a vast transnational alliance of anti-poverty advocates during an era that has seen the relative political power of transnational civil society increase. This relative increase in political power of transnational

¹⁴² R. Serge Denisoff notes in *Sing a Song of Social Significance*, Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1983, viii, that "Protest songs basically stress the lyric or intellectual aspect of song by attempting to convince the listener that something is wrong and need of alteration." Denisoff also includes a brief discussion of (1983, 19) a noted early passage surrounding the power of music in Plato's *First Republic* that calls for musical censorship in the name of the Republic: "any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole state and ought to be prohibited." Denisoff explains that this fear of music "was echoed" throughout history by no less than noble lords, clerics, politicians, priests, ministers and English monarchs.

civil society has been the outside structural force that complimented Bono's own efforts and abilities.

11. Jubilee 2000

In 1996, two International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, enacted the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.¹⁴³ The HIPC initiative intended to address the excessive external debt that was incurred by dozens of lower and middle income, or poor, countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s when the IMF, the World Bank, and numerous private creditors loaned them billions of dollars. Sixty percent of this debt is now legally considered odious or unjust.¹⁴⁴ These loans included political payoffs to corrupt dictators during the Cold War era to keep them aligned with the West and were usually void of accountability.¹⁴⁵ Former World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President Joseph E. Stiglitz discussed the unjust nature of this debt: "The issue of the moral responsibility of the creditors was particularly apparent in the case of cold war loans." Stiglitz cites the case of Congo's notorious ruler Mobutu, who was lent monies by the IMF and the World Bank that the corrupt dictator subsequently stole. The incompetence of the IFI's lending policies did not end there. Some of the loans were tagged for IFI development projects that were poorly designed, or simply failed.¹⁴⁶ Sometimes IFI institutions stipulated loan contingencies in the form of social spending cutbacks, which

¹⁴³ Jeffrey, Sachs. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005, 34.

¹⁴⁴ Nancy Birdsall and John Williamson, *Delivering On Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture*. Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development and the Institute for International Economics, 2002, 58.

¹⁴⁵ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003, 244.

¹⁴⁶ C. Collins, Z. Gariyo and T. Burdon, *Jubilee 2000: Citizen Action Across the North-South Divide* Chap. in *Global Citizen Action*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 136-7.

when enacted caused political instability. In several instances loans were used to purchase military equipment that perpetuated ethnic conflicts, which killed innocents and disrupted economies.¹⁴⁷ Many times drought would ruin export commodities, or increasing energy costs would decimate IFI project profits, rendering countries unable to repay. All of these situations resulted in what has been called the debt crisis.¹⁴⁸

The debt crisis was realized by the IFIs as early as 1982 when Mexico threatened to default on its international debt – an issue that was first viewed by Western governments as a threat to the stability of the entire international financial system, with little regard to its impact within Mexico itself. It was soon realized by many in the international NGO community that loan repayment was unrealistic, as many countries were barely covering interest payments. This created a situation where several nations were spending more on loan repayments each year than on basic services for their citizens, such as education and health care. Sachs admonished the rich countries noting the debt issue should have been resolved years ago, and believes that "rich countries should have given the poorest countries grants rather than loans, so that the poor countries would have never been indebted in the first place."¹⁴⁹ Hardt and Negri see this debt system as a modern form of slavery calling it "a legal mechanism of enslavement..." and note, "it is applied not merely to the individual indentured worker or even to a specific racial group or indigenous population (where the

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, Elizabeth A. Donnelly, "Proclaiming Jubilee: The Debt and Structural Adjustment Network," in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkink, and James V. Riker. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 158.

¹⁴⁹ Sachs, 2005, 281.

assumption of a civilizing mission is the basis of debt) but rather to entire nations."¹⁵⁰ The 1992 UN Human Development Report was also critical in stating, "the World Bank and the IMF should be the buffer to protect developing countries, but their recent record shows that they have become institutions for recycling debt, not recycling resource."¹⁵¹

Early attempts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to address the growing problem were sporadic. By the late 1980s and due to increased NGO and church interest, national debt crisis networks were created to exchange information and coordinate efforts on the issue.¹⁵² In the early 1990s these networks reformed under new names and began to increasingly work together, as well as with other anti-debt groups within the debt-affected countries themselves. The Rethinking Bretton Woods IFI reform project was created in 1993 by the Jesuit-sponsored Center of Concern to correspond with the 50-year anniversary of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where both the IMF and the World Bank's predecessor, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, were created. In addition, the *Fifty Years is Enough* coalition was formed by thirty-three U.S. groups that had affiliates in twelve countries. *Fifty Years is Enough* sought three types of reform including *process reform* in the form of transparency and accountability, *policy reform* relating to debt and structural adjustment issues, and *project reform* which questioned projects types and the related decision-makers, as well as how local communities would be involved. Both

¹⁵⁰ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. *Multitude: War and Democracy in an Age of Empire*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004, 279.

¹⁵¹ Davison Budhoo, "IMF/World Bank Wreak Havoc on Third World." In *50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund*, ed. Kevin Danaher. Boston: South End Press, 1994, 22.

¹⁵² Donnelly, 2002, 159.

coalitions had overlapping membership albeit different styles, as the *Fifty Years is Enough* groups were more radical and confrontational in style, language, and strategy.¹⁵³ Each group had some success in creating dialogue with World Bank and IMF officials, as well as with members of the Clinton Administration.

By the mid-1990s, there were large coordinating debt relief bodies in virtually every region of the world. In the United States the groundswell of IFI-targeted NGO activity coalesced into the Multilateral Debt Coalition, which was coordinated and developed by Oxfam International, the Center of Concern, and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC). Europe was represented by the European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD), a Dutch founded coalition represented by sixteen NGOs from different European countries; which by the mid-1990s was corresponding with approximately sixty other NGOs from Europe, the United States, Canada, and the South.¹⁵⁴ The Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD) represented Latin America; Asia was represented by the Asian Campaign on Debt and Structural Adjustment and included over ninety organizations; and the African Network and Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) represented Africa.

The transformation from loose-knit debt networks to the transnational coalition Jubilee 2000 began in 1993 when Bill Peters, a debt campaigner and former British High Commissioner to Malawi as a member of Her Majesty's (HM) Diplomatic Service, had formed what was then just a small charity. Jubilee's name referenced the biblical

¹⁵³ Ibid, 160.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

injunctions about debt forgiveness, as suggested by Michael Schluter of the Cambridge (U.K.) Jubilee Centre.¹⁵⁵ By 1996, the Jubilee concept had resonated throughout the debt relief network, and the Jubilee 2000 U.K. campaign was launched. It was led by the overseas relief agencies of the Anglican and Catholic churches, and headed by Ann Pettifor, a seasoned and astute political organizer.¹⁵⁶ The Jubilee 2000 U.S. network was formed by leaders of the Religious Working Group and the Multilateral Debt Coalition in 1997, and was launched at the June 1997 G7 summit in Denver, Colorado. A Washington, D.C. office with two staff members was opened in spring 1998. By the end of 2000, there were fifty-seven national Jubilee 2000 networks around the world. Pettifor is quick to emphasize the informal nature and flat organizational structure of the Jubilee network, but noted the U.K. campaign's tendency to take the lead, even though it did not have "an explicit leadership role." Pettifor explained, "Jubilee 2000 is an informal international network. The British may be the oldest and the best funded but it is not the coordinating body. There is no coordinating body."¹⁵⁷

In 1995, Jubilee 2000 strategy partner Jamie Drummond (who later became Executive Director of DATA, Bono's think tank/lobbying firm), proposed the strategy of using celebrity musicians to publicize the young campaign. Drummond remembers: "I was

¹⁵⁵ Bill Peters, "The Third World Debt Crisis – Why a Radical Approach is Essential," *Round Table*, April 2000.

¹⁵⁶ Donnelly, 2002, 161.

¹⁵⁷ Fred Rosen, "Doing Battle Against the Debt," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, (xxxiii) 1, July/August 1999, 43.

going to try and basically persuade the music industry to support this young campaign."¹⁵⁸

Drummond further stated that Bono was one of the first people that came to his mind, noting his communication abilities and spiritual conviction. Drummond first attempted to contact Bono in 1997 and was unsuccessful, but with the help of the Universal Music Group's chief lawyer, Richard Constant, was able to "put the campaign firmly in front of Bono and to encourage him to support it."¹⁵⁹ Bono then unexpectedly phoned Drummond in 1998. Drummond remembers that Bono's involvement would eventually take "various different guises," but really took off in late 1998. Drummond's glowing comments about Bono, and the pursuit of his endorsement for Jubilee 2000, lends credence to the humanitarian reputation of the rock star.

Bono publicly began his campaign by penning a February 1999 op-ed in *The Guardian* newspaper entitled *World Debt Angers Me*, on the eve of the televised Brit Awards – the U.K. equivalent to the Grammy Awards. Bono's op-ed eloquently explained Jubilee 2000's position noting, "There's been a mix of bad lending, bad borrowing, bad economics and bad luck. Jubilee 2000 says, 'write off those unpayable debts in the year 2000, under an open, fair and transparent process. Put in place a new discipline for lending and borrowing to stop the debts building up again.' I'm with Jubilee 2000." Bono described Jubilee 2000 as a bipartisan, broad, and inclusive international organization.¹⁶⁰ This nod to nonpartisanship and coalition-building in Bono's first public pronouncement for Jubilee

¹⁵⁸ Drummond in Interview with Laura Jackson; Jackson, 2001, 180.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 181.

¹⁶⁰ Bono, "World Debt Angers Me," *The Guardian*, 16 February 1999.

2000 was not surprising considering his past hesitation to endorse political parties and/or candidates, but they were essential elements of his eventual political success.

Bono's op-ed also called on several world leaders to support the debt relief campaign, including U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown, Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and U.S. president Bill Clinton; and challenged them to "face the implications of their own script," and added, "a sense of occasion is everything." Bono compared the African debt crisis to post-World War II war-torn Germany in which the Allies forgave German war debts, and the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan helped rebuild their infrastructure. Bono claimed that the Marshall plan "saved the next generation of Germans from repeating the horrors of the 20s and 30s." Lastly Bono wrote that he believed politicians had the will, but would only find the way if there was "an extraordinary public outcry."¹⁶¹

The Brit Awards provided Bono with a live television audience that could generate some much needed publicity for Jubilee 2000, a timely gesture considering that he was being presented the Freddie Mercury Prize for outstanding charitable works that evening.¹⁶² Upon accepting the award, Bono leapt from stage and ran down to Mohammad Ali's seat in the first row, and gave it to the boxing legend. Bono then explained that he and Mohammad Ali were both representing Jubilee 2000, Ali as the international ambassador and Bono as the "most vocal public figurehead," and then promptly demanded Western governments to "cancel debt repayments by the new millennium."

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Wall, 2005, 251-2.

DATA executive director Jamie Drummond noted that Bono's surprise speech was not scripted into the show. Drummond maintains that the event "was a golden moment" because it placed Jubilee 2000 in the newspapers "in a way that we had not managed to do before." He further noted that Jubilee 2000 already had some minor coverage in the *Financial Times* and the *Guardian*, but explained the attention Bono brought the new campaign was crucial: "it was really the celebrity thing around the Brit awards in February which forced politicians to realize that they could not afford to ignore the post bag that was swelling with letters from people from all walks of life in the U.K. who were calling on Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Chancellor Gordon Brown to do more... And within a couple of days of the Brit awards, Gordon Brown announced the U.K. would cancel £50 million in debt at the forthcoming G8 summit."¹⁶³ London School of Economics Development Scholars Allen and Weinhold look back and call it Bono's "famous" speech.¹⁶⁴ Former Oxfam Media Spokesman Seth Amgott also spoke of the event's significance and said, "There seems to be a lot reason to believe it had an enormous influence really in changing the game."¹⁶⁵

U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown's statement came through a jointly penned letter with British Development Secretary Clare Short to World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn and IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, which urged them to back his

¹⁶³ Jamie Drummond in interview with Laura Jackson; Jackson, 2001, 182-3.

¹⁶⁴ Tim Allen and Diana Weinhold, "Dropping the Debt for the New Millennium: Is it Such a Good Idea?" *Journal of International Development*, 2000, 12, 858.

¹⁶⁵ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on December 9, 2005.

reforms around debt relief.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Brown presented the debt plan to his counterparts at the G7 finance summit in Bonn, Germany, held just days after the Brit Awards, where he proposed eliminating £50 million of debt from the world's poorest countries.¹⁶⁷ Brown claimed that Jubilee 2000 and its affiliated celebrities had a tremendous impact on public opinion around the world.¹⁶⁸ Jubilee 2000 director Ann Pettifor saw a direct correlation between Brown's actions and Bono's pleas when she observed, "The Chancellor is responding directly to Bono and Mohammed Ali and that's great news."¹⁶⁹ Adrian Lovett of international relief agency Oxfam, and one of the founders of Jubilee 2000 noted, "The decisive moment on debt was June 1999 at the G8 summit in Cologne where an extra £50 million was promised. It wasn't all down to Bono, of course, but it would have never happened without him."¹⁷⁰

There must have been a point when Bono realized his past activist tactics would be insufficient to achieve the goals of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Bono explained that Jubilee 2000 was slower to catch on in the U.S. as opposed to the U.K., and as a result he "had to go straight to the decision-makers, or at the very least the people who knew those decision makers."¹⁷¹ This notion is substantiated by Donnelly who explains, "Activists also found it difficult (more so in the United States than in Europe) to generate interest in a topic that is

¹⁶⁶ Andrew Garfield, "Chancellor Takes Stars' Debt Plea to G7 Summit," *The Independent (London)*, 20 February 1999.

¹⁶⁷ Charlotte Denny, "Chancellor Urges World Leaders to Write Off Loans to Poor Countries," *The Guardian*, 20 February 1999, 24.

¹⁶⁸ Gordon Brown quoted in Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ann Pettifor quoted in Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Sean O'Hagan, "The Observer Profile: Bono," *The Observer*, 26 September 2004, 27.

¹⁷¹ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 89.

both severely under-covered by the media and portrayed as having been resolved."¹⁷²

Following the advice of friend Eunice Shriver Kennedy, Bono called her son Bobby Shriver, whom Bono explained, "immediately put the family filofax to work for me." Shriver provided more than just contacts, as he often accompanied Bono to the appointments. Through Shriver Bono also met Arnold Schwarzenegger, Shriver's brother-in-law, Governor of California, and celebrity actor, who in-turn provided the connection to Ohio Republican Representative John Kasich. Kasich would become "an important guide through the Republican side of Congress."¹⁷³

On Shriver's advice Bono also went "back to school," and in meetings set up by Shriver, he met World Bank head James Wolfensohn, ex-Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker, David Rockefeller, and Harvard economist and poverty specialist Jeffery Sachs, who was also an economic advisor to Jubilee 2000.¹⁷⁴ Bono realized the importance of this education for lobbying purposes: "[I needed to] know what I was talking about before I went up to Capitol Hill to lobby on behalf of Jubilee 2000 for the cancellation of the LDC's [least developed countries] debt to the rich countries of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] as a part of the millennium celebrations."¹⁷⁵ Bono speaks glowingly of his education and his mentor Jeffery Sachs noting, "I would enter the world of acronyms with a man who can make alphabet soup out of them. Soup you'd want to eat.

¹⁷² In Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, "From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics," in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkink, and James V. Riker. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 175.

¹⁷³ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 89.

¹⁷⁴ James Traub, 2005.

¹⁷⁵ Quotes taken from Bono's forward in Sachs, 2005, xv.

Soup that would, if ingested properly, enable a lot more soup to be eaten by a lot more people." Sachs is just as effusive about his student Bono calling him "an outstandingly capable interlocutor" and a gifted leader.¹⁷⁶ Bono's decision to go "back to school" was perhaps his most crucial. As will be seen, charisma can only get celebrities so far – Bono has proven that expertise and issue-knowledge are both imperative for successful celebrity activism.

Bono even sought out potential critics because he "wanted to get to know the people who might oppose the idea" and admits that he's "always attentive to the bearers of bad news, because they're a little more reliable."¹⁷⁷ Les Gelb from the U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) offered to help Bono create a list of potential ideological foes. Gelb's advice to the rock star mirrored Bono's philosophy: "I'm not going to give you the names of people that can help you – I'm going to give you the 30 names of people who can block you."¹⁷⁸

Conservative Harvard economist Robert J. Barro was one of the first debt relief critics with whom Bono met. Barro forthrightly told Bono that he was "an unlikely candidate to support Jubilee 2000" and advised the rock star to pursue more leftist economists.¹⁷⁹ Bono didn't flinch, explaining to Barro that was "precisely why he wanted to talk." Barro recalls, "He wanted to see whether hard-thinking conservative economists could

¹⁷⁶ Sachs quoted in Lisa McLaughlin, "Can Rock n' Roll Save the World?" *Time Europe* (17 December 2001) 158, no. 25, 52-3 and in Sachs, 2005, xii.

¹⁷⁷ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 91 and James Traub, 2005.

¹⁷⁸ Madeline Bunting, "We Have to Make Africa an Adventure." *The Guardian*, 16 June 2005.

¹⁷⁹ Robert J. Barro, "My Luncheon with Bono," *Business Week* (12 July 1999), 3637, 22.

be convinced of the soundness of the campaign." Barro listened and was shocked to hear the rock star's intelligent arguments. Nevertheless, Barro was not "persuaded to put debt relief on the Top 10 list of growth-promoting policies for poor countries." Barro did concede that Bono's arguments were better than anticipated, and offered "two restrained cheers for Jubilee 2000."¹⁸⁰ This may have been the first instance in which someone was surprised and impressed by Bono's issue-knowledge about the debt relief campaign – a reaction that would soon be echoed by many politicians.

Bono also contacted Presidential pal Bill Clinton, and procured a summer 1999 Oval Office meeting. Clinton had already agreed in principle to cancel two-thirds of African poor-country debt owed to the United States through the World Bank's HIPC initiative.¹⁸¹ Bono pitched the Jubilee 2000 debt relief idea to Clinton, who said that he was already supporting the HIPC initiative.¹⁸² Bono told the President that the HIPC initiative "wasn't going far enough or quick enough." Bono pled that the millennium "was the hook to hang this on and to getting the Bretton Woods people... farther down the road." Bono left the Clinton meeting feeling that the president was interested and supportive, and the two kept up their correspondence through letters and phone calls.

Bono recalls that Clinton was somewhat hesitant because his Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin was not a fan of debt cancellation.¹⁸³ Rubin incidentally resigned his Treasury Secretary post on July 2, 1999 – only weeks after the Bono-Clinton meeting. Fortunately for

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ James Traub, 2005.

¹⁸² Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 230.

¹⁸³ Ibid .

the campaign, Rubin's successor Lawrence Summers became a major proponent of debt relief, and Bono's next lobbying target. Clinton recalled the first time Summers met Bono: "I'll never forget one day during my Administration, Secretary Summers comes into my office and says, 'You know, some guy just came in to see me in jeans and a T-shirt, and he just had one name, but he sure was smart. Do you know anything about him?'"¹⁸⁴ Summers also remembers his first encounter with Bono, when he had agreed to visit a Bono lobbying session with Summers' Chief of Staff Sheryl Sandberg and Clinton's Chief Economic Advisor Gene Sperling. *The New York Times* reported that Summers "tried to give Bono the polite brushoff," and in understated belittlement noted, "These are complicated issues. I'll have to take it up with the G7 finance ministers."¹⁸⁵ Bono was not swayed and rejoined, "You know what, I've been all over the world, and I've talked to all the major players, and everyone said, 'If you get Larry Summers, you can get this done.'" Sheryl Sandberg recalled the interchange, "It was a really important moment. I think we were all inspired and motivated."¹⁸⁶ Bono's combination of charisma and issue-knowledge once again prevailed.

In June 1999, Jubilee 2000 organized peaceful protests in 35 countries to coincide with the G7 summit in Cologne, Germany.¹⁸⁷ The largest gathering occurred the week before the summit in London where 50,000 Jubilee 2000 supporters formed a three-mile

¹⁸⁴ Josh Tyrangiel and Benjamin Nugent, "Bono," *Time*, (4 March 2002), 159, no. 9, 62-8.

¹⁸⁵ James Traub, 2005.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*/

¹⁸⁷ Fred Rosen, "Doing Battle Against the Debt", *NACLA Report on the Americas*, (xxxiii) 1, July/August 1999, 43.

human chain.¹⁸⁸ Bono and former Live Aid promoter Bob Geldof joined the human chain with 35,000 protestors in Cologne during the summit, and afterwards presented a worldwide debt relief petition to summit host German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Bono and Geldof also used the occasion to connect with U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. While still in Cologne, the G7 leaders announced an unprecedented debt relief package that would forgive \$60 billion in debt for 33 poor countries.¹⁸⁹ *Commonweal* magazine reported that the G7 adopted the U.S plan that was presented by Bill Clinton.¹⁹⁰ The think tank North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) believed Jubilee's lobbying had been effective: "Indeed, the movement's lobbying among the leaders of the major industrial nations played a part in the G7's announcement in Cologne, Germany..."¹⁹¹

In September 1999 Clinton announced he would seek 100 percent U.S. bilateral debt cancellation for HIPC countries, which would be funded with a four-year, \$1 billion Congressional Bill.¹⁹² Bono was credited for Clinton's 100 percent bilateral debt cancellation (as opposed to the original two thirds), when he had convinced staffer Gene Sperling of its importance: "When Bono left, Sperling called a treasury official and said that he wanted to insert something on debt relief into a speech Clinton was about to give at the World Bank. [Sperling] and Summers got a few minutes in the presidential limo. Clinton

¹⁸⁸ Jamie Wilson, "50,000 in Human Chain Reinforce Petition Shipped to G8 Leaders," *The Guardian*, 14 June 1999.

¹⁸⁹ Fred Rosen, 1999, 43.

¹⁹⁰ David Beckmann, "Debt relief at the Millennium," *Commonweal*, 15 December 2000.

¹⁹¹ Fred Rosen, 1999, 43.

¹⁹² Donnelly, 2002, 172.

instantly agreed to call for 100 percent cancellation of the debt owed to the United States by 33 impoverished countries."¹⁹³

Bono was ecstatic when Clinton made the announcement, and remembered: "We thought we cracked it, we were jumping up and down." Thus began Bono's formal introduction to American politics, in which the president is only one of three theoretically equal federal branches. This realization led Bono to quip, "It's funny, I thought the president of the United States was the Big Kahuna, the Boss. But he's not. In the United States, the Congress is in charge."¹⁹⁴ Bono felt he was "inside the body politic, trying to figure out how it lived and breathed, how it behaved." Bono further noted:

[I was] a rock star wandering around the corridors of power rather than placarding at the gates outside. Strange. Every few weeks I had to travel to Washington, D.C., to go and meet all kinds of unexpected people, in an attempt to get debt cancellation accepted in the United States. It was uphill. Myself and Bobby Shriver were entering a world not just of ideologue politicians, but one of bankers and economists, and a certain elite who guard America's piggy bank. For most of the people, especially the bankers, it's against their religion to cancel debts. Bobby had a background in finance, but I was way out of my depth.

Bono's United States Congressional lobbying journey had begun. Former Oxfam Media Spokesman Seth Amgott candidly explained the strategy: "we needed some high-profile, high-level support to get the appropriation through Congress, and we invited Bono

¹⁹³ James Traub, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 90.

over and do some press and take some Congressional meetings."¹⁹⁵ Bono already had an important Washington ally in conservative Alabama Republican Representative Spencer Bachus. Bachus began campaigning for the Jubilee 2000 agenda after a group of his constituents, including members of a Catholic parish and a Presbyterian church, enlightened the Congressman about the poor country debt situation, which convinced him to take up a "new crusade."¹⁹⁶ In September Bachus, Bono, and Jeffrey Sachs all served on a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace panel, where Bachus captivated the crowd with his pragmatic arguments and earnestly pled, "I believe the American people to be loving and compassionate... I believe that if they knew about the conditions in your countries, they'd say: Forgive the debt! But they don't know. They know [who is] the number one football team. They know who won the fight in Las Vegas. But they don't know what you're going through. I didn't even know."¹⁹⁷ Bachus also held a joint news conference with Bono in which the rocker praised the Congressman for his passion. Bachus demonstrated his commitment to the cause by fasting for one day and even sent a symbolic \$1.20 to each of his fellow 434 Representatives – the average amount each American would pay for debt forgiveness.¹⁹⁸ Bachus notes that he was impressed by Bono "because he knew the issues backward and forward," which was one more testimony to Bono's growing expertise.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on December 9, 2005.

¹⁹⁶ Michael Grunwald, "GOP's Bachus Makes Debt relief His Mission," *The Washington Post*, 9 October 1999, A03; David Beckmann, 2000.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Miles A. Pomper, "With Religious Backing, Third World Debt Forgiveness Wins House Panel's Approval," *CQ Weekly*, 6 November 1999, 2668.

¹⁹⁹ Mark Memmott, "Rocker Leads Drive to Lift Third World Debt," *USA Today*, 14 June 2001.

Bono also met with one of his most influential allies in September – Pope John Paul II. Bono candidly explained the inclusive strategy behind the Pontifical visit: "We knew we had to get both sides, so we got Billy Graham and the Pope..."²⁰⁰ The September 23 meeting at the Pope's residence in Rome marked 100 days to the millennium, and included an Jubilee 2000 international delegation of economists, artists, and campaigners.²⁰¹ Bono brought a book of Irish poetry by Seamus Heaney as a gift to the Pontiff, who offered the rock star a rosary in return.²⁰² Any tension in the room was soon eased when "the first funky Pontiff," as Bono later called the Pope, stared-down Bono's ever-present shades and tried them on. A photo of the momentous cultural event was taken, but not immediately released by the Vatican. Bono particularly remembered John Paul's grin – "the wickedest you could ever imagine."²⁰³

Humor aside, the day was imperative for the campaign as the Pope publicly embraced Jubilee 2000 and its calls for debt forgiveness, and made a strong appeal to world leaders to take urgent and decisive action towards resolving the debt crisis.²⁰⁴ Ann Pettifor called the meeting and the resulting endorsement "a day that will go down in history."²⁰⁵ Bono later stressed the significance of the meeting explaining, "They weren't just platitudinous words out of Castel Gandolfo on that day. Actions followed. They were very tactical and strategic, and put the shoulder of the church to a few doors that had been

²⁰⁰ *Pro Bono*, The Guardian, 18 March 2002.

²⁰¹ *Pope Meets Bono and Calls for Debt relief*, The Guardian, 23 September 1999.

²⁰² Jackson, 2001, 189.

²⁰³ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 202.

²⁰⁴ *Pope Meets Bono and Calls for Debt relief*, The Guardian, 23 September 1999.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

slammed to us."²⁰⁶ Former Oxfam Media Spokesman Seth Amgott explained that the Conference of Catholic Bishops was "enormously influential on debt cancellation" in the United States.²⁰⁷ Bono's meeting with the Pope helped draw in the Christian contingent that became part of his expanding coalition.

In October 1999, Bono became involved with NetAid, a United Nations (U.N.) sponsored African benefit concert that attempted to emulate Live Aid. Technological corporate sponsor Cisco Systems created a website to promote the event globally, which was introduced at New York City press conference on September 9 by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Bono, where the website was first clicked-on by U.S. President Bill Clinton, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, and South African ex-President Nelson Mandela.²⁰⁸ NetAid featured simultaneous concerts on October 9 in New Jersey, London, and Geneva, and included a Bono sans U2 performance with hip-hop artist Wyclef Jean at the New Jersey venue. Other musicians including Sting and Sheryl Crow also played NetAid, which included appeals for U.N.-sponsored programs including refugee resettlement, poor country debt relief, and environmental protection.²⁰⁹ The concert initially appeared to be an overwhelming success as 100,000 people attended, the internet video feeds were accessed 2.4 million times, and more than 1 billion people watched or listened

²⁰⁶ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 203.

²⁰⁷ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on December 9, 2005.

²⁰⁸ Jackson, 2001, 188.

²⁰⁹ Paul Farhi, "NetAid's Gross Take Still Unavailable; Benefit Organizers Yet to Have Divulge Tally," *The Washington Post*, 15 October 1999, C07.

via television or radio.²¹⁰ Yet the final donations were less robust as NetAid only garnered \$1 million and received a disappointing 6,000 volunteers from online registrants.²¹¹ DATA front man Jamie Drummond noted that NetAid was not a great success and downplayed Bono's role in the disappointing event.²¹²

Bono was back in Washington in November and specifically targeting Republican Congressmen. Bono's November 4th meetings were organized by Ohio Republican Representative John Kasich, who Bono credits with providing a lot of help with debt cancellation and noted, "He passionately made the case to the Republicans."²¹³ Kasich in turn has said that Bono has "transcended music" and his band U2 has "gone from a rock band to a rock band with a purpose."²¹⁴ Later Kasich explained his views about celebrity culture: "We live in a celebrity world. That's why all these idiots are following Paris Hilton around. Bono in a lot of ways is like Arnold [Schwarzenegger]. Arnold has taken celebrity and combined it with a political purpose."²¹⁵ Kasich's comment is illustrative of a common misconception about celebrity politics. It is true that Schwarzenegger was a celebrity previous to his gubernatorial election, but has transcended celebrity political activism by entering formal politics. This work contends that Bono has surpassed all previous celebrity political efforts, with the exception of those who have moved from celebrity to elected

²¹⁰ Ibid and Paul Fahri, "NetAid Catches Few On the Web; Internet, Shows Brought in Meager \$1 Million," *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1999, C01.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Jamie Drummond in interview with Laura Jackson, 2001, 190.

²¹³ George Lloyd and Beth Berselli, "The Reliable Source," *The Washington Post*, 5 November 1999, C03; Chuck McCutcheon, "Foreign Aid Bill Gives Clinton Requested Funding," *CQ Weekly*, 28 October 2000, 2552; Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 92.

²¹⁴ Donna Cassata, 2005.

²¹⁵ *What Washington Says About Bono*, The Associated Press, 7 June 2005.

official. Although, there is reason to believe that Bono actually has *more* power and influence than these elected celebrities.

The day before Bono arrived in Washington, the House Banking Committee approved Iowa Republican Jim Leach's \$1 billion debt relief bill.²¹⁶ Bono was presumably lobbying to keep it alive in Congress when he met with Texas Republican and House Majority Leader Dick Armey, Georgian Republican Senator Paul Coverdell, and Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut.²¹⁷ *CQ Weekly* reported that the new debt relief movement was "winning converts despite budget constraints and the traditional lack of political support for foreign aid programs," which contributed to the success of the Jubilee 2000 coalition.²¹⁸ Bono was pursuing his task dutifully by befriending and lobbying numerous Congressional members and their staff. The fruit of his labor was beginning to show in the form of a bipartisan political coalition.

Congress eventually reached a compromise that provided \$123 million in FY 2000 bilateral debt relief from the foreign operations bill, and it would consider an additional \$1 billion in multilateral debt relief in 2001.²¹⁹ The sticking point was in the financial details of debt forgiveness, which engendered another debate about IMF gold revaluation. Congress wanted to fund debt relief through the revaluation of IMF-owned gold. The gold was listed on IMF books at \$47 an ounce, but if recalculated to the 1999 value of \$300 an ounce, it

²¹⁶ Miles A. Pomper, "With Religious Backing, Third World Debt Forgiveness Wins House Panel's Approval," *CQ Weekly*, 6 November 1999, 2668.

²¹⁷ Ibid and George Lloyd and Beth Berselli, 1999, C03.

²¹⁸ Miles A. Pomper, "With Religious Backing, Third World Debt Forgiveness Wins House Panel's Approval," *CQ Weekly*, 6 November 1999, 2668.

²¹⁹ Miles A. Pomper, "Foreign Aid Compromise is a Success for Clinton Team," *CQ Weekly*, 20 November, 1999, (57) 45.

would provide the excess capital for the debt proposal. Armeý was one of the major critics of the plan and advised that the “complicated proposal deserves thorough scrutiny by the relevant committees next year.”²²⁰ Armeý was reportedly “reluctant to approve the debt relief funds in the closing weeks of [the] congressional session.” Armeý himself sounded uncertain and said the gold sales question “is a fascinating issue and it’s an issue where the heart says go, go, and the mind says, well, just wait a minute, a little because it’s very complex.”²²¹

Finally, “after weeks of delay,” a deal between Armeý, fellow Texan and Republican Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm, and Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers authorized the IMF to revalue its gold reserves to help pay for debt forgiveness.²²² The deal was brokered with the gold industry by former Oxfam Media Spokesman Seth Amgott and lobbyist Lydia Williams, and according to Amgott, “Bono did not have a big personal involvement.”²²³ It is possible that Bono’s meeting with Armeý may have helped loosen the Texan’s objections to the plan. Armeý would later grade Bono’s lobbying skills as an A-plus, and noted the rock star was “well-informed and intensely devoted to the issues.”²²⁴ Armeý expounded on Bono’s expertise: “In the vernacular of country western,

²²⁰ Miles A. Pomper, “Debt Issue Stalls Foreign Aid,” *CQ Weekly*, 13 November 1999, 2706.

²²¹ Ibid

²²² John Burgess, “Debt relief,” *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1999, E02; and Deborah McGregor, “Republican Deal Clears IMF Debt relief Plan,” *The Financial Times*, 17 November 1999, 12.

²²³ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on December 9, 2005.

²²⁴ Donna Cassata, 2005.

[Bono] was country when country wasn't cool. He's made an intellectual and emotional commitment to a project that's gone beyond himself."²²⁵

The consistent advocacy of Treasury Secretary Summers was also a critical component of the success of the debt relief plan. Summers had been pushing Congress for the plan after he was convinced by Bono's and Spencer Bachus' arguments, and even penned a Washington Post op-ed on the subject in which he called debt relief "the moral imperative for the world's richest economy" and a "national strategic imperative."²²⁶

Summers was also pressed by Clinton, who had made debt relief a priority with the help of Bono's prodding. Gene Sperling told Bono a story that illustrated how Clinton fought for debt relief. Bono recalls, "At one point I had sent [Clinton] a letter. Gene was called up to the top cabinet in Air Force One, and the president was screaming at him at the top of his voice, pointing at my letter, going: 'Why aren't we doing this?'"²²⁷

The Congressionally approved \$123 million in bilateral debt relief was a small victory for Jubilee 2000 and Bono. It was also just the beginning of a long-term political lobbying effort by Bono. The next step for Bono and the coalition was to secure an additional \$1 billion in funding for multilateral debt relief that had been promised by Clinton. Treasury Secretary Summers agreed and acknowledged that their work was not done, admitting that "much more is needed to complete the Administration's share" of the

²²⁵ *What Washington Says About Bono*, The Associated Press, 7 June 2005.

²²⁶ Miles A. Pomper, "Foreign Aid Compromise is a Success for Clinton Team," *CQ Weekly*, 20 November, 1999, (57) 45; Michael Grunwald, "GOP's Bachus Makes Debt relief His Mission," *The Washington Post*, 9 October 1999, A03; Lawrence H. Summers, "Debt relief: A Fresh Start," *The Washington Post*, 3 November 1999, A35; Robert J. Barro, "Why Would A Rock Star Want to Talk to Me?" *Business Week*, 16 July 2001, (3741) 24.

²²⁷ Bono in interview with Michka Assayas; Assayas, 2005, 231.

June 1999 Cologne debt relief commitment.²²⁸ In February 2000, the Clinton Administration announced it would seek \$210 million in supplemental monies from the fiscal 2000 budget for debt relief, an additional \$225 million from the fiscal 2001 budget, and \$375 million in advance appropriations for future-year debt relief.²²⁹ This new round of debt relief faced significantly more opposition than the first effort. The initial blow occurred when the House of Representatives ignored Clinton's \$210 million 2000 supplemental spending request, which wasn't included in the final bill that was passed on March 30. Ranking California Democrat Nancy Pelosi tried to override the opposition by appending a last minute debt relief amendment, but it was subsequently defeated.²³⁰

The next hurdle appeared when North Carolina Republican and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms wanted to attach conditions to debt relief legislation, in the form of IMF and World Bank institutional reform. *CQ Weekly* reported that Helms wanted to abolish the IMF, but offered an alternative: "If the IMF wants to avoid that fate, the IMF will have to make some changes in the way the IMF conducts its business."²³¹ Helms had previously attempted to attach pork-barrel contingencies on the original 1999 bill, when he did not allow the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to

²²⁸ Miles A. Pomper, "Third World Debt relief Plan Unveiled." *CQ Weekly*, 5 February 2000, 264.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Miles A. Pomper, "Debt relief Loses Momentum," *CQ Weekly*, 24 June 2000, 58 (26).

²³¹ Miles A. Pomper, "Helms, Others Put Conditions on Debt relief," *CQ Weekly*, 4 March 2000, 487.

consider the measure in an effort to pressure the Clinton Administration to approve disaster funds for his state.²³²

Helms eventually reached an agreement with Treasury Secretary Summers that would implement some of his requested IMF changes, but they did not satisfy Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm. Gramm held up the fiscal 2001 foreign aid authorization bill, and demanded that his committee consider the measure.²³³ Helms retaliated on June 28 by splitting the foreign aid bill into four separate measures, each of which he would attempt to advance through the Senate separately, with one bill specifically funding debt relief. Helms' position had changed measurably – possibly because of the IMF contingencies placed in the bill. His shift was captured by a plea in *CQ Weekly*: "I don't understand why they don't go along and do it, because it's an important piece of legislation."²³⁴

The House finally passed the FY 2001 \$225 million foreign aid bill with a debt relief amendment in July. California Democrat Maxine Waters attached the debt relief amendment, which was adopted in a "drawn-out, dramatic vote."²³⁵ *CQ Weekly* reported that the amendment was passed only after "an extended tug-of-war between party leaders." The amendment was almost defeated, but four Democrats and one Republican switched their votes at the last minute (David Obey, D-Wisconsin; Sander M. Levin, D-Michigan; David

²³² Miles A. Pomper, "With Religious Backing, Third World Debt Forgiveness Wins House Panel's Approval," *CQ Weekly*, 6 November 1999, 2668.

²³³ Pomper, Miles A. "Attempting to Sidestep Gramm, Helms Splits Foreign Aid Authorization Bill Into Four," *CQ Weekly*, 1 July 2000, 1623.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ *House Passes Foreign Aid Bill With Increase for Debt relief*, *CQ Weekly*, 15 July 2000, 58 (29).

Wu, D-Oregon; Leonard Boswell, D-Iowa; and Tom Latham, R-Iowa). Waters noted the amendment was a very big victory and said it was part of a deliberate strategy: "The Congressional Black Caucus made a conscious decision that we were going to take charge."²³⁶ Waters probably had help from the measure's widespread Christian backing.

One last holdout was Alabama Republican Sonny Callahan. The clergy members in his district were "ginned up... by Bono and his little band," a reference to the grassroots tactics employed by DATA.²³⁷ Former DATA Communication Director Seth Amgott explained the strategy, noting that they "worked with grassroots organizations like Bread for the World [that had] members in those districts, and with religious leaders whose national denominations might be a part of the campaign, to show Congressman Callahan that there was social interest in these issues."²³⁸ Callahan admitted that he eventually gave in to his constituents.²³⁹ Treasury Secretary Summers also pushed for the amendment at a July 12 Capitol Hill press conference in which he pled, "It is imperative for our country economically, morally, and diplomatically to provide this debt relief."²⁴⁰

In September, Bono spoke at the Millennium Summit in New York City, and presented a debt relief petition with 21.2 million signatures from over 150 countries to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.²⁴¹ Bono also appeared in Washington D.C. on September 21 at a debt relief rally flanked by Treasury Secretary Summers, Utah Republican Orrin Hatch,

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ James Traub, 2005.

²³⁸ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on December 9, 2005.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ *House Passes Foreign Aid Bill With Increase for Debt relief*, CQ Weekly, 15 July 2000, 58 (29).

²⁴¹ Jackson, 2001, 199.

John Kasich, Maxine Waters, and Gene Sperling. Bono pled with the lawmakers: "I'm asking... get your scissors and cut through the crap."²⁴² White House Economic Director Sperling also announced that President Clinton would hold a bipartisan debt relief summit on October 2.²⁴³

A coup de grace of sorts occurred in a D.C. meeting with Republican Senator Jesse Helms, as Bono's arguments brought tears to the eyes of the Senator. Helms then embraced Bono and told him, "I want to do anything I can to help you."²⁴⁴ John Kasich, who was also at the meeting, was shocked by Helms' reaction and later quipped: "I thought someone had spiked my coffee."²⁴⁵ Afterwards Helms said Bono had "depth I didn't expect," and the Senator fully committed to debt relief.²⁴⁶ Helms explained: "If I can find some way that the Lord would show me how to really help these people, I'd quit the Senate and try to do it. I told Bono that. He is working hard and I'm going to help him the best I can."²⁴⁷ Helms also confirmed that Bono changed his mind about debt relief.²⁴⁸ Helms soon persuaded the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, as its Chairman, to approve the additional \$435 million debt relief appropriation.²⁴⁹ The Helms meeting was the first of many that helped create an unlikely alliance between the noted conservative and the rock star. The Bono-Helms axis has become one of Bono's most celebrated political triumphs, and highlights the importance

²⁴² Ibid, 201.

²⁴³ Miles A. Pomper, "Hill Rally Asks Debt relief for Poor Nations," *CQ Weekly*, 23 September 2000, 2228.

²⁴⁴ James Traub, 2005.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ David Beckmann, "Debt relief at the Millennium," *Commonweal*, 15 December 2000.

²⁴⁷ Mark Memmot, 2001.

²⁴⁸ Joseph Kahn, "A Star Close to the Heart of Aid Policy," *The New York Times*, 15 March 2002, A8.

²⁴⁹ Nancy Birdsall and John Williamson, 2002, 58.

of his non-partisan, coalition-building strategy. Senator Helms would later prove invaluable when he helped Bono gain credibility with the Bush Administration.

Clinton's October 2 debt relief summit featured a variety of individuals including Bono, Pat Robertson of the Christian Coalition, *Bread for the World* President and Jubilee 2000 activist David Beckmann, Archbishop Theodore McCarrick, and Rabbi David Saperstein.²⁵⁰ Beckmann recalled that at the meetings conclusion, "the participants vowed to work with their constituencies and colleagues to make sure Congress funded the full amount needed for debt relief for 2001, \$435 million, before the end of the session."²⁵¹

On October 25, Congress finally agreed to a plan that would fully fund the \$435 million for debt relief. The agreement also allowed the IMF to release \$800 million from gold sales for additional debt relief.²⁵² Gene Sperling, who according to Bono had been reprimanded by Bill Clinton for not furthering debt relief, reported that the Administration was extremely pleased.²⁵³ Sperling also said of Bono: "[He] is exceptional, not only in his knowledge and his commitment but in his desire to work in a strategic and practical way."²⁵⁴

The Washington Post reported that the eclectic coalition of the Pope, Sachs, and Bono provided the intense pressure that eventually garnered the support of a majority of Republicans, and that Clinton had been unable to persuade skeptical lawmakers to go along

²⁵⁰ Joseph Kahn, "A Star Close to the Heart of Aid Policy," *The New York Times*, 15 March 2002, A8

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Eric Pianin, "Hill Leaders Agree on Third World Debt relief," *The Washington Post*, 25 October 2000, A01.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Mark Memmot, 2001.

until the Bono-led coalition began lobbying.²⁵⁵ *CQ Weekly* reported, "the coalition's backing put the issue on the Congressional agenda."²⁵⁶ Donnelly credited Jubilee 2000's lobbying blitz for securing the appropriation.²⁵⁷ Birdsall and Williamson wrote: "A group of debt campaigners headed by Jubilee and with illustrious supporters like Bono and the Pope led a campaign to cancel these debts..."²⁵⁸ Edward W. Scott, cofounder of the Center for Global Development summed up Bono's role in the campaign:²⁵⁹

Perhaps no single person did more to advance public and political awareness of the debt issue than the rock star, Bono, lead singer of the group known as U2. Bono has come to symbolize a new sense of global social responsibility which the debt question has sparked in the development world.

President Clinton signed the foreign aid bill with the debt relief provisions on November 6, a ceremony in which he "specifically praised [Bono's] fervent efforts on behalf of Jubilee 2000."²⁶⁰ Jubilee 2000 had progressed significantly since Bono and Jeffrey Sachs were told "in no uncertain terms, that debt cancellation could not pass the U.S. Congress."²⁶¹ Sachs explained their early skepticism: "That was the initial view across the political spectrum, from the Clinton White House and Treasury Department to the Republican-dominated House of Representatives."

²⁵⁵ Eric Pianin, "Hill Leaders Agree on Third World Debt relief," *The Washington Post*, 25 October 2000, A01; Eric Pianin and Steven Pearlstein, "Lott Sees a Finish by Friday; Spending Bill, Debt relief Are Chief Issues Before Congress," *The Washington Post*, 24 October 2000, A04.

²⁵⁶ *Debt relief*, *CQ Weekly*, 16 December 2000, 2881.

²⁵⁷ In Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002, 174.

²⁵⁸ Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, 115.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, x.

²⁶⁰ Jackson, 2001, 207.

²⁶¹ Sachs, 2005, 342.

After the Jubilee 2000 campaign had procured several debt relief victories both in the United States and internationally – including the G7's June 1999 \$55 billion enhanced HIPC initiative – the campaign decided to continue its mission, albeit under a different moniker. Jubilee 2000 was christened *Drop the Debt* in late 2000 with the immediate goal of lobbying the 2001 G7 meeting for further debt relief measures.²⁶² Birdsall and Williamson called the Jubilee 2000 campaign "by far the most successful industrial-country movement aimed at combating world poverty for many years, perhaps in all of recorded history," noting its success in not just changing official policy, but also in arousing the rich world's concern for the world's poor that had been conspicuously lacking for many years.²⁶³

This arousal of the "rich world's concern for the world's poor" is an eloquent way of stating that the issue had been placed onto the international political agenda – or as political science theory calls it – agenda setting. Agenda setting is one of the inconspicuous ways in which Bono has been influential. The debt relief issue was virtually unknown to the public and ignored by governments before Jubilee 2000, but because of Bono and the transnational Jubilee 2000 alliance, the issue became just that – a political issue. It was now a political issue that was now present on domestic and international political agendas, and an issue that was being discussed and debated by the public, the media, and bureaucrats. And it was an issue that did not fade away.

²⁶² Mike Crawley, "Rich Nations Grant Poorest 22 A Checkbook Reprieve," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 December 2000, 7.

²⁶³ Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, 1.

12. Bono's "Next International Cause"

The American political landscape saw changes in 2000 as George W. Bush was controversially elected president – an election that was ultimately decided by the Republican-controlled Supreme Court.²⁶⁴ Change was also swirling in Bono's head as he searched for ideas for his next international cause during a 2001 meeting with policy maven C. Fred Bergsten, director of the think tank Institute for International Economics.²⁶⁵ Bergsten said of Bono: "I found him more impressive and devoted than I imagined. The other thing that is really dramatic is how much Bono knows not only about the substance but about the politics." Bergsten informed Bono that there were several directions to go including sticking "to the direct attack on poverty and kind of work on countries to increase their foreign aid." Another option Bergsten suggested was African trade reform. Bergsten expounded on this idea: "Trade, not aid. For the longer run, it remains true no country has ever successfully developed its economy without a big expansion of its trade and participating in the globalization process."²⁶⁶ The Bergsten meeting may have been a key impetus for the 2002 formation of Bono's think tank/lobbying firm, DATA. One international cause that Bergsten did not pitch to Bono was the African HIV/AIDS crisis.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Max Skidmore, *Presidential Performance: A Comprehensive Review*. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2004, 355.

²⁶⁵ Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, "The Ideas Industry," *The Washington Post*, 26 June 2001, A15.

²⁶⁶ Ibid

²⁶⁷ Nana K. Poku notes in "The Global AIDS Fund: Context and Opportunity," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2002), 284 that "the virus is at one and the same time a crisis and an endemic condition. It is a crisis because the speed of its spread has proved to be quite overwhelming."

The African AIDS pandemic soon became the next piece of Bono's African crusade and was eventually represented by the "A" in DATA's acronym.

The African AIDS pandemic had expanded considerably since the mid-1980s when its potential development into an international epidemic was first recognized.²⁶⁸ Whiteside calls it "the most devastating epidemic in recent history" and that twenty-two million people had already died.²⁶⁹ *Washington Quarterly* agreed saying, "Not since the bubonic plague has the world faced an infectious disease pandemic of such sweeping proportions as the present HIV/AIDS global pandemic – at whose epicenter Africa firmly stands."²⁷⁰ In 2001, 40 million people were infected with HIV, and although Africa represents only ten percent of the world's population, it housed 68% of HIV infections, 77% of AIDS deaths, and had 90% of the world's HIV/AIDS orphans and infected children.²⁷¹ Africa is also the only place besides the Caribbean where the epidemic is generalized throughout the population, rather than concentrated in specific risk groups. As a result almost the same number of men and women are affected. In other words, AIDS does not discriminate in Africa – everyone is at risk.

HIV/AIDS has created a destructive situation across numerous sectors in African society. Whiteside discusses the direct relationship between HIV/AIDS prevalence and increased poverty in Africa: "The causal chain runs from macro-factors, which result in

²⁶⁸ Kevin M. De Cock, et al., "Shadow On the Continent: Public Health and HIV/AIDS in Africa in the 21st Century." *The Lancet*, 360 (6 July 2002), 68.

²⁶⁹ Alan Whiteside, "Poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2000): 313.

²⁷⁰ Stephen J. Morrison, "The African Pandemic Hits Washington," *Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2001), 24, no. 1, 197.

²⁷¹ Kevin M. De Cock, et al., 2002, 68.

poverty through the community, household and individual, into the capacity of the individual's immune system."²⁷² Poku also discusses this relationship noting, "Poverty itself does not cause AIDS; however, there are endless potential links between poverty, poor health and poor health care which leave the poor dangerously exposed to diseases such as HIV."²⁷³ This destructive cycle has exacerbated the fragile condition of African nations, and has also engendered new international security concerns. The United Nations Security Council met in 2000 to discuss the security implications of HIV/AIDS. Poku notes that the meeting "highlighted the growing awareness that the epidemic is a security threat that requires a global mobilization."²⁷⁴ Then United States Vice-President Al Gore illuminated these concerns when he argued that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has "reached well beyond a health crisis and now [constitutes] a threat to global security, the viability of states, and economic development."²⁷⁵ To use a phrase Bono is fond of saying; Africa is truly "a continent bursting into flames."²⁷⁶

A country's health has also been increasingly linked to its very economic development.²⁷⁷ Jeffrey Sachs concludes that many African countries are in a poverty trap, whereby "a poor country is simply too poor to achieve sustained economic growth..." He further explains that economic growth depends on minimum standards of health, education,

²⁷² Whiteside, 2002, 316.

²⁷³ Poku, 2002, 284.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 283.

²⁷⁵ Stephen J. Morrison, "The African Pandemic Hits Washington," *Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2001), 24, no. 1, 197.

²⁷⁶ From Bono's Speech to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton U.K., September 29, 2004.

²⁷⁷ Exemplified by the World Health Organization's (WHO) Jeffrey Sachs led Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, which published *Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development* in 2001.

and infrastructure.²⁷⁸ A country's poor health infrastructure can also lead to state bankruptcy, liquidity crises, and transition crises that involve significant institutional change. These economic failures can then cause state failures that threaten U.S. national security, create economic losses, increase international crime and drug trafficking, increase African environmental degradation, and exasperate infectious diseases.²⁷⁹

The Washington Quarterly's winter 2001 issue listed seven critical future challenges to effectively combat HIV/AIDS in Africa, and clearly exposed the inadequacies of US efforts at targeting and combating HIV/AIDS in Africa.²⁸⁰ It is obvious from *The Washington Quarterly* article that the African HIV/AIDS crisis was starting to surface politically in America, but that there was still much to be done. The political awakening began under the Clinton Administration in 1999, when U.S. trade policies changed, rhetorical commitments to battling HIV/AIDS overseas were elevated, and aid commitments were raised.²⁸¹ In February 2000, President Clinton addressed the National Summit on Africa and "appealed passionately to African leaders and citizens to deal more openly with the HIV/AIDS crisis and pledged greater U.S. efforts."²⁸² The surge in African HIV/AIDS policy activity continued through the end of Clinton's presidency in January 2001. When Bush assumed the presidential mantle, his HIV/AIDS policy was not yet clear and even appeared hostile when his second foreign policy action upon taking office was to review

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Stephen J. Morrison, "The African Pandemic Hits Washington," *Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2001), 24, no. 1, 197-209.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 199.

²⁸² Ibid, 200.

Clinton's executive order supporting the right of African countries to import or produce generic versions of HIV/AIDS medications.²⁸³ In addition, during Bush's presidential campaign, his advisors repeatedly stressed that Africa was not strategically imperative to America, and during the presidential debates Bush had stated that Africa was not a priority.²⁸⁴

Meanwhile Bono's mentor Jeffery Sachs had also jumped headfirst into the African HIV/AIDS epidemic, which probably helped inspire Bono's efforts. Sachs explains that in the late 1990s he "went on the warpath" with the international financial community over HIV/AIDS.²⁸⁵ He complained that the IMF and the World Bank had been in Africa for decades and "had remained blind to the most basic realities there, and to the growing human and economic catastrophe." Sachs helped form an April 2000 HIV/AIDS summit in Nigeria, and was also called to lead the new World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH), which Sachs chaired from 2000 – 2001. The Commission's December 2001 report requested increased donor aid from rich countries to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa to the tune of \$27 billion per year by 2007, up from \$6 billion per year. Sachs noted that the report's impact was atypical, considering the ephemeral nature of most reports.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ *Bush Medicine for Africa*, The Nation, 26 February 2001; Michael Dobbs, "Trip Marks President's Turnabout On Africa," *The Washington Post*, 7 July 2003, A1.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Sachs, 2005, 203.

²⁸⁶ Sachs, 2005, 205.

The Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health had quite a notable reception. Reports come and go. This one, I think it is fair to say, stayed. It made the important point that we, as a generation, can do something dramatic to improve our world. The report found a wide audience, in part, because it was based on a broad and surprising consensus. It was launched with the kind of pizzazz that it deserved, with Brundtland; U.K. Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short, Ray Gilmartin, the CEO of Merck; and Bono as enthusiastic supporters.

Sachs' testimony was indicative of Bono's growing influence as a political agenda setter. Sachs also proposed the idea for a global fund to fight AIDS and malaria, and introduced the plan during a speech at the 2000 International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa – an event that Sachs called a turning point.²⁸⁷ Sachs wrote that "Word spread of the speech and the idea of a new global fund took hold."²⁸⁸ Sachs enlisted the UN's help through Kofi Annan, who helped him refine the concept. In March 2001, when the resulting Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was in its final stages of formation, the Bush Administration's stance on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic was still unclear.²⁸⁹ Kofi Annan publicly announced the creation of the Global Fund during an April speech at the Abuja, Nigeria HIV/AIDS Summit. Then on May 11 in the White House Rose Garden, President Bush, who was flanked by Kofi Annan and Nigerian president Osegun

²⁸⁷ Gretchen Vogel, "Dollars and Cents Vs. the AIDS Epidemic," *Science*, (29 June 2001), 292, no. 5526.

²⁸⁸ Sachs, 2005, 205.

²⁸⁹ Karen DeYoung, "Bush AIDS Policy Remains Unclear; Activists Awaiting Despite Reassurances," *The Washington Post*, 31 March 2001, A15.

Obasanjo, announced U.S. support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which included an initial \$200 million pledge.²⁹⁰

Bono's political efforts had not stagnated either. He began his lobbying advance on the new Administration immediately, and secured a January 2001 meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell, to whom Bono brought a signed note from George C. Marshall, "another military man turned Secretary of State."²⁹¹ The Marshall note was symbolic as Bono and other anti-poverty campaigners would often mention the need for a Marshall Plan for Africa, referring to the plan created by the ex-general that gave 1% of American GDP to post-World War II European reconstruction efforts over a four-year period.²⁹² Colin Powell later became a staunch advocate for increased U.S. aid to Africa.

Bono's strategy involves more than just meetings with cabinet level officials and Congress. He also targets staff members from the White House and Congress. The payoff with staffers is potentially big, as they can secure meetings with their bosses, continually press the cause, and they are much easier to access. Bono used this strategy with White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, White House advisor Karl Rove, and top aides at the Treasury Department.²⁹³ The Treasury Department meetings may have helped Bono meet new Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, who refused to meet him at first. O'Neill thought

²⁹⁰ Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Gives AIDS Fund \$200 Million Donation; Bush Vows More Money for Public-Private Project," *The Washington Post*, 12 May 2001, A19.

²⁹¹ Josh Tyrangiel and Benjamin Nugent, 2002, 62-8.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Mark Memmot, 2001; *Pro Bono*, The Guardian, 18 March 2002.

Bono "was just some pop star that wanted to use me."²⁹⁴ Once O'Neill agreed to meet with Bono, their scheduled half-hour session overran by an hour. O'Neill challenged Bono in the meeting: "If you want U.S. money to flow to Africa, take me to the green hills and show me what works."²⁹⁵ Bono smiled and agreed: "Let's set a date." The date would come in May 2002 when the unlikely pair took a ten-day fact-finding trip to Africa. O'Neill was impressed by Bono and noted: "He's a serious person... He cares deeply about these issues, and you know what? He knows a lot about them."²⁹⁶ O'Neill also acknowledged the persistence of U2's fan base, admitting that the Treasury Department received about 20,000 email messages from U2 fans pressing for more action on HIV/AIDS.²⁹⁷ The O'Neill episode highlights an uncharacteristic situation as Bono was refused a first meeting. In this instance Bono's celebrity was not sufficient to secure a meeting with his lobbying target. It took Bono's persistence and a bit of luck to get a first introduction with the Treasury Secretary, but ultimately rested on his issue-knowledge and expertise to win O'Neill over.

Bono also targeted National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who as Bono metaphorically noted, "gave the keys to her office to a bunch of English activists," referring to her later cooperation with Bono's think tank/lobbying firm DATA.²⁹⁸ Rice explained when she met with Bono "The administration was grappling with ways to build a consensus on foreign assistance" and was surprised to learn of Bono's stance on African

²⁹⁴ Sean O'Hagan, "The Observer Profile: Bono," *The Observer*, 26 September 2004, 27.

²⁹⁵ Ron Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004, 244.

²⁹⁶ Sean O'Hagan, "The Observer Profile: Bono," *The Observer*, 26 September 2004, 27.

²⁹⁷ Joseph Kahn, "A Star Close to the Heart of Aid Policy," *The New York Times*, 15 March 2002, A8.

²⁹⁸ Bono quoted in Assayas, 2005, 233.

accountability.²⁹⁹ The view that there is responsibility for the recipient was "precisely the kind of reform the Administration had been thinking of."³⁰⁰

Bono once again met with conservative economist Robert J. Barro to discuss his latest HIV/AIDS efforts. The two connected at Harvard's 2001 commencement, where Bono was receiving an honorary master's degree from the Kennedy School of Government's Center for International Development.³⁰¹ Barro agreed to meet Bono after U2's Boston concert, which the professor attended, and reported being amazed by the show. Bono told Barro of his latest mission to alleviate the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa at a post-concert meeting in the hospitality suite of Bono's hotel.³⁰² Bono explained that "he wanted to combine a push for medical assistance from rich countries with an expansion of international trade." Bono also told Barro that like their debt relief discussions two years earlier, "he wanted to get an understanding of the conservative objections to his ideas." As with the debt relief discussions, Barro explained his objections to Bono's arguments, but he did support "expanded international trade... [combined] with the expansion of medical aid." Barro clarified his position in *Business Week*:³⁰³

Because I hold Bono in high esteem, I wish I could believe that debt assistance for AIDS would encourage economic development and save lives in Africa. But my understanding of economics and my research on economic growth keep me from

²⁹⁹ James Traub, 2005.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Robert J. Barro, "Why Would A Rock Star Want to Talk to Me?" *Business Week*, (16 July 2001) 3741, 24.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid.

believing these things. I wonder what would happen if Bono instead directed his persuasive talents to further the classical liberal ideas that actually matter a lot for economic performance. I have in mind property rights, the rule of law, free markets, and small government. And I would be happy to include efficient investments in human capital in the form of education and health. But of course, this is just a dream. And the concert in Boston was really great.

Barro's dream may have been partially realized, and it is possible that his comments impacted Bono's development stance. The tripartite pillars to African aid pushed by Bono's think tank/lobbying firm DATA, which were formed after the Barro conversation, include *Democracy, Accountability and Transparency* – classical liberal ideas as Barro requested. The exchange between Bono and Barro highlights Bono's charisma and influence, but also demonstrates one of the lobbyist's greatest challenges – shaping and/or changing the ideology of an influential person.

Bono also contacted Jesse Helms to further his latest campaign. Helms even attended a Washington D.C. U2 concert in June – his first rock concert ever. The octogenarian senator reported being amazed and noted bucolically, "People were moving back and forth like corn in the breeze."³⁰⁴ Helms added: "When Bono shook his hips, the crowd shook their hips... the noisiest thing I ever heard."³⁰⁵ Helms also hosted a D.C. luncheon for Bono that was attended by nine other senators. Bono reported being humbled and told Helms he felt like "an outsider in the ornate capital," but was reassured by the Senator: "You'll never be

³⁰⁴ Dorothy Rompalske, "Rock Star to the Rescue: Bono Tackles World Poverty – and the White House is Listening," *Biography Magazine*, October 2002.

³⁰⁵ *Pro Bono*, The Guardian, 18 March 2002.

an outsider. You'll always be a friend here."³⁰⁶ Bono soon secured a closed meeting with the senator to discuss the African AIDS crisis. Bono explained: "I went to people like Jesse Helms, who had been very tough on the concept of foreign assistance and very bleak on AIDS. He's a religious man so I told him that 2,103 verses of scripture pertain to the poor and Jesus speaks of judgment only once – and it's not about being gay or sexual morality. But about poverty. I quoted that verse of Matthew, chapter 25: 'I was naked and you clothed me.' He was really moved. He was in tears." For the second time in as many years, Bono had brought Jesse Helms to tears. Helms would later publicly repent for having not done more to combat the global HIV/AIDS epidemic and admitted being ashamed.³⁰⁷ Helms even admitted that he drew religious inspiration from Bono.³⁰⁸ Bono recounted his experience with Helms.³⁰⁹

I took my time with him to press ahead with our work in the AIDS emergency. He did an incredible thing: he publicly repented for the way he had thought about HIV/AIDS. Politicians rarely do that. He really changed the way people on the Right thought about the disease. ...I found him to be a beautiful man with convictions that I wouldn't all agree with, but had to accept that he believed in them passionately.

Jeffrey Sachs wrote about the phone call he received from Bono immediately after the Helms meeting.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ Mark Memmot, 14 June 2001.

³⁰⁷ Miles Pomper, "Conservative Firebrand Helms Tempers His Image in Final Term." *CQ Weekly*, (30 March 2002) 60, no. 13, 875-6.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Assayas, 2005, 179-180.

³¹⁰ Sachs, 2005, 344.

One day I was driving home when my cell phone rang. It was Bono. "What are you doing?" he asked. When I told him I was driving home, he said that I better pull over. "What's up?" "You won't believe what just happened. Senator Jesse Helms just blessed me and the effort on AIDS." Bono and the senator had read scripture together, and Helms had committed to help push the AIDS legislation through the White House and Congress.

A top Helms staffer, Lester Munson, reported "the Senator is very much a fan of Bono... or that's my sense from hearing him talk all the time about this person who now seems to be his favorite rock star."³¹¹ The Helms reversal was monumental for Bono, as Helms' influence eventually afforded him White House access – and his eventual connection to President Bush. After Helms' change of heart about HIV/AIDS, the senator contacted Vice-President Dick Cheney, who then persuaded Bush to meet Bono. President Bush later remembered: "Dick Cheney walked into the Oval Office; he said, 'Jesse Helms wants us to listen to Bono's ideas.'³¹²

Bono began 2002 in a whirlwind, as U2 performed the Super Bowl halftime show, and he took an eight-day trip to Africa with Jeffery Sachs to observe HIV/AIDS relief work.³¹³ Upon returning from Africa, Bono joined fellow African activist and Microsoft mogul Bill Gates, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, and former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo on a poverty and HIV/AIDS panel at the World Economic Forum in New York City.

³¹¹ *Pro Bono*, The Guardian, 18 March 2002.

³¹² Dorothy Rompalske, "Rock Star to the Rescue: Bono Tackles World Poverty – and the White House is Listening," *Biography Magazine*, October 2002.

³¹³ Ben White, "An Elite Cast Debates Poverty; O'Neill, Bono, Gates Discuss Aid Plans at N.Y. Forum," *The Washington Post*, 3 February 2002, A03.

Bono used the appearance to publicly announce the expansion of his African activism to include vaccination and disease eradication. O'Neill reiterated his reluctance to increasing U.S. African aid substantially, noting that it was often "misused and [fails] to help" African countries, but hinted that he was pursuing a new aid structure that required imagination.³¹⁴ The Forum also included 40 world religious leaders, a group whose importance to the African agenda did not escape Bono.³¹⁵

In March, Bono reignited his relationship with the Christian contingent that was integral to the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign. This came on the heels of the Franklin Graham organized February evangelical conference in D.C., *Prescription for Hope*, which focused on the HIV/AIDS crisis. Franklin Graham announced that HIV/AIDS would become a priority: "We as the church have been too quick to pass judgment on this disease. Let's put this issue at the top of our agendas as individuals, churches, denominations, and Christian organizations."³¹⁶ Jesse Helms also attended the conference and used the appearance to publicly repent for his past stance on HIV/AIDS. Helms also penned an aforementioned *Washington Post* op-ed entitled *We Cannot Turn Away*, in which he pled for increased Congressional African HIV/AIDS spending.³¹⁷ Bono also met with Evangelical leaders in February, where he presented his strategic outline for approaching Congress and the White House. The Evangelicals said this was Bono's first personal connection with the Evangelical

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ John Dart, "Bono: 'Juxtapositioning' For The World's Poor," *Christian Century*, 13-20 February 2002.

³¹⁶ Timothy C. Morgan, "Bono's Burning Question," *Christianity Today*, 22 April 2002, 5.

³¹⁷ Jesse Helms, "We Cannot Turn Away," *The Washington Post*, 24 March 2002, B07.

community.³¹⁸ It is becoming clear that a pattern is emerging with Bono's political strategy. By approaching and appealing to Christian groups, Bono exhibited his propensity for non-partisanship and coalition building.

The early months of 2002 also saw Bono busily forming his think tank/lobbying firm DATA. He had secured donations from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, international financier George Soros, Silicon Valley mogul Ed Scott, the Entertainment Industry Foundation; and even Bono himself helped fund the new advocacy group.³¹⁹ The policy wonks of the newfound yet unnamed think tank were working on a new aid proposal that would reflect Paul O'Neill's call for imagination in new aid directions, and that considered the Administration's insistence that money was tight.³²⁰ DATA eventually proposed a scheme to nurture good governance, which included a "two-pronged strategy to 'reward success' in six to nine well-governed countries and to keep others from 'falling back' through major increases in funding on AIDS, TB and Malaria."³²¹ In early 2002, Jamie Drummond, ex-Jubilee 2000 activist and founding Executive Director of DATA, was summoned to Washington and "asked not to leave."³²² It was reported that "in a series of closed door meetings," Drummond "worked with White House officials on the details of an aid program based on the principles that Bono had proposed." Presidential advisor Josh

³¹⁸ Sheryl Henderson-Blunt, "Bono Tells Christians: Don't Neglect Africa," *Christianity Today*, 22 April 2002.

³¹⁹ *Bono-Think*, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2002, A18; Cathleen Falsani, "Bono's America," *Christianity Today*, March 2003, 44; and *Bono-Think*, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2002, A18.

³²⁰ Josh Tyrangiel, "The Constant Charmer," *Time*, (26 December 2005), 166, no. 26, 46-62.

³²¹ *Ibid* and James Traub, 18 September 2005.

³²² *Ibid*.

Bolten acknowledged that Bono “was working with the president at a time when he was considering” the program.³²³

The Bush Administration would not enact the program void of Bono’s consent, a testimony to Bono’s intrinsic involvement. Condoleezza Rice delivered the terms of the agreement to Bono – which included Bono’s public endorsement of the new program in the form of a press conference alongside President Bush. As Rice explained, “It’s great to have a person who would not normally be identified with the president’s development agenda as a part of it.” Bono then told Rice he would only agree to the appearance if the president also agreed to a historic HIV/AIDS initiative, and almost nixed the public presidential appearance.³²⁴ Rice was not happy with Bono’s demand, but asked the rock star to trust the Administration: “Bono, this president cares about AIDS too, and let me tell you that he is going to figure out something dramatic to do about AIDS. You’re going to have to trust us.”³²⁵ Bono acquiesced and the Bono-Bush press conference was set.

Bono now secured the presidential meeting he had been seeking since Bush’s inauguration. Bono remembers stating his position pretty quickly at the March 15 Oval Office meeting: “the point was an unarguable one – 6500 people dying every day of a preventable and treatable disease would not be accepted anywhere else in the world other than Africa, and that before God and history this was a kind of racism that was

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ibid.

unacceptable."³²⁶ Bush responded to Bono's pleas favorably: "Yeah, it's unacceptable. In fact, it's a kind of genocide." White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan later downplayed Bush's genocide comment and claimed the President "was using it figuratively as a way to describe an immense tragedy."³²⁷ Bono acknowledged Bush's hyperbole, but admitted that Bush "really helped us in using that word."

After the meeting, Bono accompanied Bush to a press conference where the President announced the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program (later renamed the Millennium Challenge Corporation). The MCA was designed as a three-year program that would provide up to \$5 billion per year in additional monies for poor countries that were committed to reforming their economies and stamping out corruption.³²⁸ Bush explained the rationale behind the MCA, stating that the United States "must encourage nations and leaders to walk the hard road of political, legal and economic reform so that all their people can benefit."

The *Financial Times* reported that the new program "represents an attempt by the US to wrest back the initiative on global development, where it has been under fire from campaigners and European countries for its relative ungenerosity on development aid."³²⁹ *The Guardian* reported that Bush's announcement on foreign aid astonished development

³²⁶ Assayas, 2005, 232.

³²⁷ *Bono Meets President*, St. Petersburg Times, 15 March 2002, 2B.

³²⁸ Alan Beattie, "Bush Promises Big Rise in US Aid to Help Fight War on World Poverty," *Financial Times*, 15 March 2002, 1.

³²⁹ Ibid.

experts.³³⁰ Crediting Bono they reported, "...Bono, unlike many of the other development lobbyists in Washington, kept on going after the Republicans took over the White House. [Bono] was convinced – he told skeptical aid experts, that the Republicans were taking him seriously – and Bush's extraordinary testimony to Bono's influence was vindication."

The Bush Administration had wryly nicknamed Bono *The Pest* because of his pesky lobbying, but Bush publicly commended Bono at the White House MCA announcement for the "responsible use of his influential position," citing his willingness "to lead to achieve what his heart tells him," and that "nobody should be living in poverty and hopelessness in the world."³³¹ Bono was aware that his alliance with the right-wing Republican president was not viewed positively by all of his fans, but also knew the effectiveness his own growing influence. Bono explained, "It is much easier and hipper for me to be on the barricades with a handkerchief over my nose. It looks better on the resume of a rock n' roll star. But I can do better by just getting into the White House and talking to a man who I believe listens, wants to listen, on these subjects."³³² Bono also spoke of the MCA lobbying experience: "On the Millennium Challenge, [Bush] was delivering. He was agreeing to the pitch, so it was a different mood. I was laying the ground for the next pitch, a historic AIDS initiative, but I didn't want to be too overt."³³³ The MCA legislation was one of Bono's most substantial political achievements. The financial aspect alone surpassed his previous efforts,

³³⁰ *Pro Bono*, The Guardian, 18 March 2002.

³³¹ *Ibid* and *President Proposes \$5 Billion Plan to Help Developing Nations*, The White House Office of Press Secretary Press Release, 14 March 2002.

³³² *Bono Meets President*, St. Petersburg Times, 15 March 2002, 2B.

³³³ Assayas, 2005, 233.

but the most impressive element was convincing the Bush Administration to adopt his agenda, after it was established that they were not interested in African aid. Bono's MCA effort took all of his political skills including persistence, charisma, expertise, and coalition building.

After Bush's MCA announcement, Jesse Helms called for \$500 million in additional funding to combat African HIV/AIDS by proposing an amendment to the emergency supplemental appropriations bill with Tennessee Republican Senator Bill Frist, who was also a noted African development proponent. Helms and Frist made the funding contingent on matching private sector dollars pegged to the U.S. agency for International Development's HIV/AIDS programs.³³⁴ *The Boston Globe* reported that the climate in Washington to dramatically increase foreign assistance to poor countries was better than it had been in years, and the turning point may have been when Bono and Jesse Helms "began quoting scriptures to each other." Helms' aides confirmed the momentous occasion: "From that private meeting last year, the arch-conservative and deeply religious senator began questioning why the United States wasn't doing much more to fight AIDS in Africa."³³⁵ Bono could once again claim responsibility for helping to influence the political agenda of African aid issues.

In May 2002, Bono accompanied U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill on a highly publicized African trip to investigate the best uses for the new MCA measure. The rock star

³³⁴ Jesse Helms, 24 March 2002, B07.

³³⁵ John Donnelly, "Helms's Reversal on US Aid Reverberates: Senator Seeks \$500M to Help Stamp Out AIDS Transmission in Africa," *The Boston Globe*, 27 March 2002, A12.

and the former Alcoa Chief Executive were dubbed the “odd couple” by almost every newspaper that covered the ten-day tour through Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Africa.³³⁶ O’Neill and Bono first held opposing strategies regarding the correct way to help Africa – O’Neill emphasizing the role of business investment and downplaying aid, noting its past ineffectiveness, and Bono continually prodding the man with “a very big wallet” to increase aid.³³⁷ Bono said that the Treasury Secretary “is hanging on very tightly to the excuse that the reason that the U.S. is at the bottom of the league table, in rich-country contributions to poor countries, is because aid is inefficient.” As the trip progressed, O’Neill appeared to grow more indignant at the lack of basic needs such as water in Africa. In one Ghanaian village O’Neill compared the water to rinse water from a washing machine, and questioned the situation rhetorically, “I don’t understand why one of life’s most important conditions, namely clean water, hasn’t been solved.”³³⁸

O’Neill’s comments at a Ghanaian press conference were indicative of his shifting position: “We can create the basis for real change... the potential is there, the potential exists here for a much more productive society that has much better enjoyment of life and life’s conditions.”³³⁹ O’Neill biographer Ron Suskind dryly noted, “The script notes [between Bono and O’Neill] began to blur.” O’Neill was unexpectedly calling for increased African aid towards the end of the tour: “The world community ought to provide substantially more

³³⁶ Satiyesh Manoharajah, “Bono Who?” *The Guardian*, 2 June 2002.

³³⁷ Paul Blustein, “Good Spirits Despite Differences; O’Neill, Bono Disagree About Aid but Get Along Well on 4-Nation Tour of Africa,” *The Washington Post*, 26 May 2002, A24.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Suskind, 2004, 246.

money for treating poor people afflicted with AIDS and the human immunodeficiency virus that causes the disease."³⁴⁰ *The Washington Post* interpreted the political nature of O'Neill's comments, citing his ability to sway opinion in the Bush Administration and Congress on financial matters – a pertinent issue given Congress was considering several bills to substantially increase spending on global HIV/AIDS relief.³⁴¹ O'Neill was cautious about outright endorsement of legislation, explaining, "Before we know whether we need more money in the supplemental, we need to understand, for God's sake, what we are going to do with what we have got."

Bono noticed O'Neill "getting angrier by the day," but the Treasury Secretary still preached a steady diet of fair trade talk, which was beginning to influence the rock star.³⁴² O'Neill felt that "Africa would benefit more from even a modest expansion of trade than from a radical increase in aid."³⁴³ Bono had previously explored the trade angle with both policy expert Fred C. Bergsten and conservative economist Robert Barro, but O'Neill's endorsement may have cemented the philosophy for Bono. *Trade* would soon represent the *T* in the name of his advocacy organization, DATA. As Bono explained (emphasis added):

[O'Neill had] been telling me the future of Africa is in the hands of business and commerce. And I knew that to be sort of true, but not as much as I needed to, *and this opened my mind to subjects like unfair trade relationships*. It's a shock to discover that for all our talk of the free market, the poorest people on Earth are not

³⁴⁰ Paul Blustein, "Mothers With AIDS Move O'Neill to Back Money for Treatment," *The Washington Post*, 25 May 2002, A25.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

allowed to put their products on our shelves in an evenhanded way. They have to negotiate all kinds of tariffs and taxes. It's not a level playing field. We can sell to them, but they can't sell to us. I started to realize that even the most friendly faces to Africa in Congress would obstruct trade reform. It was the left that sponsored the Farm Bill in the United States, which subsidizes American agriculture and makes it impossible for African farmers to compete. Imagine the shock of walking through the markets in Accra, Ghana, where ghettos have been swollen with out-of-work rice farmers, to find cheap American and Vietnamese rice on sale to people who used to produce their own.

Bono's comments starkly illustrate both his quest and his capacity for learning the details of the issues, resulting in ever-increasing expertise on the issues. His comments also highlight his open-minded, non-ideological mindset that is surely beneficial in pursuing his nonpartisan, coalition building strategies.

O'Neill became particularly interested in the incomprehensible African dirty water situation, which confounded the Treasury Secretary given the billions in aid monies that have poured into Africa. O'Neill calculated a \$25 million price tag for a system of new wells that could provide clean water to an entire African country such as Uganda. O'Neill presented his \$25 million plan to Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni during the African trip, who somberly told the Treasury Secretary, "it will cost many times your price."³⁴⁴ Museveni was citing the results from an Ugandan water system study commissioned from a U.S. consulting firm, which put the cost at \$2 billion. After O'Neill examined the

³⁴⁴ Suskind, 2004, 254.

consultant's study, he deciphered the infrastructure recommendations for the Ugandan president: "...this is recommending you build a water system like in Detroit or Cleveland. You won't need that for a hundred years. You just need to drop wells, and mostly maintain them. Your people can handle the rest. We can do this quickly, maybe a year or two."³⁴⁵

O'Neill returned to Washington "with the fervor of a convert" and began pitching his \$25 million water project to anyone who would listen – reporters and Administration officials alike.³⁴⁶ He met with Condoleezza Rice on June 3 and shared what he had witnessed in Africa, including HIV/AIDS, hunger, and dirty water; and then pleaded his case to Rice: "We can focus on this and show real results, and that can really help the people of Africa."³⁴⁷ But Rice was already aware of his clean water "mission," which is what it had already been dubbed in several newspaper articles. O'Neill had apparently breached the message control protocol of the White House through his "extemporaneous speech with commitments attached." This was typified in an interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC's *This Week* where O'Neill claimed that the U.S. government "...can insist that our aid money go for tangible results in creating wells and the distribution of water."³⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Rice was surprised by O'Neill's water plan since they had only briefly discussed water issues before O'Neill's trip. Rice was noncommittal and knew Bush "might

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Suskind, 2004, 256.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, 257.

not like [O'Neill's] edgy, anything-might-happen appeal" that as Suskind notes, "had few if any, precedents for a cabinet secretary."³⁴⁹

O'Neill also pitched the idea to Secretary of State Colin Powell by appealing to his legacy: "If we bring the water, it's something, Colin, we'll be remembered for – and remembered favorably for – long after the two of us are gone."³⁵⁰ Powell reportedly laughed and exclaimed, "You certainly can stir things up, Paul, just like always... I think you are really on to something," but confessed that he would "have to think through the geopolitical logistics." O'Neill then penned an African policy memo to President Bush and outlined the situation in a broader context of foreign policy, stating the need for a nonmilitary foreign policy characterized by value and respect for the developing world.³⁵¹ O'Neill called for enforcing the rule of law, respecting human rights, and fighting corruption. He listed several priorities including HIV/AIDS, education, and clean water; and strategically noted, "This is an area where we should be able to make the greatest difference in the shortest time."

O'Neill finally got a presidential one-on-one on August 12 in Waco, Texas, where he presented his clean water mission. He told Bush about the \$25 million Ugandan plan, noting that it "would be a real demonstration model... for what America can do to make life better for real people with real struggles."³⁵² Bush asked a few perfunctory questions, but seemed more concerned with O'Neill's thoughts on reordering structural issues within the World Bank and the IMF. O'Neill felt that it would be a lost cause if Bush didn't connect with his

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid, 258-259.

³⁵² Ibid, 266.

plan in the first minute or two. After these first critical minutes, O'Neill felt like there was nowhere to go with the president, and gave it one last shot:³⁵³

For just twenty five million, we should establish a project, with goals of twenty-four to thirty-six months at the outside, to help provide clean water to everyone in Ghana as a demonstration model, demonstrating our values as Americans, and our ingenuity, and that this can be done for a reasonable cost and it can be done fast. You don't have to leave another generation to the vagaries of whether it rains or not, for chrissake!"

Bush "looked blankly at him," which led O'Neill to switch quickly to HIV/AIDS, and pled for an historic effort. Bush claimed he was "on the case" noting that, "...we need to do something important here... The question is what, and how big?" O'Neill told the president that he'd "push to the theoretical limits of the possible," a comment that led Bush to nod and change the subject to the economy.³⁵⁴

Nearly four months later, on December 5, O'Neill was fired by the Bush Administration. It was the final chapter in a brewing showdown between the pragmatic Treasury Secretary and the ideologue president. Suskind writes that Bush required a loyalty O'Neill "could never swallow."³⁵⁵ O'Neill explained that Bush required "a false kind of loyalty, loyalty to a person and whatever they say or do," and added: "...that's the opposite of real loyalty, which is loyalty based on inquiry, and telling someone what you really think

³⁵³ Ibid, 266-267.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, 268.

³⁵⁵ Ibid, 326.

and feel – your best estimation of the truth instead of what they want to hear."³⁵⁶ Bono called O'Neill and offered his condolences: "You're not a politician, that was always your strength... [you] had tried to make a difference but found out it was about winning."³⁵⁷ In an interview with O'Neill biographer Ron Suskind, Bono spoke well of the former Treasury Secretary: "O'Neill is amazingly loyal – an old fashioned thing, really – and he inspires great loyalty in others. That's because he looks at you as an equal; there's no arrogance there. He just wants to know what you're thinking – and he really listens."³⁵⁸

The O'Neill episode is one of the more fascinating political conversions of which Bono has been part. O'Neill could be seen as a stiff corporate CEO who was tapped by the conservative Republican Administration to efficiently guide the Treasury Department – but he has been known to be more than just a coldhearted capitalist, especially his stance on environmental issues. O'Neill discussed these views in an interview with Robert F. Kennedy Jr., where he called pollution a leadership failure, and recounted his revolutionary speech to the Alcoa board where he told them "We are environmentalists first and industrialists second."³⁵⁹ The point is that O'Neill's African conversion was not a miracle, and was probably related with facts on-the-ground as opposed to Bono's influence, especially considering that as Treasury Secretary he initially refused to meet Bono. It is also important to note that O'Neill may have never visited Africa sans Bono. As in most incidents that this

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 326.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, 321.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, vii.

³⁵⁹ Robert F. Kennedy Jr., *Crimes Against Nature: How George Bush and His Corporate Pals Are Plundering the Country and Hijacking Our Democracy*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004, 107.

work investigates, there were more factors involved than simply Bono, but the rock star's efforts have been substantial, and even integral in some cases.

13. International Efforts

Although it was apparent that Bono was primarily focused on lobbying the United States during the early years of the new millennium, he had not abandoned his international efforts. In June 2002, the annual G8 summit was being held in Alberta, Canada, and was ostensibly focused on Africa, thanks in large part to Bono's lobbying of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Chrétien promised Bono that Africa would be center stage and that Canada was prepared to open trade to the poorest African countries.³⁶⁰ There was hope that the 2002 G8 summit would create an historic plan for Africa – a plan the G8 originally intended to create during the 2001 summit in Genoa, Italy, but was derailed by rioting protesters. It was during the 2001 summit that Chrétien had first approached Bono and the two met on a cruise ship in Genoa.³⁶¹ Bono was also roundly criticized during the 2001 G8 meeting, when photos of the rock star showed him laughing with world leaders in the safety of the summit compound as Genoa descended into chaos. Bono explained that the picture caught his amused response to a joke by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who lightheartedly asked Bono "to go to work for him on Russia's debt."³⁶² Bono also acknowledged that it was "one of the worst moments for me ever captured in a photograph." He recalls: "The city looked like a war zone. A lot of people got hurt in riots. A young man

³⁶⁰ Charles Cobb Jr., "AAGM: Rock Star Bono's Agenda for Africa," *Financial Times*, 1 March 2002.

³⁶¹ Anne Dawson, "Chrétien Rocks with Bono; Rockers Ask PM to Help End Debt In Third World," *The Toronto Sun*, 22 July 2001, 4.

³⁶² Assayas, 2005, 237.

lost his life to an Italian policeman, and I was documented [on] the other side of the riot line, laughing with the politicians."

In February 2002, Bono and Chrétien met again at a New York Hotel where both were attending the World Economic Forum, and they discussed the upcoming Canadian G8 plan. Bono praised the Canadian leader's integrity noting: "It's just great to have a Prime Minister, you know, walk like he talks," and exclaimed that Chrétien "really is leading the world on this."³⁶³ Bono had also struck-up a friendship with Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin, who would succeed Chrétien as Prime Minister in December 2003. Bono spoke glowingly of both: "These Canadian politicians keep taking the lead on issues that really concern us, the people who are in what you might call the movement for change in the developing world."³⁶⁴ Chrétien challenged international leaders to "join with committed Africans in a new partnership for development, growth, and prosperity" during his speech at the World Economic Forum.

One week later, at the meeting of the G7 finance ministers in Canada, Chrétien charged Paul Martin with stirring interest in his African initiative.³⁶⁵ Martin may have attempted to pitch the idea to his fellow finance ministers, but U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill wasn't impressed. When reporters queried O'Neill about G7 discussions of Chrétien's African initiative, he noted that it was "touched on in only the most general of

³⁶³ David Gamble, "Canada Singing Bono's Tune; U2 Star Praises PM, Liberals," *The Toronto Sun*, 2 February 2002, 4.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Mike Blanchfield, "Treasury Secretary Lauds Bono's Efforts to Help Poor," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 10 February 2002, A5.

terms," and then "launched into an unprompted appreciation of Bono," stating that Bono had become "the real driving force behind raising the profile of Africa on the world stage."³⁶⁶

In April 2002, Chrétien took his own seven-nation trip to Africa in an attempt to highlight his upcoming G8 African initiative. The Montreal newspaper *The Gazette* observed that "Not since the end of the Cold War... has the issue of foreign aid lit up the global radar screen as brightly as it does now," and gave credit to Bono noting: "For a while there, it was starting to seem that Canada's foreign policy was being set by Bono of the Irish rock group U2, whose lobbying on the issue of Third World debt relief seems to have been a major factor prodding Canada into playing a leading role among industrialized nations."³⁶⁷ *The Toronto Sun* also credited Bono with Finance Minister Paul Martin's \$1 billion poor-country debt cancellation deal.³⁶⁸

As the G8 summit approached, rumors circulated that Bono would attend the summit, but he was unable to appear due to touring conflicts with U2. Bono called the Prime Minister offering his regrets, and thanked him for keeping the African issue at the forefront of discussion.³⁶⁹ Bono did manage to lobby one more G8 leader before the Canadian summit, when in mid-June he met French President Jacques Chirac in Paris. In the days preceding the summit, Chrétien repeatedly defended his African agenda to the other G8 leaders, the most notable being American President George W. Bush, who wanted Iraq to be

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ *Foreign Aid in Focus*, *The Gazette*, 1 April 2002, B2.

³⁶⁸ Anne Dawson, "Chrétien Rocks with Bono; Rockers Ask PM to Help End Debt In Third World," *The Toronto Sun*, 22 July 2001, 4.

³⁶⁹ *Bono Not Attending Summit, Sends Regrets to Chrétien*, *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 June 2002, A3.

the focus.³⁷⁰ Chrétien passionately insisted that "his African aid plan [wouldn't] be shoved aside," and candidly reminded reporters that he was the chair of the summit.³⁷¹ The initiative was being viewed as politically definitive for Chrétien (*The Toronto Sun* reported that Chrétien's African initiative "is vital... and has been billed as the legacy of his nine-year leadership."), and it was no surprise that he voraciously defended his agenda.

The media-hyped deal brokered by G8 leaders in the Canadian mountain resort town of Kananaskis, Alberta offered Africa a seemingly paltry \$1 billion – an amount that Canadian newspaper *the Daily Telegraph* sarcastically noted G8 nations spent “everyday on farm subsidies.”³⁷² Numerous aid organizations panned the deal, but British Prime Minister Tony Blair was more astute, calling it a significant step considering the G8 spent “a day discussing an African Action Plan,” and predicted that “This rightly will be remembered and known as the summit that devoted the lion’s share of its attention to Africa.” Blair explained, “We are going to help Africa help itself. This is not old-fashioned aid – it’s a genuine partnership for the renewal of Africa.”³⁷³ *The Financial Times* reported that Blair had been lobbying vigorously for extra money at the summit.³⁷⁴ French President Chirac also made a strong plea for increased assistance to Africa and called on all countries to react, and added, “The evils which are overcoming Africa wound us as well.” Bono was blunt in his criticism of what he perceived as Chrétien’s failure to convince world leaders to fork

³⁷⁰ Maria McClintlock and David Gamble, "Agenda Not Lost: PM; African Plan Top Priority at Kananaskis G8 Conference," *The Toronto Sun*, 25 June 2002, 18.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Andy McSmith, "Leaders ‘Lack the Will to Solve World Poverty,’” *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 2002, 14.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Christopher Adams and Ken Warn, "Africa Rescue Plan Sadly Inadequate, Say Aid Agencies," *The Financial Times*, 28 June 2002, 10.

over significant aid money for Africa.³⁷⁵ He complained: "It was an inspired thing, I think, of Prime Minister Chrétien... to have it as the centerpiece at this year's G8, but really what I'm looking at is a lot of rhetoric, a lot of the old numbers just kind of fiddled with. Basically, the scale of the response does not match the scale of the problem."³⁷⁶

³⁷⁵ Maria McClintlock, "Bono: Chrétien Failed Africans," *The Toronto Sun*, 29 June 2002, 10.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

14. DATA: Debt-AIDS-Trade-Africa

Bono's think tank/lobbying firm/advocacy group, DATA, was conceived at least a year earlier in 2001 when Bono had begun recruiting staff and fund raising for the new organization.³⁷⁷ Seth Amgott, who worked with Bono during the Jubilee 2000 Campaign as Media Spokesman for Oxfam and eventually became DATA's Communication Director, explained why DATA was formed: "[Bono] was enormously successful as a lobbyist and attracting attention to these issues, and the idea was to formalize it somehow, and have staff and lobbyists, and access to the best policy minds, and to work with the rest of Washington in a continuous fashion."³⁷⁸ Amgott also noted that in brainstorming the ideas that eventually materialized into DATA, Bono "cast a wide net," which included co-founder Bobby Shriver and director Jamie Drummond. DATA opened London and Washington D.C offices in 2002, and had over twenty staffers.³⁷⁹ DATA's two-part mission consists of raising public awareness and lobbying governments in the world's wealthy nations (The United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan) about Africa's unsustainable debts, the HIV/AIDS crisis, and unfair trade, which is detailed in Figures 1 and 2.³⁸⁰ Figure 1 is taken from a website section called "What is DATA?" Figure 2 contains website sections called "What does DATA do?" and "What is DATA proposing?" Figure 1 also outlines DATA's goal to persuade

³⁷⁷ Cathleen Falsani, "Bono's America," *Christianity Today*, March 2003, 44; and *Bono-Think*, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2002, A18.

³⁷⁸ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on 9 December 2005.

³⁷⁹ DATA website: <http://data.org/whydata/faqs/>; Eamon Javers, "Bono's K Street Connection," *CQ Weekly*, 28 March 2005, 762-3.

³⁸⁰ Figures 1 and 2 were taken directly from DATA's website www.data.org on 28 September 2005.

governments to provide "more resources towards Africa, and to adopt policy that helps rather than hinders Africa in achieving long-term prosperity." In return, DATA calls on African governments to provide democracy, accountability, and transparency. DATA also networks with other African-focused grassroots organizations and NGOs, which include international networks in Australia, Canada, Japan, and Africa itself. DATA also uses celebrities to focus public attention on Africa, and consults with other policy experts to inform their debate. DATA cites humanitarian, economic, and security reasons to justify its positions. Birdsall and Williamson explain the holistic strategy that DATA has embraced, noting the importance of simultaneously addressing several development issues (emphasis added):³⁸¹

Debt relief is not a magic bullet for getting the development process in poor countries back on the rails. Indeed, elementary arithmetic tells us that – if the estimates of the costs of achieving the millennium development goals are anywhere near the mark – even complete debt cancellation would not come close to sufficing. Any campaign directed to achieving these goals needs to focus on the issues of trade and aid, not just on debt – *as does Bono's new campaign leading up to the 2002 Group of Eight summit*. There is also, of course, a whole agenda of domestic reforms that developing countries themselves need to pursue, spanning governance, macroeconomic discipline, the institutional infrastructure of a market economy, public expenditure based on social services, and other priorities, as emphasized in the Monterrey consensus.

³⁸¹ Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, 101.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Monterrey consensus mentioned by Birdsall and Williamson refer to a set of eight U.N. goals that were developed from the September 2000 U.N. Millennium Declaration and are meant to "work toward a world that would promote peace and social justice, eradicate chronic poverty, and support sustainable development."³⁸² The goals and their year 2015 targets were formally adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in December 2001 and signed at the March 2002 U.N. inaugural International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, by all 191 U.N. member states.³⁸³ Several of the goals mirror those of DATA's for the African continent. The goals are as follows:

1. Eliminate extreme hunger and poverty
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

³⁸² Shalendra D. Sharma, "The Promise of Monterrey: Meeting the Millennium Development Goals," *World Policy Journal* (Fall 2004), 51.

³⁸³ Sachs, 2005, 25.

15. DATA's Efforts in the United States

DATA's inception created an indistinguishable line between the actions of Bono and his political organization. Bono's political lobbying now presumably represents DATA, but in actuality represents minimal divergence from his past lobbying actions. It is at this point he fully evolved from being a rock star with a cause to an institutionally legitimate lobbyist within the Washington machine. This work from this point forward will treat Bono's actions as synonymous with and representative of DATA's, as he and his think tank/lobbying firm rarely make any distinction.

DATA's first public entrée on to the American landscape was the December 2002 *Heart of America Tour*, where Bono, actress Ashley Judd, comedian/actor Chris Tucker, and bicyclist Lance Armstrong visited a host of public and private institutions including churches, colleges, and truck stops to spread awareness of the AIDS emergency.³⁸⁴ The tour hit towns from Nebraska to Tennessee, and featured financial guru Warren Buffet at its December 1 kickoff in Lincoln, Nebraska, who offered his support to DATA and shared his feelings about Bono: "I admire him enormously and believe his cause is just. As a Nebraskan, I am proud that Bono chose to begin his Heart of America tour here in

³⁸⁴ *Heart of America Tour: Africa's Future and Ours' Kicks Off on World AIDS Day*, DATA press release, 11 November 2002.

Lincoln."³⁸⁵ In their meeting, Buffet also advised Bono not to "appeal to America's conscience," but rather to its greatness.

³⁸⁵ *Warren Buffet Joins Activists Bono, Ashley Judd, and Lance Armstrong to Kick Off the Heart of America Tour in Lincoln, Nebraska*, DATA press release, 1 December 2002.

DATA aims to raise awareness about, and spark response to the crises swamping Africa: unpayable Debts, uncontrolled spread of AIDS, and unfair Trade rules which keep Africans poor.

DATA is part of a rising tide of action by people like you to beat back these crises.

The organization was founded in 2002 by Bono, the lead singer of U2, along with Bobby Shriver and activists from the Jubilee 2000 Drop the Debt campaign. At the core of DATA's mission is a view that these issues are not about charity, but about equality and justice.

DATA calls on the governments of the world's wealthy nations — the United States, Europe, Canada and Japan — to put more resources towards Africa, and to adopt policy that helps rather than hinders Africa in achieving long-term prosperity. We also call on Africa's leaders to strengthen Democracy, Accountability and Transparency toward their own citizens- to make sure that support for African people goes where it's intended and makes a real difference.

DATA is bringing people and organizations from all around the world together to stop the spread of AIDS and extreme poverty in Africa. From our offices in Washington D.C. and Los Angeles, we work in partnership with grassroots organizers and other non-governmental organizations across the US to build a movement of Americans who want to help Africans achieve a better future and want their government to do the same.

In Europe, our office in London works with other organizations to raise awareness and put pressure on governments, especially the members of the G8 and the EU (U.K., France, Germany, Italy) who, alongside the US, are the world's largest economies. Through international networks, we also work with campaigners in other countries such as Australia, Canada and Japan as well as in Africa itself.

DATA has focused public attention on Africa through trips to the continent with high-profile celebrities (such as Bono, Bob Geldof and Chris Tucker), politicians and media, as well as inviting African activists from Uganda and Ghana to tour with celebrities through the United States (such as Ashley Judd, Warren Buffett and Lance Armstrong), as well as through reports on whether politicians are keeping their promises to Africa.

We talk to the experts, so we know what is really working — and what's not. We pull together, summarize and explain cutting-edge research on what works in Africa — and use our access to deliver those insights to top officials who might otherwise not hear the message of hope. And above all, we work to tell our leaders and politicians that people like YOU want to see action.

Again and again, politicians tell us they want to do more for Africa. Then they don't. Why? Because they don't hear from YOU — their citizens, voters and taxpayers — that you care and want to see something done. We're here to get the word out that you do care — and to give YOU the best ways to get the word out for yourself

Fig. 1. What is DATA?³⁸⁶

³⁸⁶ Figure 1 was taken directly from DATA's website on 28 September, Available [Online]: www.data.org 2005.

DATA works to raise awareness of the crisis facing Africa and to increase support in the United States and abroad to address this issue. We lobby the governments of wealthy nations to increase funding and promote policies which will benefit Africa. We also work to inform citizens of wealthier countries and to increase grassroots support for better policies towards Africa.

What is DATA Proposing? DATA advocates a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the crises of poverty and disease that plague the African continent. For humanitarian, economic and security reasons, DATA is asking for a real commitment from richer countries to:

Relieve unpayable debts — Many African countries are paying more in old debts to rich countries than they pay for health care or education for their own people! These countries have developed clear and budgeted plans for how they could fight poverty if only the resources were available and debt relief is one way to provide those resources. The rich countries that have already committed to forgiving African debt need to follow through and they also need to work with the World Bank and the IMF to forgive the debts owed to these international organizations.

Fight the AIDS crisis — Africa is home to 30 million living with HIV/AIDS; 6,500 die every day and there are already 11 million orphans. AIDS is a global emergency and the whole world needs to work together to fight it. It will cost more than \$10 billion per year to fight this killer; so far, we're spending less than half that amount. Every year we wait to fully fight the epidemic, more people die and the overall cost of stopping AIDS gets bigger. Rich countries need to work with Africa to raise the money needed, to fight the stigma attached to living with AIDS, and to make sure the drugs that are needed to fight AIDS and other diseases are available to Africans.

Provide more development assistance — Development assistance is critical to helping countries pay for education, health care, clean water, roads and other development priorities. We've set a global goal of dedicating 0.7% of our nations' wealth on the poor people of the world — but most rich countries aren't even close to that goal. While increasing the quantity of development assistance, we also need to improve the quality of development to make sure that every dollar, euro, and yen we send is as effective as possible.

Make trade fair so that Africa can work to boost its own economic growth — Africa is currently limited in its ability to earn resources through trade because international trade rules limit Africans' ability to sell their products abroad and allow for U.S. and European goods to be 'dumped' into African markets at disproportionately low prices. The U.S. should open its market quota and duty free to all African exports and remove agricultural subsidies which hurt African farmers.

We're not asking for cookie-cutter solutions or band-aids. We're looking for the richer countries of the world to stand up and say enough is enough. Only by making a long-term commitment can the U.S. truly help Africa achieve the internationally agreed upon Millennium Development Goals to cut poverty in half.

Fig. 2. What Does DATA Do?³⁸⁷

³⁸⁷ Figure 2 was taken directly from DATA's website on 28 September, Available [Online]: www.data.org 2005.

During the tour, DATA activists distributed a total of 10,000 action cards that could be sent to Congress or President Bush, and demanded that the crisis in Africa be answered with an historic HIV/AIDS initiative.³⁸⁸ In Chicago, Bono met with pastor Bill Hybels of suburban mega-church Willow Creek, who "came away convinced that Bono's faith is genuine, his vision to relieve the tragic suffering in Africa is God-honoring, and his prophetic challenge to the U.S. church must be taken seriously."³⁸⁹ Bono spoke to numerous churches and repeatedly told their congregations that the African HIV/AIDS crisis is the defining moral issue of our time.³⁹⁰ Bono also commented on the sometimes incongruous relationship between HIV/AIDS and the Christian church during a speech at JFK airport in New York where 80,000 gift boxes were being sent to infected African children by Franklin Graham's Operation Christmas Child: "It brings out the best in the church, like you see today in response to these children suffering HIV. But if we're honest, it has also brought out the worst in the church. Judgmentalism [sic], a kind of sense that people who have AIDS, well, they got it because they deserve it. Well from my studies of the Scriptures, I don't see a hierarchy to sin. I don't see sexual immorality registering higher up on the list than institutional greed – or greed of any kind, actually; Problems we suffer in the West."³⁹¹

Bono's coalition building strategy was strongly manifested during DATA's *Heart of America Tour*. Bono felt it was imperative to gather ground support from the Christian contingent to win his African policy battle in America – no matter the denomination. Bono

³⁸⁸ Ibid and Cathleen Falsani, *Bono's America*, Christianity Today, March 2003, 44.

³⁸⁹ Cathleen Falsani, March 2003, 40-41.

³⁹⁰ Ibid, 41.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

and DATA hit St. Paul's United Methodist Church in Lincoln, the "Evangelical Mecca" Wheaton College outside Chicago, Northeast Christian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, and several others. Bono explained his strategy in a *Christianity Today* interview, which was ultimately the same reason he granted an interview to the Christian publication: "This is what's important and why I would be doing this interview with *Christianity Today*, to implore the church to reconsider grace, to put an end to the hierarchy of sin... All have fallen short. Let's stop throwing stones at people who've made mistakes in their life, and let's start throwing drugs."³⁹² It was now obvious that DATA would utilize Bono's strategies of nonpartisanship and coalition building, which was exemplified by DATA's goal of uniting liberals and social conservatives.³⁹³

In early 2003, Bono's and DATA's efforts to increase U.S. assistance for the African HIV/AIDS epidemic were unexpectedly addressed during the President's January 28 State of the Union speech. Africa received top billing as Bush unveiled his new and unprecedented plan to combat African HIV/AIDS – the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Bush asked Congress to triple current HIV/AIDS funding for Africa, or \$15 billion over five years. Kofi Annan highlighted the importance of the announcement noting: "This is an enormous breakthrough. It's the first time in the history of this pandemic that we are seeing a commitment for anything on the scale that is

³⁹² Ibid, 43.

³⁹³ Eamon Javers, 28 March 2005, 762-3.

necessary."³⁹⁴ *The Washington Post* reported that Bush surprised many Republicans with the African announcement and that it represented a marked change from the position shortly after Bush took office.³⁹⁵ *Foreign Affairs* called the president's dramatically increased foreign aid "One of the greatest surprises of George W. Bush's presidency," citing both the Millennium Challenge Accounts and PEPFAR, and called the new HIV/AIDS bill "a huge step forward for an Administration in which several top officials had publicly questioned whether Africans have the capacity to implement treatment programs effectively."³⁹⁶ *Foreign Affairs* credited "the Helms conversion, coupled with quiet backing from conservative religious leaders such as Franklin Graham," as providing enough support to enact the revolutionary HIV/AIDS program. *The Washington Post* credited Bush's remarkable turnabout to "An unlikely coalition of Christian evangelicals and liberal activists." It was also reported that Bush Administration officials were "convinced of the scale of the crisis in part because of trips to Africa last year by outgoing Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans."³⁹⁷ The *Post* also mentioned that several Administration officials had become friends of Bono.

Although Bono had been a postscript in the *Washington Post* article, his involvement was imperative to the PEPFAR announcement, as evidenced by his many lobbying meetings and through ideological converts such as Paul O'Neill. And there was the promise for a

³⁹⁴ Mike Allen and Paul Blustein, "Unlikely Allies Influenced Bush to Shift Course on AIDS Relief," *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2003, A1.

³⁹⁵ Ibid

³⁹⁶ Steven Radelet, "Bush and Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2003), 82, no. 5 104-117.

³⁹⁷ Mike Allen and Paul Blustein, "Unlikely Allies Influenced Bush to Shift Course on AIDS Relief," *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2003, A1.

historic HIV/AIDS initiative from Condoleezza Rice. In addition, the Bush Administration's summoning of key DATA personnel for the MCA bill exhibited their reliance on Bono's policy wonks for the development of legislation.

Bono had also written an op-ed in *The Washington Post* the day before the State of the Union Speech, which urged the president to talk about the HIV/AIDS crisis "for a few minutes... and define a historic American response."³⁹⁸ President Bush appeared to answer Bono's challenge directly during the State of the Union when he noted: "Ladies and gentlemen, seldom has history offered a greater opportunity to do so much for so many."³⁹⁹ Bono's op-ed also recounted his meetings with Bush who had "promised that despite the deficit... these efforts would not go without funding." In addition, Bono wrote of hearing the rumblings of a movement on DATA's Heart of America tour. Surely Bono knew about the historic State of the Union announcement beforehand, and coordinated his *Washington Post* op-ed accordingly.

Bono sounded like a seasoned political lobbyist in the subsequent DATA press release, where he acknowledged the Congressional funding reality that lay before PEPFAR: "Now we must work with Congress to turn this vision into a funded reality and demand measurable results in the war against AIDS on the ground..."⁴⁰⁰ President Bush's plan called for \$15 billion over five years, \$8.5 billion of which would be new monies distributed from a U.S. bilateral account called the Global AIDS initiative aimed at 14 of the hardest hit

³⁹⁸ Bono, "Mr. President, Africa Needs Us," *The Washington Post*, 27 January 2003, A19.

³⁹⁹ *DATA's Reaction to President Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief*, DATA press release, 1 February 2003.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

countries. In addition, a new U.S. AIDS Ambassador office was created within the State Department, with the inaugural appointment conferring ex-Eli Lilly CEO Dr. Randall Tobias. One billion dollars would also be earmarked for multilateral funding to the newly formed Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Although announced with historical overtones, these new monies would be continually contested throughout the appropriations process in the U.S. Congress.

The new HIV/AIDS funding hit political reality upon first discussions in the House of Representatives, where it was initially snared in partisan wrangling. The first issue surrounded the U.S. contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS – Democrats were intent on funding the new organization, arguing that the U.S. was obligated considering that Congress had helped authorized its creation.⁴⁰¹ House Republicans who wanted conditions attached, including provisions that would prohibit funding for groups that supported abortion and condom distribution.⁴⁰² The White House became involved in the fray when it helped kill a March 17 bipartisan agreement, bowing to conservative pressure about the concerns.⁴⁰³ Bush eventually prodded lawmakers to accept an amended version that guaranteed priority for abstinence education and allowed faith-based groups to opt-out of the condom distribution measures found in most HIV/AIDS prevention programs. The president spoke to members of Congress, the ambassadorial corps, and HIV/AIDS activists at a White

⁴⁰¹ Niels C. Sorrells, "Bright Hope for AIDS Bill Dim in New Round of Debate," *CQ Weekly*, 8 March 2003, 570.

⁴⁰² Jonathan Riehl, "Bush Cites Uganda's Anti-AIDS Program as Template for Action," *CQ Weekly*, 8 March 2003, 571.

⁴⁰³ Bob Cusack, "White House Derails AIDS Funding Bill; Rep. Hyde to Revise Assistance Legislation," *The Hill*, 1 April 2003, 11.

House AIDS event, two days before the House voted on the amended Hyde-Lantos bill that sponsored the funding.⁴⁰⁴ There were no subtleties in Bush's speech that day: "We are here today to urge both Houses of the United States Congress to pass the emergency plan for AIDS relief, which will dramatically expand our fight against AIDS across the globe." Bush once again referenced the historic implications of the legislation when he starkly offered two possible responses to the suffering brought on by HIV/AIDS: "We can turn our eyes away in resignation and despair, or we can take decisive, historic action to turn the tide against this disease and give the hope of life to millions who need our help now. The United States of America chooses the path of action and the path of hope."⁴⁰⁵ Bush also cited the horrific HIV/AIDS statistics from the previous three months – or since the PEPFAR announcement – 760,000 deaths, 1.2 million new infections, and 175,000 HIV/AIDS infected babies born. He lastly urged Congressional speed and seriousness, and urged "all nations...to join with us in this great effort."

On May 1, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the bill 375-41, and then went to the Senate.⁴⁰⁶ A DATA press release praised the vote and noted it was "the first major legislative effort since Bono founded DATA to advance the goals he has been working on for over five years of informal work with members of Congress, heads of state

⁴⁰⁴ *Bush to Urge Action on Global AIDS Bill*, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 29 April 2003, 5A; *President Urges Congress to Act Quickly on Global HIV/AIDS Initiative*, White House Office of Press Secretary Press Release, 29 April 2003.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid

⁴⁰⁶ Niels C. Sorrells, "House Passes Bush Anti-AIDS Plan; Democrats Challenge GOP Changes," *CQ Weekly*, 3 May 2003, 1056-7.

and international leaders on behalf of Africa."⁴⁰⁷ The Senate speedily passed the House version unchanged on May 16 – due in large part to pressure from the Bush White House. Indiana Republican and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar initially pressed for his own version of the bill, but Bush urged him to drop it and pass the House version so Bush could have a global HIV/AIDS bill for the June G8 Summit in France.⁴⁰⁸ The final version included one minor change that recommended debt relief for nations hit hardest by HIV/AIDS, which the House accepted on May 21 and was signed into law by President Bush on May 27th. Bono was also pushing for a Congressional deal before the G8 Summit with an attached debt relief provision, positions that he outlined in a May 15 DATA press release: "Congress needs to work its will quickly to get an historic bipartisan bill by the time of the G8 Summit in France. Debt relief is a critical component of the AIDS fight; it doesn't make sense to give AIDS cash with one hand and take debt service back with the other."⁴⁰⁹

The new HIV/AIDS bill pledged up to \$1 billion per year for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, but was contingent on funding matches by other wealthy nations – which is partially why Bush wanted to have bill in hand at the G8 Summit. Bono quickly turned to his European ally Tony Blair, who along with new U.K. international development secretary Baroness Amos, hosted breakfast talks on May 22 at his Downing Street home for Bono and fellow African campaigner Bob Geldof. Blair's official spokesman cited the occasion as an

⁴⁰⁷ *Bono's Group: House Vote Advances Historic AIDS initiative*, DATA Press Release, 1 May 2003.

⁴⁰⁸ Niels C. Sorrells, "Political Expediency Takes Over As Senate Passes AIDS Relief Bill," *CQ Weekly*, 17 May 2003, 1210-1.

⁴⁰⁹ *Bono's Statement on Congressional Action on AIDS*, DATA Press Release, 15 May 2003.

“opportunity to take stock of progress on the action plan for Africa agreed at last year’s G8 Summit.”⁴¹⁰ Bono also spoke with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and French President Jacques Chirac to increase pressure on the G8 to “deliver something meaningful on AIDS at the G8 Summit.”⁴¹¹ In addition, DATA sent all the G8 leaders a strategy package complete with a note from Bono. President Chirac responded and called for Europe to join with the United States in the war on AIDS.⁴¹²

The G8 Summit was mostly overshadowed because of the publicized rift between Bush and Chirac, after the French leader questioned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As *The Independent* reported, "discussion of the most contentious issues had been kept at a general level to avoid headlines about ‘summer splits,’ which could destabilize the world economy.”⁴¹³ G8 members did meet with the leaders of five African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) to discuss progress on Africa’s New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a 2002 deal that African leaders struck with donor countries, which obliged them to improve their economic and political governance.⁴¹⁴ *The Financial Times* reported, "It was still hard to find common ground both among the EU leaders and with the U.S. over their agricultural subsidies to Africa.”⁴¹⁵ EU leaders also postponed their planned funding match of U.S. HIV/AIDS monies until a June 20th

⁴¹⁰ Liane Katz, "Blair to Hold Africa Talks With Stars," *The Guardian*, 21 May 2003.

⁴¹¹ *President Signs AIDS Bill with Added Debt relief; Clarifies Greater Support for Global Fund to Fight AIDS*, DATA Press Release, 27 May 2003.

⁴¹² *DATA Reaction to European AIDS Funding Announcement*, DATA Press Release 1 June 2003.

⁴¹³ John Lichfield, "G8 Summit: Third World Attacks Failure of Evian to Tackle its Problems," *The Independent*, 4 June 2003, 12.

⁴¹⁴ Robert Graham and Michael Peel, "France Wants Dollars 6bn Africa Pledge to be Honoured," *The Financial Times*, 2 June 2003, 9.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

European Council Meeting in Greece. Jamie Drummond of DATA explained that "The Europeans put off a real commitment on AIDS for three weeks..."⁴¹⁶ At the June 20th meeting, Tony Blair announced that Europe would be unable to match the U.S. contribution, as budget problems rendered them unable to commit.⁴¹⁷ Bono attacked the European laggards by penning an open letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that appealed for German share of EU match and claimed, "A small group of countries including Germany are blocking this agreement."⁴¹⁸ A German government spokeswoman rebutted Bono's accusations stating they were "simply wrong" and added, "All claims that the present government is not doing enough in the fight against AIDS do not correspond to reality."⁴¹⁹ It became apparent that Bush was serious about matching European funds when he undercut the U.S. HIV/AIDS bill with a \$1.65 billion in the 2004 budget.⁴²⁰ In addition, his budget request for the Millennium Challenge Account was only \$1.3 billion, \$400 million less than anticipated.⁴²¹

In early July, Bush became only the third U.S. President to visit sub-Saharan Africa when he took a weeklong tour of Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, and Nigeria,

⁴¹⁶ *DATA Reaction to Evian G8 Summit*, DATA Press Release, 2 June 2003.

⁴¹⁷ *EU Will Not Match US AIDS Donation*, The Guardian, 20 June 2003.

⁴¹⁸ *U2 Lead Singer Bono Calls on Schröder to back AIDS fund*, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 July 2003.

⁴¹⁹ Derek Scally, "Germans Deny Bono Claims on Blocking Funds to Fight AIDS," *The Irish Times*, 18 July 2003, 15.

⁴²⁰ Carolyn Skornek, "Overseas AID for '04: Back to Status Quo," *CQ Weekly*, 14 June 2003, 1442.

⁴²¹ *DATA Responds to Today's Congressional Activity and Calls for America to Help Keep President Bush's Promise to Africa*, DATA Press Release, 22 July 2003.

where the president received “a generally polite but indifferent welcome.”⁴²² Bush used the trip to tout PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Account, and prodded Congress to fund both. DATA simultaneously launched its *Keep America’s Promise to Africa* campaign, which was formed in response to Bush’s attempted funding cuts. The campaign sought to raise awareness across America about the initiatives, and announced a major partnership with America Online (AOL) designed to bring unprecedented awareness about the African crisis while educating millions of Americans.⁴²³ The campaign also enlisted a large contingent of prominent Christians including musicians and church leaders.⁴²⁴ The Christian groups engaged in numerous activities including a pledge card drive focused at concerts, festivals, and churches. In addition, Bono filmed a public service announcement about the HIV/AIDS emergency that was shown at many of the same events.

The new DATA campaign was reacting to a July move by the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee that proposed only \$2.1 billion for the AIDS bill, almost a third less than originally promised in Bush’s State of the Union address six months earlier, and again during his recent speeches in Africa.⁴²⁵ Subcommittee Chairman and

⁴²² Taken from White House website; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/>; Dana Milbank, “Bush to Congress: Fund AIDS Fight; President Vows to Work for Peace in Africa,” *The Washington Post*, 13 July 2003, A18.

⁴²³ *With President Bush in Africa, Congress Holds the Fate of Historic Presidential Promise to Africa in its Hands*, DATA Press Release, 8 July 2003.

⁴²⁴ *Churches, Christian Artists and Faith Community Play Vital Role in Urging Americans to Keep Promise to Africa, as Congress Holds Fate of Historic Presidential Promise in its Hands*, DATA Press Release, 14 July 2003.

⁴²⁵ In a July 9 meeting with South African President Thabo Mbeki Bush said: “Over the next five years, we will spend \$15 billion in the global fight against AIDS.” And In a July 11 Ugandan speech Bush noted: “over the next five years, my country will spend \$15 billion on the fight -- (applause) -- to fight AIDS around the world, with special focus here on the continent of Africa.” *President Bush Meets with South African President Mbeki*,

Arizona Republican Jim Kolbe explained that the original \$15 billion authorization was “a floor, not a ceiling,” even though the subcommittee’s HIV/AIDS bill budget request was actually more than Bush’s June request.⁴²⁶ Kolbe also chided Bush for complicating the job, noting that Bush “compounds the problem by continuing to talk about the \$3 billion, the \$15 billion, in Africa.” The subcommittee’s ranking Democrat, Nita Lowey of New York, perhaps interpreted Bush’s pronouncements most aptly when she accused him of creating the illusion of funding \$3 billion for the AIDS bill in 2004, when “In reality, he requested only \$2 billion.”⁴²⁷ The House passed a \$17.2 billion foreign operations spending bill on July 24 that included \$2 billion for PEPFAR and \$800 million for the Millennium Challenge Account, which were both sent to the Senate for consideration.⁴²⁸

Bono began his fall American budget-lobbying blitz anew in September, which was now becoming a trend for the rock star. Bono also engineered private meetings with President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Senate Minority Leader and South Dakotan Democrat Tom Daschle, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.⁴²⁹ Bono first met with President Bush in a September 16 Oval Office session, where he pressed him on the remaining \$1 billion for PEPFAR. Bono explained the urgency of the additional funding: “For the extra \$1 billion, this contentious extra \$1 billion, you’re going

July 8, 2003; *President Bush Discusses Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*, White House Press Releases, 11 July 2003.

⁴²⁶ Carolyn Skornek, “House Panel Expresses Regret Over Lack of Funding for Plan To Fight HIV/AIDS Overseas,” *CQ Weekly*, 12 July 2003, 1766.

⁴²⁷ Ibid

⁴²⁸ Carolyn Skornek, “AIDS Program Supporters Hope Senate Will Come Through With Full Funding for Program,” *CQ Weekly*, 26 July 2003, 1922.

⁴²⁹ John Bresnahan, “Bono Plays the Money Game,” *Roll Call*, 16 September 2003.

to be able to prevent 1.6 million – one million, six hundred thousand people – from getting infected."⁴³⁰ Bono felt that Bush would face long-term political fallout if the promised funding were not approved. Bono candidly noted: "It will be seized upon as proof that George Bush is insincere, that his so-called 'historic AIDS initiative' wasn't in fact. That it was an incremental improvement in AIDS numbers, [Bush's Africa trip in July] was a showpiece and that the Irish rock star was an idiot for standing in the photographs." Bono's meeting with the president wasn't his typical genial lobbying engagement as he and the president "had a good ole row" over the HIV/AIDS funding.⁴³¹ Bono reported feeling depressed afterwards, as he and the president couldn't agree on the numbers. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan cited aid infrastructure concerns as reason for under-funding the program in its first year. He assured reporters that funding would continue to ramp up over time and that PEPFAR would receive a total of \$15 billion over five years.⁴³²

Bono and DATA also hosted a Washington *Keep America's Promise to Africa* event that called on President Bush and Congress to fully fund the HIV/AIDS bill and the Millennium Challenge Account.⁴³³ The event featured numerous Christian groups including the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bread for the World, World Vision, the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. DATA claimed that the groups wrote thousands of letters to Congress in support of the MCA and

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Mike Allen, "Bono Recounts 'Row' With President Over AIDS Funds; Africa Needs More Money Sooner, Singer Says," *The Washington Post*, 17 September 2003, A3.

⁴³² White House Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, 16 September 2003.

⁴³³ *Bono, Bishops, Africa Experts Call for Full Funding on Global AIDS and Anti-Poverty Promises*, DATA Press Release, 16 September 2003.

HIV/AIDS initiatives. DATA also bought promotional radio ads in targeted states that included Pennsylvania and Ohio, home states of key U.S. Senators. The ads featured actress Ashley Judd calling out Senators Arlen Specter, Rick Santorum and Mike DeWine; asking them "to keep America's promise of \$3 billion in the next year to fight AIDS in Africa."⁴³⁴ She also called HIV/AIDS the worst plague in human history. Judd's ad provided a toll-free number that would connect listeners to their Senator's office in Washington.

Senator Santorum eventually became one of Bono's key conservative allies as he "tried to persuade White House officials that the MCA is 'part of our war on terror' and should be financed accordingly."⁴³⁵ In December 2004, Santorum wrote a *Roll Call* op-ed to fellow Republicans stating that they "have an obligation to lead the fight against the pandemic of HIV/AIDS," and called HIV/AIDS "one of the greatest challenges of our time."⁴³⁶ Santorum also challenged all of Congress, noting it had "the responsibility to extend aid and adequate funding to the men, women and children affected by HIV/AIDS around the world." Santorum said of Bono, he is "above anybody I've run into among celebrities," and added: "He came with the proverbial baggage because of previous celebrities. He knows he has to be better than that. He has to have the knowledge...tangible, discernable goals, tangible discernable data. That, to me, is really what he has brought."⁴³⁷

⁴³⁴ Ashley Judd Speaks Directly to Voters: Tell Senators Specter and Santorum to Fully Fund the Global AIDS Initiative, DATA Press Release, 30 September 2003; and Ashley Judd Speaks Directly to Voters: Tell Senator DeWine to Fully Fund the Global AIDS Initiative, DATA Press Release, 1 October 2003.

⁴³⁵ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁴³⁶ Rick Santorum, "How do Republicans and Democrats Plan to Lead in the 109th Congress?; GOP Must Keep Campaign Promises," *Roll Call*, 6 December 2004.

⁴³⁷ *What Washington Says About Bono*, The Associated Press, 7 June 2005.

Santorum's accolades highlight yet another instance of Bono's talents with the issues – it was apparent that the rock star was becoming a policy expert.

The DATA ads may have had their intended effect as Ohio Republican Senator DeWine proposed a \$289 million amendment to the AIDS bill, which was passed 89-1 on October 30 and boosted the total to \$2.4 billion – \$400 million more than the original Bush budget request. DeWine and Oklahoma Republican Don Nickles skirmished over the amendment, the latter of whom stalled the measure for three days because it was not offset by cuts in other foreign aid monies.⁴³⁸ Although DeWine may have been motivated by the DATA ads, he has been a noted African proponent and a top Republican lawmaker on the HIV/AIDS issue.⁴³⁹ DeWine was also part of a Senatorial contingent headed by Bill Frist that went on a 10 day African visit the previous August, where he was moved by the “pain, death and orphaned children left in the wake of this epidemic.”⁴⁴⁰ Bono responded in a DATA press release calling it “a key move from the Senate,” and praised the Senators including DeWine, calling them “the bodyguards of the world’s poor.”⁴⁴¹ The final funding for PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Account was not officially available until January 22, as the omnibus spending bill was passed as a part of the fiscal year 2004 budget. PEPFAR received \$2.4 billion and the Millennium Challenge Account \$1 billion. DATA’s

⁴³⁸ Tom Diemer, "Senate Boosts U.S. Spending to Fight Global AIDS Epidemic," *Plain Dealer*, 1 November 2003, A7.

⁴³⁹ Jack Torry and Kevin Joy, "U2 Lead Singer Bono Hails DeWine's Efforts to Help Poor," *Columbus Dispatch*, 2 November 2003, 6A.

⁴⁴⁰ Tom Diemer, "Senate Boosts U.S. Spending to Fight Global AIDS Epidemic," *Plain Dealer*, 1 November 2003, A7.

⁴⁴¹ *DeWine Amendment on Global AIDS Passes Senate by 89-1; Bono and DATA Reaction*, DATA Press Release, 31 October 2003.

executive director Jamie Drummond called the new monies the largest increase in U.S. assistance to poor countries in 40 years.⁴⁴²

Bono's academic advisor Jeffrey Sachs discussed the rock star's involvement with the new HIV/AIDS bill, explaining that Bono had a "front row seat in the shaping of a political coalition that delivered a package of aid initially derided as preposterous."⁴⁴³ Sachs also took credit for pitching the \$3 billion per year program to the Bush Administration, and notes he twice briefed Condoleezza Rice in the early days of the Bush Administration. Sachs discussed with Rice the need for a major expansion of HIV/AIDS treatment, and argued for its practicality and affordability. In addition, Sachs' ex-student and new Chief Economic Advisor to President Bush, Lawrence Lindsay, offered little hope when he told Sachs not to hold his breathe for the \$3 billion per year. But Sachs credits the success of the AIDS bill to the broad coalition that had formed and backed the issue. He cited a contingent of "liberals, the religious right, NGOs, and a broad public" who were far more sympathetic to action than the political leaders suspected. Sachs saved his Bono-praise for last by noting:⁴⁴⁴

Once again, Bono played a unique role in pulling the coalition together, not just as a celebrity and entertainer, but as a rare individual who could reach deeply into the hearts and minds of a remarkable range of individuals. ...Bono brilliantly brought the AIDS tragedy to the attention of several key leaders of the religious right, and this in turn showed the White House that AIDS legislation was not a political trap,

⁴⁴² *DATA on Federal Budget Passage: Biggest Increase for Poor Countries in 40 Years*, DATA Press Release, 22 January 2004.

⁴⁴³ Sachs, 2005, 343.

⁴⁴⁴ Sachs, 2005, 344.

but actually a political boon. ...In the end this coalition was even more inclusive than usual. It involved experts from the public health and biomedical community. ...It involved celebrities, religious leaders, liberals and conservatives. And ultimately, the president.

Bono surpassed his own political efforts for the third time in as many years with the PEPFAR HIV/AIDS legislation. PEPFAR was more financially robust than the MCA legislation, and was delivered with historic overtones. DATA policy experts probably assisted in writing PEPFAR legislation, similar to their role in the MCA process. It is known that Bono-mentor Jeffrey Sachs presented the PEPFAR idea to the Bush Administration and probably also assisted in writing the bill. As Sachs' ebullient praise of Bono explains, the rock star used his remarkable coalition building talents to build the consensus that ultimately forced the issue.

The African aid that was secured for FY 2004 with the help of Bono and DATA was no small victory, but offered little time for celebration as the vicious Washington money game began anew. Ten days after DATA announced the largest increase in U.S. assistance to poor countries in 40 years, President Bush submitted his fiscal 2005-budget proposal, which included \$2.8 billion for the global AIDS bill and \$2.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account.⁴⁴⁵ The \$2.8 billion Bush requested for PEPFAR was close to what was expected, as the Administration had always insisted that funding would ramp up over five years. But the MCA request was less than the \$3.3 billion that had been anticipated. The

⁴⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State Webpage, Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28709.htm> ; International Affairs-FY 2005 Budget, Fact Sheet. Office of the Spokesman, 2 February 2004.

Global Fund for AIDS also took a big hit from Bush as he proposed only \$200 million for the multilateral program, a \$300 million reduction from FY 2004. DATA's Jamie Drummond swiftly announced plans to work with the Administration and Congress for full funding of the three programs, while avoiding cuts to other life saving programs.⁴⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the first eligible MCA countries were announced in May, and half were in Africa. DATA also released a report, *Meeting the Millennium Challenge*, which highlighted existing logistics and the capacity of African countries to fully utilize MCA funding.⁴⁴⁷

DATA's Director of Government Relations, Thomas Hart, testified before the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology on April 20, and argued for greater African debt relief with fewer conditions attached. Bono also joined the Congressional testimony circuit on May 18 when he appeared as a witness representing DATA, along with AIDS ambassador Randall Tobias, before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee chaired by Kentucky Republican Mitch McConnell. Ohio Senator DeWine explained that the purpose of the hearing was to examine current and future U.S. HIV/AIDS funding in regard to Bush's Global AIDS Initiative. DeWine also used the Bono sound byte "historic" in reference to the initiative, and praised Bono's efforts noting: "We don't know anyone else who has really had the vision in this area and who has captured the attention of the public, not only in the United States, but all around the world, and we

⁴⁴⁶ *Reaction to the President's Budget Request on Global AIDS and Poor Countries*, DATA Press Release, 2 February 2004.

⁴⁴⁷ *DATA Report: Meeting the Millennium Challenge*, DATA Press Release, 15 May 2004.

salute him for his great work as well."⁴⁴⁸ Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy noted that he was "delighted that longtime friend, Bono, is here," and explained: "He is a close friend of the Leahy family. We have spent time together, each member of the family with him, and we think the world of him." Dr. Tobias continued the Bono encomiums exclaiming, "It would be hard to find anybody who's worked harder on this issue..."

Tobias began by discussing the programmatic foci of the HIV/AIDS bill, noting that \$350 million had just been released to recipient countries for antiretroviral treatment, HIV/AIDS prevention, safe medical practice programs, and care for orphans and vulnerable children.⁴⁴⁹ McConnell, DeWine, Leahy, and Illinois Democrat Richard Durbin then questioned Tobias about various programmatic aspects including the organizational capacities of involved agencies and actors. After a recess, Bono took the stand and received a glowing introduction from McConnell: "Our second witness needs no introduction. In this town, he's known as much for his music as he is for his work on behalf of HIV/AIDS and debt relief. He's an effective spokesman for these causes, and his political skills are as good as any on this subcommittee, perhaps even better." Then, in a seemingly unexpected political move, McConnell mentioned a *Time* article in which Bono discussed his admiration for Burmese National League for Democracy leader and political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi. McConnell publicly asked Bono to help publicize her situation with a straightforward plea: "I unabashedly use this opportunity while the spotlight shines on a high profile activist

⁴⁴⁸ Transcript of U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Holds a Hearing on FY '05 Budget Request for HIV/AIDS Programs and Research, 18 May 2004.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

such as yourself to highlight her plight," and added, "Bono, I know you agree that we cannot fail Suu Kyi or freedom in Burma." The Bono/McConnell Burma connection stems from a mutual interest in Suu Kyi's plight, and culminated with a January 2004 jointly-penned open letter to the United Nations. In the letter Bono and McConnell called for increased sanctions to help push the Yangon regime towards democracy, and warned that, "The future of Myanmar rests with the return of democracy and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues."⁴⁵⁰ It also requested involvement from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and U.N. leader Kofi Annan. It became clear that McConnell and Bono also wanted to use the Congressional hearing to publicize their Burmese political objectives.

After McConnell's Burmese detour, Bono gave his opening remarks, recalled his previous work with McConnell on debt relief, and cited some of the accomplishments that the freed monies provided including three times the amount of Ugandan children who were now able to attend school. Bono went on to mention his work with the Bush Administration on the MCA, and urged the Senators to support the president's \$2.5 billion budget request. He also pled for more dollars for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, offering commonsense reasoning: "Every dollar counts, but some dollars count for triple. By this, I'm talking about the Global Health Fund, an essential part of the fight and a vital partner to what the U.S. is doing. Every contribution America makes gets other countries to kick in more. Tony Blair says so. So does President Chirac. So does Paul Martin. I know because I've spoken to all

⁴⁵⁰ *Rock Star Bono Leads Call for Action Against Myanmar Junta*, Agence France Presse, 19 January 2004.

these people recently. I make their lives miserable, too, you'll be relieved to hear."⁴⁵¹ Bono also brought AIDS activist and African nurse Agnes Nyamayawo to testify, who after having been diagnosed HIV positive 15 years ago, offered living proof of the effectiveness of antiretroviral drugs.

The questioning from the Senators thus began, and once again, the Burmese situation surfaced when McConnell asked Bono on the record if he supported the "renewal of import sanctions against the Burmese Hunta [sic]." Bono enthusiastically responded, "I don't just support it, I applaud it as loudly as I can," and added, "Let me say on your leadership on this, there's no one leading support for Aung San Suu Kyi like you, and to have Senator Leahy by your side and make sure that this has the support of all of America is amazing." McConnell then sought Bono's advice on convincing the EU for "a tougher approach...towards the generals in Rangoon," and dryly noted, "I thought the attempted assassination of Suu Kyi last year might have gotten their attention, but apparently not." Yet before Bono could answer, McConnell rephrased his original question more directly: "What thoughts do you have about how we get the Europeans fully engaged in the sanctions regime?" Bono's response was astonishing considering it came from a rock star (emphasis added):

I am deeply ashamed as a European on the pitiful lack of volume in support for her.

I think Prime Minister Blair has been doing some good work, but we need more and

⁴⁵¹ Transcript of U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Holds a Hearing on FY '05 Budget Request for HIV/AIDS Programs and Research, 18 May 2004.

we need the rest of Europe to pay attention. *I will personally speak to Romano Prodi, who's the president of the EU, about this and see at their next meeting if we can get a resolution.*

The testimony immediately returned to HIV/AIDS and the MCA, with the capacity issue resurfacing, to which Bono addressed: "I think what we need to say, 'Yes, there are difficulties spending the money effectively and efficiently, but we have to spend on building the capacity.' That's what you do in an emergency, in a war. You know, you just have to build the infrastructure, and this is a war." Senator Leahy also provided a working example of Bono's personal charisma when he cited the personal effect of a previous comment from Bono's testimony: "I was struck by something you said in your statement – and I wrote it down – 'A better world is also a safer world,' and that really goes to the bottom line on everything you're trying to do." Leahy added, "I mean, you've seen probably more than anybody of this effect of AIDS and what's being done to combat it. You've traveled everywhere."⁴⁵² Senator Durbin used the opportunity to seek Bono's opinion regarding the appropriate approach for expediently getting affordable medications to those in poor countries with HIV/AIDS. Bono expressed his desire for "the brains... the know-how...the scientists" of the pharmaceutical companies, noting "they could really be the heroes of the tour here." Bono acknowledged that they should make a profit, "just not on the greatest health crisis in 600 years on the backs of poor people." DeWine's closing remarks were effusively complimentary of Bono, and again offered testimony to Bono's charismatic

⁴⁵² Ibid.

appeal and issue expertise, as the Senator queried the rock star on his political tactics (emphasis added):

Bono, thank you very much for being with us again. Again, very, very compelling testimony as well. You know, you really have been at the forefront, if you look at the issues that matter: the Millennium Challenge Account – you’ve advocated for that; debt relief – you know, that matters so very much; AIDS. You know, on all three of those issues, you know, you have been there. You’ve been the leader. Your testimony today, I think, has been so compelling because you’ve talked about AIDS from a holistic point of view, that we can’t just look at AIDS separately... You know, you truly understand this issue. You have done such a good job, I think, of focusing the public’s attention on AIDS, *and I would just ask you, as you’ve gone around, not just in the United States, but in other countries, what works and what doesn’t work when you’re either addressing people in towns in the United States or when you’re dealing with leaders in other countries? What’s compelling and what’s not compelling when you talk about this issue? What works and what doesn’t work, and how are we doing with other countries, too?*

While in Washington for his Congressional testimony, Bono was Senator Richard Lugar’s guest of honor at a reception to promote an extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a Clinton Administration African trade bill that was enacted in 2000. This was the third time the Senator and the rock star had worked on legislation

together, with the previous interactions being related to debt relief.⁴⁵³ AGOA Passage was nearly assured in the House, but there were worries about the bill becoming bogged down in the Senate.⁴⁵⁴ The House passed the new bill on June 14, which extended AGOA until 2015, and the Senate passed it unanimously June 24. *The Washington Post* reported on the Senate's turnaround: "Senate passage...was deemed almost impossible...but an imaginative coalition proved the impossible possible."⁴⁵⁵ The imaginative coalition included the business lobby, religious groups, the Congressional Black Caucus, and Bono. DATA called AGOA's passage a win for Africa and America, and reported that renewal was never certain, crediting the leadership of several Senators including Lugar.⁴⁵⁶

A few weeks after Bono's Congressional testimony, he met with the European Union Development Ministers in Dublin at a June 1 informal Council meeting, which focused on debt relief, support for peacekeeping in Sudan, and the EU's long-term aid budget.⁴⁵⁷ Bono was invited by the meeting's host, Irish development minister Tom Kitt, who wanted the rock star there "because of his experience and influence with the issue," and noted that "his participation...will add a valuable non-governmental perspective to our discussion." Kitt sought to utilize Bono's powerful public influence, and explained that his presence "could also help to mobilize a larger EU-wide audience in support of development objectives at a time of major political, financial and institutional change within the EU." It is not known if

⁴⁵³ *Lugar Hosts Bono on African Trade Promotion*, 18 May 2004; Taken from Lugar Press Release on Website, <http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=221715>

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁵ *Fresh Trade Politics*, *The Washington Post*, 14 July 2004, A18.

⁴⁵⁶ *DATA on AGOA: A Win for Africa and America*, DATA Press Release, 25 June 2004.

⁴⁵⁷ *Development Council: Bono to Join Dublin Talks on Debt relief*, European Information Service European Report, 29 May 2004.

Bono used the opportunity with the EU officials to discuss the Burmese situation as promised to Senator McConnell. In September Bono did join a group of fellow musicians who were recording a benefit album for the imprisoned Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi, by donating the song *Walk On*, by U2, which was written about Suu Kyi and on their 2001 record *All that You Can't Leave Behind*.⁴⁵⁸ On October 7, European Commission president Romano Prodi threatened increased sanctions against the Burmese junta, citing increased European pressure surrounding the issue: "the problem of Myanmar was raised by all on the European side."⁴⁵⁹ Bono and Senator McConnell's Burmese wish was finally answered four days later on October 11 as the EU announced further economic sanctions.⁴⁶⁰

Bono's 2004 work in Washington was unfinished as concerns about Congressional funding for the HIV/AIDS bill and the MCA were still looming. In March the House Budget Committee chaired by Iowa Republican Jim Nussle proposed a \$4.7 billion cut to the international affairs account in the House Conference Report and "made no assumption" that funding for PEPFAR would be included.⁴⁶¹ DATA went on the offensive, and straight to Nussle's politically marginal Iowa district.⁴⁶² An action alert was first sent out to DATA activists, which urged them to call Congressmen Nussle's Washington office using a DATA-provided toll-free number. DATA also placed radio ads in several Iowa towns that named Nussle as the one person standing in the way of the bi-partisan plan to save lives, and

⁴⁵⁸ Anita Singh, "Music Stars Join Forces for Democracy Activist," *The Press Association*, 22 September 2004.

⁴⁵⁹ *EU Threatens Myanmar with Increased Sanctions at Asia-Europe Summit*, Deutsche Press-Agentur, 7 October 2004.

⁴⁶⁰ *E.U. Tightens Sanctions on Myanmar*, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 October 2004.

⁴⁶¹ Emily Pierce, "Nussle Feeling the Heat from Locals," *Roll Call*, 22 April 2004.

⁴⁶² Emily Pierce, "Nussle Heeds Call, Boosts AIDS Funds," *Roll Call*, 1 June 2004.

urged listeners to call the toll-free number.⁴⁶³ In addition, DATA recruited several aid organizations including Bread for the World and the Global AIDS alliance, who pressed their Iowa members to contact the Congressman. Nussle, a Lutheran, heard from the Bishop of the Iowan Lutheran church, Philip Hougen, who helped the campaign by writing letters to newspapers in Nussle's district.⁴⁶⁴ Nussle also heard from Catholic, Presbyterian and Ecumenical church leaders, including some who were initially refused meetings with the Congressman.⁴⁶⁵ DATA's former Communication Director Seth Amgott explained the strategy:

Everything we've experienced over the years is that hearing from constituents and local leaders is the most effective way. It's great that Bono and others can make a good case and have a good case on global poverty and AIDS and those issues, but in a democratic system, the most effective thing is to have constituents and local leaders weigh in.

Nussle eventually buckled and added an additional \$2.8 billion to the House Conference Report. In a press release Nussle admitted he "heard from a number of Iowa constituents who were concerned about funding for international programs fighting AIDS and other diseases," and offered the budget increase to "support historic levels of funding for those efforts."⁴⁶⁶ *Roll Call* reported that Nussle spokesman Sean Spicer "acknowledged... Nussle agreed to come closer to the Senate funding number...partly because of his

⁴⁶³ *DATA in Iowa: Don't Cut Budget for AIDS in Africa*, 23 March 2004; Available [Online]: <http://www.data.org/archives/000409.php>

⁴⁶⁴ Jane Norman, *Advocates of AIDS Relief Seek Money*, 18 March 2004.

⁴⁶⁵ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on 9 December 2005.

⁴⁶⁶ *House Passes Conference Report on Nussle Budget*, Jim Nussle Press Release, 19 May 2004.

constituents' complaints," adding that Nussle wanted to make sure they understood that he was truly supportive of AIDS funding.⁴⁶⁷ The House passed the final foreign aid budget on July 15, which allocated the full amount of Bush's \$2.8 billion for the AIDS bill, but only half the president's requested \$2.5 billion for the MCA. Amgott called the Nussle reversal exceptional, considering "he changed his mind visibly and publicly and said exactly why afterwards..." and noted, "That is unusual in my experience." Amgott explained that politicians usually act to avoid embarrassing public reversals: "More often you see people changing their behavior to avoid such things happening to them in the future."⁴⁶⁸

DATA also targeted the home States of U.S. Senators Mitch McConnell and Mike Dewine with telephone and letter-writing campaigns. Once again, additional aid organizations joined the effort including Bread for the World, Kentucky Global AIDS Campaign, the University of Louisville Global Justice, AIDS volunteers of Cincinnati, and the Northern Kentucky Association of African Charities.⁴⁶⁹ The Senate eventually agreed to \$3.1 billion for PEPFAR, but only \$1.12 billion for the MCA. The final budget agreement appropriated \$2.8 million for the AIDS bill, matching Bush's request, and \$1.5 billion for the MCA, which was \$1 billion less than the president's request.

A March 2005 *CQ Weekly* article detailed DATA's use of two Washington lobbyists who were paid nearly half a million dollars annually for their services; ex-Tom Delay aide and former director of the National Republican Congressional Committee Scott Hatch, who

⁴⁶⁷ Emily Pierce, "Nussle Heeds Call, Boosts AIDS Funds," *Roll Call*, 1 June 2004.

⁴⁶⁸ As reported to the author in a personal telephone interview with Seth Amgott on 9 December 2005.

⁴⁶⁹ Feoshia Henderson, "Activists Lobbying Senators to Fund Foreign Aid Program," *The Kentucky Post*, 28 July 2004.

targets Republicans, and veteran Democratic lobbyist Tom Sheridan.⁴⁷⁰ DATA's government relations director Tom Hart explained the rationale behind the lobbyists noting: "The poorest people on Earth need the same sort of representation in Washington that any other special interest receives... We're making decisions that affect millions of lives here. Bono realized that he needed to play by the rules of Washington, and that's what we're doing."⁴⁷¹ Lobbyist Hatch spoke about working for Bono with *CQ Weekly*, and compared the similarities to other Washington lobbying jobs – yet stressed the uniqueness of his new position: "The only difference is, my guy's wearing blue glasses." Senator Rick Santorum is on a first name basis with the lobbyists and acknowledged that he sees "Tom and Scott quite a bit," adding that he "usually sees Bono when he comes to town, too."⁴⁷² Santorum also discussed Bono's exceptional lobbying abilities, explaining that he "stands out from the other celebrities that hit the hill because he comes to a meeting prepared – and follows up."⁴⁷³

In January 2005, the fiscal 2006 budget game started churning as President Bush's budget requests were announced. The president requested an expected \$3.2 billion for PEPFAR, the total of which was consistent with previous administration pronouncements, but funding requests for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS had decreased for the second

⁴⁷⁰ Eamon Javers, "Bono's K Street Connection," *CQ Weekly*, 28 March 2005, 762-3.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

straight year, despite pledges from Bush two years earlier.⁴⁷⁴ In addition, Bush did not deliver on his full commitment to the MCA, and requested only \$3 billion of the promised \$5 billion for fiscal 2006.⁴⁷⁵ DATA called Bush's request for the MCA a "significant step back from his repeatedly promised level of \$5b for the FY06 budget."⁴⁷⁶ DATA also chided the Administration for not prioritizing implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account. DATA did praise Bush's request for the PEPFAR, and cautiously noted that it "fills the U.S. commitment to ramp up its 15 country bilateral focus program," but complained that it did not include the United States' share for the Global Fund.

The MCA was originally slated to receive \$1.6b in 2004, \$3.2b in 2005 and \$5b in 2006, but has been consistently under-funded in both the president's budget requests and the final Congressional appropriations.⁴⁷⁷ Jeffery Sachs called the MCA's operation "a disgrace," to which Bono empathized, "I understand his rage; I share it."⁴⁷⁸ Bono also admitted that the MCA was "a brilliant idea, but has been very slow to get going."⁴⁷⁹ Bono has discussed a row with President Bush concerning MCA funding, where he "roundly criticized him for the slowness in the Millennium Challenge." An unnamed, angry Senator defended the President by throwing a newspaper in Bono's direction and scolded the rock

⁴⁷⁴ Michael M. Phillips, "Bush Falls Behind on Promises to Antipoverty, AIDS Funding," *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 January 2005.

⁴⁷⁵ *Bush to Pledge \$3.2B to Combat AIDS Abroad*, The Associated Press, 27 January 2005. Available [Online]: <http://www.data.org/archives/000697.php>

⁴⁷⁶ *The President's Budget Request for FY 2006*, DATA Policy Release, 7 February 2005.

⁴⁷⁷ Sachs, 2005, 218.

⁴⁷⁸ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁴⁷⁹ Bono Reader Q & A, *The New York Times*, 21 September 2005.

star: "How dare you disrespect the president of the United States!"⁴⁸⁰ This may have been part of Bono's heated debate with president Bush over AIDS drugs "not getting out quick enough," in which Bush "banged the table" at the rock star to get Bono's attention, and then "smilingly reminded" Bono that he was the president.⁴⁸¹ Bono also offered restrained criticism of the Bush Administration in a February 2005 telecasted acceptance speech for the Inaugural T.E.D. Prize (Technology, Entertainment, Design): "I have been, of late disappointed with the Bush Administration. They started out with such promise on Africa. They made some really great promises and, actually, have fulfilled a lot of them. But some of them they haven't. They don't feel the push from the ground..."⁴⁸² In March the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. organization formed to operate the Millennium Challenge Account, authorized delivery its first round of grants, totaling \$100 million, to Madagascar. The announcement came, as *The Washington Post* dryly reported, "three years to the day after President Bush proposed creating the program..."⁴⁸³

In February Bono added more international accolades to his resume, with his third Nobel Peace Prize nomination. Rumors also began to circulate that the rock star was being considered for the presidency of the World Bank, a position traditionally nominated by the United States and held by an American.⁴⁸⁴ The rumors intensified when a February 25 *Los*

⁴⁸⁰ Jann S. Wenner, *Bono: The Rolling Stone Interview*, *Rolling Stone*, (3 November 2005), 986, 67.

⁴⁸¹ Assayas, 2005, 236.

⁴⁸² *Bono at TED*, transcript from TED website: http://ted.com/ted2005/moments/bono_transcript.cfm

⁴⁸³ Paul Blustein, "Program's First Grants Set to Aid Madagascar," *The Washington Post*, 10 March 2005, A14.

⁴⁸⁴ Inger Sethov, "Bono and Pope Among Nobel Prize Nominees," *Reuters Online*, 17 February, 2005.

Angeles Times editorial championed Bono for World Bank president.⁴⁸⁵ The editorial penned Bono as the "most eloquent and passionate spokesman for African aid in the Western world," and added he could "enhance the World Bank's image" as well as mobilize public opinion to hold nations accountable for their aid commitments. U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow propelled the rumors when he didn't rule out the Bono nomination during an early March appearance on ABC's *This Week*, and professed his admiration for the rock star.⁴⁸⁶ President Bush ended all speculation when he officially nominated U.S. deputy defense secretary and Iraqi war architect Paul Wolfowitz.⁴⁸⁷ Unbelievably, Wolfowitz consulted Bono prior to his acceptance of the position, in what was later revealed by *CQ Weekly* as an effort to mollify European leaders who were concerned about Bush's controversial nomination.⁴⁸⁸ Wolfowitz advisor Kevin Kellms admitted that Wolfowitz had initiated lengthy conversations with Bono, which were "incredibly substantive about reducing poverty," and added that the two had clicked.⁴⁸⁹ The politically motivated leak surprised Bono's camp, in what DATA's Tom Hart noted was an "off-the-record conversation." Wolfowitz officially assumed the World Bank presidency in June, and immediately took a four-nation African trip. During interviews he publicly assured that "reducing poverty and supporting economic development in Africa" would be his top

⁴⁸⁵ *Bono for the World Bank*, *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 2005.

⁴⁸⁶ *Could Bono Handle the Bank?* CNNMoney.com, 8 March 2005: Available [Online]: http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/07/news/newsmakers/bono_worldbank

⁴⁸⁷ *Wolfowitz Discusses World Bank Mission with Bono*, Reuters, 17 March 2005.

⁴⁸⁸ Eamon Javers, 28 March 2005.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

priority.⁴⁹⁰ Wolfowitz later complemented the effectiveness of Bono's political style:

"Pomposity and arrogance are the enemies of getting things done. And Bono knows how to get things done."⁴⁹¹

In late May Bono managed to get a lunch appointment with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice while in D.C. with his band U2. The two talked about the upcoming U.K.-hosted 2005 G8 summit, African aid, and foreign operations spending.⁴⁹² Bono also met with Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman and Mississippi Republican Thad Cochran, and Senate Minority leader Harry Reid to further press his case. *Roll Call* reported that "Everyone in Reid's office went gaga" over Bono, and noted that Reid warned the Irishman not to "let the White House use him," to which Bono cracked, "Well, I'm not a cheap date."⁴⁹³ Two weeks later in early June, Tony Blair visited the White House, and participated in a joint press conference with President Bush that focused largely on Africa. Bush also announced \$674 million in additional 2005 funding for humanitarian emergencies in Africa, which would be skimmed from a recent supplemental appropriations bill that was originally slated for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁹⁴ The proposal was seen as "a gesture to Blair," in recognition of the U.K. Leader's recent attempts to garner international support for his plan that would double aid to Africa and eliminate all remaining

⁴⁹⁰ Albert Eisele, "Alleviating African Poverty is a 'First Priority,' Wolfowitz Says," *The Washington Post*, 22 June 2005, 4.

⁴⁹¹ Josh Tyrangiel, "The Constant Charmer," *Time*, (26 December 2005): 166, no. 26, 46-62.

⁴⁹² Donna Cassata, 7 June 2005.

⁴⁹³ Mary Ann Akers, "Heard on the Hill," *Roll Call*, 7 June 2005.

⁴⁹⁴ Bush quote taken from *President Welcomes British Prime Minister Blair to White House*, White House office of the Press Secretary Press Release, 7 June 2005; and Peter Baker, "U.S. to Increase Funding for Africa; In Gesture to Blair, Bush to Announce \$674 Million Addition," *The Washington Post*, 7 June 2005, A19.

African international debt, a proposal which Bush had "been cool to." It is unknown whether Bono's late May 2005 lobbying specifically targeted the \$674 million appropriation, or if indeed the new African aid was just a gesture to Blair.

Ten days later Bush held White House meetings with the African presidents of Mozambique, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia and Niger, and assured them the U.S. would work "harder and faster" to certify MCA countries.⁴⁹⁵ At the end of June and with the G8 summit approaching, Bush pledged funding for a new \$1.7 billion African aid package, which included \$1.2 billion over five years to fight malaria, \$55 million over three years to promote women's justice and empowerment in Africa, and \$400 million for African teacher-training.⁴⁹⁶ Not surprisingly, malaria and educational access were two issues Bono discussed with the White House in May.⁴⁹⁷ Bush also called for G8 backing of Tony Blair's \$40 billion Africa debt deal, and cited the leadership of Great Britain and the United States. Bush also proposed to double aid to Africa again by 2010 and told Africans they "can be certain...America will be your partner and your friend." In a DATA press release Bono praised the president's commitment, but cautiously added that they'll "fight about the numbers."⁴⁹⁸ Bono also complimented Bush's speech, and called the president "a man who means to understand the challenges in Africa and America's opportunity to help solve them as partners."

⁴⁹⁵ Michael A. Fletcher, "President Pledges to Speed up African Aid," *The Washington Post*, 14 June 2005, A04.

⁴⁹⁶ *President Discusses Trade Summit, Progress in Africa*, White House Office of the Press Secretary Press Release, 30 June 2005.

⁴⁹⁷ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁴⁹⁸ *Reaction to President Bush's Pre-G8 Africa Speech*, DATA Press Release, 30 June 2005.

Throughout the 2005 budget process DATA had campaigned for a \$400 million increase in Bush's \$3.2 FY 2006 PEPFAR request. The House of Representatives fully funded Bush's \$3.2 billion request, albeit with what DATA called "shifted priorities" in what amounted to minor programmatic financial reshuffling.⁴⁹⁹ In August 2005 the Senate allocation for the AIDS bill was at \$3.6 billion, which matched DATA's request. Bono was back in D.C. in mid-October for another U2 show during the third leg of the *Vertigo* tour just before the final markup of the FY 2006 foreign operations bill – the timing of which was probably not coincidental. Bono's publicized political stops included a White House lunch with President Bush, a meeting with National Security advisor Stephen Hadley, a quick drop-in to a weekly House Democratic meeting where he lobbied for the full \$3.6 billion in PEPFAR funding, and a private lunch with Democratic Senators John Kerry (Mass.), Patrick Leahy (Vt.), Barack Obama (Ill.), Dick Durbin (Ill.), and Representatives Nancy Pelosi (Ca.), Steny Hoyer (Md.) and Nita Lowey (N.Y.).⁵⁰⁰ White House Press Secretary told reporters the Bono/Bush meeting was a follow-up to their G8 Summit discussion at Gleneagles, and surrounded Bono and the Administration's "common priorities." One reporter even asked McClellan about the possibility of Bono receiving a position within the Administration, a rumor that the Press Secretary confessed he hadn't heard. The reporter then asked if Bono was "considered an advisor or a supporter of the

⁴⁹⁹ *\$3.6B for Global HIV/AIDS in the FY06 Budget*, DATA Policy Release, 15 August 2005.

⁵⁰⁰ *Press Briefing by Scott McClellan*, White House Office of the Press Secretary Press Release, 19 October 2005; *Bono Urges House Democrats to Support Global AIDS Funding in FY06*, DATA Press Release, 18 October 18, 2005; and Josephine Hearn, "Musician Bono drops in on House Dems' Meeting," *The Hill*, 20 October 2005.

Administration." McClellan explained that Bono "has a lot of influence," and acknowledged that Bush and Bono "had some discussions over the last few years," and admitted the Administration's appreciation of the visits.

In August the United States ruffled the African aid community when it appeared to distance itself from the Millennium Development Goals. First the Bush Administration added "more than 750 amendments" to a draft agreement set for signing at the September World Summit on Poverty and U.N. Reform in New York, one of which called for striking any mention of the Millennium Development Goals.⁵⁰¹ In addition, John Bolton, newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the U.N., claimed that the Bush Administration never agreed to support the goals, and the *Washington Post* reported that an Administration official accused U.N. officials of manipulating the truth about U.S. backsliding on foreign aid commitments.⁵⁰² The Administration was specifically opposed to a 2015 aid target of 0.7% of GDP, which European countries accepted at the 2005 G8 summit and had been previously endorsed by Bush in March 2002 as a part of the Monterrey Consensus. The *Washington Post* also reported that a senior Administration official argued that U.S. negotiators "made it clear at the time" that the U.S. "opposed the idea of committing to a numerical target but did not want to block language supported by many of its allies."⁵⁰³ Jeffrey Sachs said Bolton's claims were without ground, and claimed the Administration is simply trying to "wriggle

⁵⁰¹ Colum Lynch, "U.S. Wants Changes in U.N. Agreement," *The Washington Post*, 25 August 2005, A01.

⁵⁰² Colum Lynch, "U.N. Accused of Distorting U.S. Aid Commitments; Administration Denies Having Endorsed Specific Targets Known as Millennium Development Goals," *The Washington Post*, 2 September 2005, A06.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

out” of its commitments. During President Bush’s speech at the World Summit he assuaged fears by specifically affirming United States commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, but called them ambitious. Bush did not specifically mention the 0.7% GNP foreign aid rate, but instead equated the Administration’s creation of the MCA as seeking to implement the Monterrey Consensus.⁵⁰⁴ In a DATA press release director Jamie Drummond offered restrained praise, welcoming Bush’s explicit endorsement of the Millennium Development Goals, but added, "Had the American position been so positive from the start this summit might have made overall progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals."⁵⁰⁵

A controversy of sorts erupted in October when several politicians including Senators Rick Santorum and Hillary Clinton announced that political fundraisers were being held at U2’s two Washington D.C. concerts.⁵⁰⁶ DATA was quick to correct inaccurate media statements that portrayed the U2 shows themselves as political fundraisers.⁵⁰⁷ The fundraisers were held in private suites at Washington D.C.’s MCI Center, which were purchased by the politicians and then resold at significant increases – Senator Clinton’s 18 spots went for \$2500 each. In a DATA press release director Jamie Drummond explained that politicians often organize “events of all kinds at music concerts and other entertainment events." Drummond further distanced DATA and Bono citing their noninvolvement and lack

⁵⁰⁴ *President Addresses United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting, United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York, White House Office of the Press Secretary Press Release, 14 September 2005.*

⁵⁰⁵ *Jamie Drummond’s Reaction to President Bush’s Speech to the World Summit, DATA Press Release: 14 September 2005.*

⁵⁰⁶ Jonathan, E. Kaplan, "Bono Winces, but Money Chase Goes On," *The Hill*, 18 October 2005.

⁵⁰⁷ *DATA Reaction to Inaccurate Media Statements on U2 Shows as Political Fundraisers, DATA Press Release, 11 October 2005.*

of knowledge about the events, noting "U2 concerts are categorically not fundraisers for any politician – they are rock concerts for U2 fans." Bono's stage antics no doubt influenced the politicians as he sent shout outs to Condi Rice, Nancy Pelosi, and others at the D.C. concerts.⁵⁰⁸ Political newspaper *The Hill* reported the increasingly common use of rock concerts as political fundraisers, citing recent events at Paul McCartney and Rolling Stones shows. It is interesting to note, and probably not coincidental, that Bono has found the travel schedule of the 2005 U2 *Vertigo* tour politically opportune. Meetings were held with various elites in the cities where would U2 perform, including President Bush in D.C., Jesse Helms in Charlotte, Warren Buffet daughter and DATA board member Susan Buffet in Omaha, and New York Democratic Representative Brian Higgins in Buffalo.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁸ Mary Ann Akers, "Heard on the Hill," *Roll Call*, 24 October 2005.

⁵⁰⁹ *Brian and Bono*, The Buffalo News, 17 December 2005; *Rocker Bono Dines with Ex-Senator*, The Olympian, 19 December 2005; *Bono Raises Awareness of African Crisis*, The Associated Press, 19 December 2005.

The ONE Campaign

In 2004 DATA announced the formation of the ONE Campaign, a new American-based coalition of aid and religious groups that back an "effort to rally Americans – one by one – to fight the emergency of global AIDS and extreme poverty." The campaign was founded with a \$3 million grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and could be considered the US-based grassroots version of DATA, focusing its lobbying efforts on the American public instead of the D.C. power brokers.⁵¹⁰ As Bono explained, The ONE Campaign was envisioned to help build an American movement "so that in the future if a politician fails to keep their promises, there is a political price to pay."⁵¹¹ He added, "...if they do the right thing they deserve to get the applause."

The ONE Campaign pursues the same political issues as DATA including African poverty and AIDS, government corruption, trade, and debt cancellation. Drawing on its moniker, the ONE Campaign also seeks an additional 1% of the U.S. federal budget for international aid. The campaign uses celebrity power to highlight the issues and attract public support, which has been led by high-profiled actors such as Brad Pitt, George Clooney, Jamie Foxx and Angelina Jolie, whom have been featured in televised public-service announcements.⁵¹² Bono was present on the May 16, 2004 official launch of the

⁵¹⁰ *The ONE Campaign Receives \$3 Million from Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation*, DATA Press Release, 1 December 2004.

⁵¹¹ Bono Reader Q & A, *The New York Times*, 21 September 2005.

⁵¹² Brian Hiatt, "Bono Assembles an Army," *Rolling Stone*, 20 April 2005 Available [Online]: http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/7266479/bono_assembles_an_army/u2

ONE Campaign in front of Philadelphia's Independence Hall. DATA was joined by several other NGOs in founding the ONE Campaign including Bread for the World, CARE, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Oxfam America, Plan USA, Save the Children US, World Concern, and World Vision.⁵¹³ By November 2005, two million Americans had become members of the ONE Campaign.⁵¹⁴ In an interview with the *San Francisco Chronicle* Bono reported that conservative estimates put membership numbers at five million by the next U.S. presidential election, an amount he wryly noted is bigger than the National Rifle Association, which makes him "very, very, very happy."

The ONE Campaign is mirrored by the U.K.'s *Make Poverty History* campaign, both of which are national affiliates of the transnational coalition *Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP)*,⁵¹⁵ which is self-described on its website:⁵¹⁶

The Global Call to Action against Poverty is a worldwide alliance committed to making world leaders live up to their promises, and to making a breakthrough on poverty in 2005... It is an alliance between a range of actors around the common cause of ending poverty: existing coalitions, community groups, trade unions, individuals, religious and faith groups, campaigners and more.

⁵¹³ Taken from *The ONE Campaign* website, Available [Online]: <http://www.one.org/Background.html>

⁵¹⁴ As reported by Bono in a November 2005 interview posted as a podcast on the San Francisco Chronicle's website, Available [Online]: <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/indexn?blogid=5>

⁵¹⁵ There are hundreds of *Global Call to Action Against Poverty* affiliates throughout the world

⁵¹⁶ Taken from the *Global Call to Action Against Poverty* website, Available [Online]: <http://www.whiteband.org/Lib/about/about/en>

The international symbol of GCAP is the white wristband, which is distributed to supporters by each of the campaign's respective national affiliates such as the ONE Campaign. More than three million people wear the white wristbands in the U.K., including Prime Minister Tony Blair.⁵¹⁷ In 2005 GCAP organized three worldwide white band mobilization days to coincide with the G8 Summit, the U.N. World Summit, and the WTO meetings.⁵¹⁸ Ciara Gaynor, Co-Chair of the GCAP Media Group, explained the significance of the white band for GCAP:

[The white band] is the symbol uniting all actors all around the world. And while they might have different demands or different issues that they need to prioritize, or pressure points, ultimately they are all unified in a call for governments to do much more to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals, [which] is sort of the overarching framework under which everyone is operating, or mobilizing, and reaching out to the media and the general public.

Gaynor also attested that Bono was not involved in GCAP's initial creation, but did note that he has lent his support, and added that the ONE Campaign is "very much a part of the media side of things." Gaynor mentioned that DATA representative Oliver Buston was present at the first international GCAP strategy meeting where the alliance was first named and the white band symbol was enacted, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in October 2004. In addition, many of the organizations that finance GCAP activities are also ONE

⁵¹⁷ Eric Pfanner, "This Ad is Aimed at a Group of 8," *The International Herald Tribune Online*, 20 June 2005; Sally Pook, "Blair Joins Wristband Celebrities Who Make Charity Cool," *The Telegraph Online*, 25 March 2005, <http://www.telegraph.co.U.K./news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/03/25/nband25.xml>

⁵¹⁸ Personal Interview with Ciara Gaynor, Co-Chair GCAP Media Group, 19 January 2006.

Campaign partners, which includes the U.N. Millennium Campaign, OXFAM, and World Vision.

The ONE Campaign has also heavily relied on new technologies to help deliver its message, as evidenced by Bono's campaign pitch to U2 audiences amid the rock group's 2004-2005 *Vertigo* tour. Bono invites fans to join the campaign during U2's set by simply using a mobile phone to text their name to UNITE (86483), and a Sun Microsystems-designed aerial beams the information back to The ONE Campaign.⁵¹⁹ Fans in turn get a "thank you" reply text from Bono, and a lucky few see their name scroll across the gigantic onstage video screen. This ONE Campaign recruitment method collects thousands of new supporters per night.⁵²⁰ In addition, during the run-up to the 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland, the ONE Campaign teamed with visual technology company Viewpoint and Unicast Advertising for an awareness campaign that placed one billion online ads on web space donated by companies including Time Warner, Google, Microsoft, The New York Times, MSNBC, and Viacom.⁵²¹ The ONE Campaign created its own podcast in December 2005, which features digitally downloadable radio programs for digital audio players. The first

⁵¹⁹ Sebastian Mallaby, "High-Profile Help for Africa," *The Washington Post*, 23 May 2005, A19.

⁵²⁰ Eric Gwinn, "U2 Fans Send Out Message by Using their Cell Phones," *Chicago Tribune*, 20 May 2005; This article mentions a May 12 Chicago U2 concert where 1,980 names were sent to UNITE and a *Los Angeles Times* article reported that the campaign has yielded "as many as 10,000 names per night; Ronald Brownstein, *Hearts that Beat as 'One' Could Shake Up American Politics*, 24 October 2005.

⁵²¹ Viewpoint and 'ONE: The Campaign to Make Poverty History' Partner to Deliver One Billion Online Ads Leading up to the G8 Summit in July, DATA Press Release, 15 June 2005.

broadcast featured Nelson Mandela, Chris Martin of English rock band Coldplay, and Bono.⁵²²

In May 2005, Seattle, Washington became the first U.S. city to publicly embrace the ONE Campaign as Mayor Greg Nickels proclaimed Seattle "A City of ONE."⁵²³ In December another 32 cities, along with the states of Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, and Maine, officially joined the ONE Campaign and officially recognized White Band Day.⁵²⁴ The State Legislature of Illinois introduced a State of ONE joint resolution. In July the new network was tested as the ONE Campaign urged its members to contact their Senators in support of a \$100 million AIDS and Malaria amendment, which resulted in 25,000 phone calls to the Senators.⁵²⁵ Joe Shoemaker, Spokesman for Amendment sponsor Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), noticed the "very different feeling" that the amendment was creating: "All of the sudden people in the hallways were talking to us about it."⁵²⁶ The amendment was then passed. Another successful test for the network occurred in the days before the 2005 U.K.-hosted G8 Summit, as ONE Campaign members sent 500,000 emails to the White House "urging more aid, more action against AIDS," and "fewer farm subsidies."⁵²⁷

⁵²² *ONE Campaign Joins with Gcast to Use Podcast Technology to Help Fight Global AIDS and Extreme Poverty*, The ONE Campaign Press Release, 30 November 2005.

⁵²³ *Mayor Greg Nickels Proclaims Seattle "A City of ONE,"* The ONE Campaign Press Release, 16 May 2005.

⁵²⁴ *Four Governors and 37 Mayors Agree: Join Fight Against Global AIDS and Extreme Poverty with the ONE Campaign*, The ONE Campaign Press Release, 9 December 2005.

⁵²⁵ Ronald Brownstein, *Hearts that Beat as 'One' Could Shake Up American Politics*, 24 October 2005.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁷ *Pro Bono*, The Economist, 5 November 2005.

16. DATA's International Efforts

Germany

Bono recalls the atypical first meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder when the two had beers together – an atmosphere in which the Chancellor was relaxed and smiling.⁵²⁸ Bono implored Schröder “not to be on the wrong side of history” when discussing Germany’s stance towards African aid. Bono wanted a German aid commitment of 0.7% of GDP, which at that time lagged behind several other European countries at 0.28%. In April 2004 Bono lobbied Chancellor Schröder again, a meeting where Bono “didn’t like [the Chancellor’s] body language,” and noted that he avoided eye contact.⁵²⁹ The German economy had been less than stellar, and a Schröder official insisted that more Africa aid would “bankrupt Germany.” Afterwards a network of campaigners pursued the Chancellor, which culminated with several celebrities signing an open letter to Schröder in December.

In early 2005 Bono attended the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where he attempted to convince Chancellor Schröder to deliver more aid, and Bono had discussed a trip to Africa with the German leader. Bono admitted that he “would love to go with somebody like Chancellor Schröder,” and “would love to show him what German, hard

⁵²⁸ Bono in interview with Michka Assayas; Assayas, 2005, 236.

⁵²⁹ J.F.O. McAllister, “Promises to Keep: With Some Nudging From Activists, European Politicians Try to Make Good on Pledges to Africa,” *Time Europe*, (14 March 2005): 165, no. 11.

earned Euros, can do to transform the community..."⁵³⁰ During a speech at the World Economic Forum Schröder formally backed British international aid proposals for the first time, to which British Chancellor Brown hailed as a "breakthrough in the fight against poverty."⁵³¹ After Schröder's speech he had a private with Bono and provided a German aid commitment of 0.7% of GDP by 2015.⁵³² *Time Europe* cited Bono's involvement as reason for Schröder's African aid "pirouette."⁵³³ Bono credited the inspiration of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher and the "encouragement of the corporate sector," who thinks "it's time for Germany to take up its place in the world again."

⁵³⁰ *AFP Interview: Music Stars Ready to Buttonhole Leaders About Poverty*, Agence France Presse, 28 January 2005.

⁵³¹ Jeremy Warner, "Germans Back Brown Plan to Tackle Global Poverty," *The Independent*, 29 January 2005, 49.

⁵³² J.F.O. McAllister, "Promises to Keep: With Some Nudging From Activists, European Politicians Try to Make Good on Pledges to Africa," *Time Europe*, (14 March 2005): 165, no. 11; and James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁵³³ J.F.O. McAllister, "Promises to Keep: With Some Nudging From Activists, European Politicians Try to Make Good on Pledges to Africa," *Time Europe*, (14 March 2005): 165, no. 11.

Canada

In 2004 DATA's strategic efforts began to mirror those of Bono's, which were characterized by multilateral lobbying. Although the United States was DATA's primary focus, they continued to pursue the world's wealthiest nations – the G8 countries. At the November 2003 Canadian Liberal Party convention, Paul Martin was formally elected as Canada's Prime Minister, and invited Bono to give the keynote speech.⁵³⁴ Bono accepted, but first penned a letter to outgoing Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien that was drenched in accolades, calling his leadership on African issues "a legacy that lives on" and would flourish "way beyond your time in office," and explained that his convention speech would give the rock star the opportunity to thank both Jean Chrétien and incoming Prime Minister Paul Martin.⁵³⁵

Once in Canada, Bono told an awaiting airport crowd that he is a "fan of Canada" because "a certain kind of idealism still seems to be alive in this country," and that Canadians always look outside themselves "beyond the line of the horizon."⁵³⁶ During Bono's Liberal Party convention speech, the Canadian kudos kept coming: "I believe the world needs more Canada. Can any one country make a difference? Yes, Canada can. Canada already has. And Mr. Martin is the man to do it. Then Canada, Oh Canada, will show the world." Bono also pressed DATA's agenda during by requesting passage of

⁵³⁴ *Bono Will Add Glitter to Martin Coronation*, The Calgary Sun, 5 November 2003, 7.

⁵³⁵ *U2's Bono Says Chrétien's Help to Developing World a Lasting Legacy: Globe*, Canada Press Newswire, 11 November 2003.

⁵³⁶ David Bruser, "World Needs More Canada, Bono Says," *The Toronto Star*, 15 November 2003, A1.

Canadian drug patent laws that would provide generic HIV/AIDS drugs to Africa. He also suggested that Canada take the lead in debt forgiveness, and then discussed the technicalities surrounding Canada's percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that went to international aid. Bono reminded the Liberal Party that former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson had set a foreign aid target of 0.7% of GDP in 1969, which in 2003 was stalled at 0.29%.⁵³⁷ He then reminded the politicians that he was "there for Paul Martin" and then forewarned that "he was going to be the biggest pain in [Martin's] ass," duly noting that, "A year down the line, he's going to regret tonight." Bono also used his time in Canada to hold a strategy session with policy-wonks from Canada's "most informed" international development NGOs and known Liberal Party critics to gather input and focus his message.⁵³⁸

Bono's promise to be a pain in the ass came sooner than expected. Only three months into Martin's new post as Prime Minister, legislation was being considered that would give brand name drug firms bidding options on generic counterparts. Jamie Drummond of DATA sent a letter to Martin voicing his concerns about the legislation noting that the clause "would undermine the very purpose of the law."⁵³⁹ Canadian New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton joined the fray when he penned a six-page letter to Bono exposing Prime Minister Martin's promised aid shortcomings. Layton discussed the

⁵³⁷ Dan Rath, "In Praise of Bono: The Liberals Learn the Risks and Rewards of Borrowing a Rock Star's Cool," *Canadian Business and Current Affairs*, 24 November 2003.

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ *Bono's Pressure Group Says Canada Must Live Up to AIDS Commitments*, Agence France Presse – English, 12 March 2004.

drug company legislation, Martin's budget that left out promised monies to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, and Canada's aid as a percentage of GDP, which still hadn't increased.⁵⁴⁰

Layton pled for Bono to help put Martin's words into action.

Martin's government removed the legislation that favored the brand name drug manufacturers in April, a move that prompted Bono to call the Prime Minister and offered his approval for the reversal.⁵⁴¹ Martin anted-up again in early May, this time with a \$100 million commitment to an upstart World Health Organization (WHO) HIV/AIDS program that was in danger of stalling because of funding concerns.⁵⁴² Martin also announced the creation of Canada Corps, an initiative to "recruit professionals and volunteers to assist failing states such as Haiti in building stable democratic, social and economic institutions." In a DATA press release Bono was ecstatic: "Wow. A politician who doesn't break his promises. This is real leadership. I hope Canadians will know what this means to the rest of the world."⁵⁴³ Bono was then off to Canada to attend another AIDS spending announcement with Paul Martin. The Ottawa appearance with Martin happened to precede an upcoming election call, to which the *Toronto Star* observed, "The federal Liberals have appeared to be deliberately seeking favour with the traditional left side of their constituency this week..."⁵⁴⁴ The May 12 announcement by Martin and Bono highlighted the doubling of Canada's contribution to the Global Fund for AIDS – from \$35 to \$70 million. Bono was candid when

⁵⁴⁰ Jack Aubry, "NDP Calls On Irish Rock Star to Hound Martin," *Times Colonist*, 28 March 2004, A4.

⁵⁴¹ Susan Delacourt, "'Drugs For Africa' Bill Amended," *The Toronto Star*, 20 April 2004.

⁵⁴² Hubert Bauch, and Mike Blanchfield, "Martin Give \$100 Million to Global Fight Against AIDS: Rock Star Bono Wowed by 'Politician Who Doesn't Break Promises,'" *The Vancouver Sun*, 11 May 2004, A4.

⁵⁴³ *Canada Announces Increase in Support to WHO*, DATA Press Release, 10 May 2004.

⁵⁴⁴ Susan Delacourt, "Bono Rocks Liberal Vote," *The Toronto Star*, 12 May 2004, A1.

he admitted to being used politically, but explained why he didn't mind: "I want to be used. That's my job here – to provide applause when someone does the right thing and courageous thing and to provide cynicism when they don't. The price we are talking about here are lives – hundreds of thousands of lives these Canadian dollars are going to change. You understand that this is an issue that you wouldn't mind bending over just a little bit for, if I could be so crude."⁵⁴⁵ Bono's justifications proved correct again in September 2004, when Canadian Finance Minister Ralph Goodale announced a \$9 million debt relief deal for three of Africa's poorest nations – Senegal, Ghana and Ethiopia.

Martin approached Bono in February 2005 for another favor – a U2 concert in Ottawa. U2 was not scheduled to play the Canadian capital on their 2005 *Vertigo* tour, and had not played there in 20 years when an Ottawa radio station, *BOB-FM*, began a U2 concert campaign with its listeners. Prime Minister Martin called the morning show and offered to "point out" to Bono why U2 should play Ottawa: "...given his tremendous interest in AIDS, in the relief of third world debt, that the people in Canada, the public servants who make those decisions in External Affairs and in CIDA, and all of those agencies, they're all here in Ottawa."⁵⁴⁶ Martin got what he wished for when in March U2 announced it would play at Ottawa's Corel Centre on November 25, 2005, and Bono admitted that Paul Martin asked U2 "to play the gig."⁵⁴⁷ Bono revealed that U2 was delighted to play for three reasons: "One, 18,000 Ottawans is going to be a great night out...

⁵⁴⁵ Anne Dawson, "Bono Only Too Happy to Plug PM," *The Star Phoenix*, 13 May 2004, C5.

⁵⁴⁶ Tony LoFaro, "BOB-FM Could Become PAUL-FM if PM Lures Buddy Bono, band to Ottawa; Martin Coy on Air Over Whether He Can Attract Stars," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 February 2005.

⁵⁴⁷ Lynn Saxberg, "Hello, Bono? Can You Please Play Ottawa?" *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 March 2005.

two, because if Paul Martin agrees to give 0.7% national income to the poorest people in the world it will be a great celebration party," and "Three, if he doesn't it will be a great protest party. 18,000 Canadians calling and requesting their prime minister to give 0.7% GNP to aid will be an historic night out."

Martin's Liberal government released its foreign policy review in April, which did not include Bono's requested 0.7% aid figures. Martin went on the defensive explaining that Canada was not in a position to make an "unalterable guarantee" that it could reach the 0.7% target by 2015.⁵⁴⁸ Bono was disappointed and bewildered by the policy statement and noted, "We were looking for Canada to lead rather than be a laggard." In a Vancouver interview Bono asked Canadians to call the Prime Minister Office, and provided the number on-air.⁵⁴⁹ Martin downplayed the criticism and told reporters that he and Bono are "old friends" and that Bono was doing "what he ought to do." Martin also defended his integrity, and claimed he didn't break the promise, and then contradicted his party's recent foreign policy statement when he told reporters he would meet the 0.7% target, although he did "not know precisely when."⁵⁵⁰ Bono then took his appeals to Canadian U2 fans at an April 2005 Vancouver show. The U2 audience booed the Prime Minister when his phone number was flashed on the giant video screen. Bono urged the crowd to call Martin with their "dangerous little devices," referring to the now ubiquitous mobile phone, and added the prime minister

⁵⁴⁸ Kathleen Harris, "Bono Bashes Martin," *Edmonton Sun*, 23 April 2005.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Kelly Toughill, "Bono Still My Friend, PM Says," *The Toronto Star*, 2 May 2005, A06.

"can do what we want him to do, to lead the world out of despair and poverty, this year."⁵⁵¹ Bono was more encouraged by Martin at a Toronto September U2 show when the rock star announced that the Prime Minister is a "good man" and has "been improving."⁵⁵² Bono and Martin's see-saw relationship hit the ground again in November when Bono publicly questioned the Prime Minister while in Ottawa for the Martin-negotiated concert. Bono held a press conference and claimed he was mystified and crushed by Martin's refusal to commit to the 0.7% aid target.⁵⁵³ Martin once again offered a noncommittal retort: Bono's role is to "push me forward."

⁵⁵¹ *U2 Fans Boo Martin*, The Halifax Daily News, 30 April 2005.

⁵⁵² Angela Pacienza, "Bono Says Martin 'Improving' On Aid," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 September 2005, E8.

⁵⁵³ Stephen Thorne, "Bono Says Martin Mystifies Him," *The Toronto Star*, 25 November 2005.

United Kingdom

The U.K. leadership of Tony Blair has been exceptionally receptive to Bono, beginning with the rock star's Jubilee 2000 debt relief work. It was during the Jubilee campaign that Blair and Bono began to regularly meet and the Prime Minister recommitted Britain to helping Africa. U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown and rocker Bob Geldof also become important characters in this bizarre alliance. In September 2003, Gordon Brown called for the G8 countries to provide an extra \$50 billion in new aid for the poorest countries, which would double aid and halve poverty.⁵⁵⁴ Brown proposed his new idea of a International Finance Facility that would focus on health care and removing agricultural subsidies. A DATA press release said Brown "is again showing inspiring leadership on the need for a massive injection of new money to fight poverty in the poorest countries," and reminded that "there are few voices within governments" calling for the money that would help fulfill the Millennium Development Goals.

In January 2004 Tony Blair made an extraordinary political gesture by creating the United Kingdom's Commission for Africa, an idea sold to the Prime Minister by Bob Geldof.⁵⁵⁵ The commission was charged with producing a spring report that would help place Africa at the top of the agenda of the 2005 U.K.-chaired G8 summit. The Commission for Africa featured a plethora of international leaders including chair Tony Blair, U.K.

⁵⁵⁴ *What Comfort is there for the 40 Million Suffering from HIV/AIDS?*, DATA Press Release, 29 September, 2003.

⁵⁵⁵ J.F.O. McAllister, 14 March 2005.

Chancellor Gordon Brown, former IMF director Michel Camdessus, former US Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, Bob Geldof, Kenyan Secretary to the Economic Commission for Africa K.Y. Amoako, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and U.K. Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn.⁵⁵⁶ Tony Blair said the commission's task was to perform "a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Africa and policies toward Africa – what has worked, what has not worked and what more can and should be done." Blair also cited concerns that the Millennium Development Goals were not being met. Blair said that he hoped the report would "regalvanise the international community to act," and dryly noted, "It is easier to get people to take action if a report is published just before a summit."⁵⁵⁷

A DATA press release said the formation of the Africa Commission was "a bold and exciting move from the Prime Minister and puts Africa at the top of the international agenda where it desperately needs to be," and added that "Tony Blair and Gordon Brown are showing great leadership."⁵⁵⁸ President Bush also acknowledged the importance of Blair's move when he agreed with a reporter who asked if the Africa Commission "raised the ante quite a lot in Africa." Bush stated that it is a great opportunity, and that he was honored to be working with Tony Blair "on this important subject."⁵⁵⁹ Geldof confessed that he "secretly

⁵⁵⁶ Paul Vallely, "Blair Backs New Drive to Transform Africa's Dire Outlook," *The Independent*, 27 February 2004.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁸ *Tony Blair Announces Commission for Africa*, DATA Press Release, 26 February 2004.

⁵⁵⁹ *President Welcomes British Prime Minister Blair to the White House*, White House Press Release, 7 June 2005.

hoped for a political breakthrough" with the African Commission and "hoped for a tough public debate on what is clearly the greatest political problem of our time."⁵⁶⁰

In May 2004, Tony Blair was a guest at Bono's Dublin, Ireland home while in the city for a signing ceremony that welcomed ten new European Union member states.⁵⁶¹ The two sounded like old chums as they spent time "chatting, laughing and fiddling with the musical instruments..." They talked about guitars and music and "a little bit about Africa as well." Tony Blair called Bono a "top man" and reported really enjoying the time spent with the rock star.⁵⁶² The chumminess ended quickly when Bono went back to lobbying for Africa. In a June pre-G8 open letter to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown that was backed by DATA, Bono and several other celebrities began a public push to increase EU country aid totals to 0.7% of GDP – an amount of official development assistance (ODA) that the rich world had "famously" committed in 1978 in the Health for All by the Year 2000 pledge.⁵⁶³ Bono also criticized the EU at a Dublin press conference that was held after an informal aid meeting with development ministers from all 25 EU member states.⁵⁶⁴ Bono criticized the EU for breaking pledges on aid, and blamed "bureaucratic bottlenecks" for preventing a pledged \$14 billion from being spent. He then warned: "We are after billions, not millions. And that's what it's going to take to sort out the problems of our next-door neighbor. A lot of these people are doing some great things but there are promises being broken and that's

⁵⁶⁰ Bob Geldof, "Don't Blink: The World is Tilting on its Axis," *Times Online*, 14 June 2005.

⁵⁶¹ Bernard Ginns and Mary Carr, "Blair's Other EU Summit... With 'Top Man' Bono," *Mail on Sunday*, 9 May 2004, 23.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Sachs, 2005, 213.

⁵⁶⁴ Marie Woolf, "Blair is Warned of African Aid Shortfall," *The Independent*, 2 June 2004, 16.

unacceptable. You can't make promises and not keep them. There are some laggards hanging out here and I'm just going to be putting my hand in their wallets. We are getting there, but we just have to hurry them along."

The 2004 U.S.-held G8 summit occurred a week after the Bono letter and his corresponding public admonition. DATA and Bono were reportedly disappointed by the failure of G8 leaders "to commit to the proposal for 100% cancellation of poor country debt owed to the World Bank and IMF" – a plan that was proposed by U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown.⁵⁶⁵ DATA did welcome a series of micro-initiatives that were agreed upon including finding an AIDS vaccination, fighting famine and structural food deficits in Ethiopia, beating polio, African peacekeeping, and fighting corruption. A DATA press release also aggressively challenged U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair's role: "Tony Blair talked the talk for Africa down here in Georgia. But this is irrelevant if he does not walk the walk back in London next week when he and Gordon Brown set the aid budget. The Prime Minister needs to put money in the bank if he wants his G8 in 2005 to deliver the comprehensive and historic plan that Africa really needs and which will set him and his G8 apart from Georgia and all the others."⁵⁶⁶

In July 2004, Blair and Brown responded with an increased U.K. HIV/AIDS budget that went from £300 million to £450 million in 2005, £500 million in 2006, and then £550

⁵⁶⁵ DATA: *Disappointment, but Door Left Open to Progress on Debt relief*, DATA Press Release; 10 June 2004; and Alison Hardie, "Brown Urges Debt Write-Off," *The Scotsman*, 31 May 2004, 2.

⁵⁶⁶ DATA – *Crunch Time for Blair in Africa*, DATA Press Release, 10 June 2004.

million in 2007.⁵⁶⁷ In addition, they announced £150 million over three years for AIDS orphans and a twofold per year increase through 2007 in funding to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. The favor dance continued as Bono agreed to speak at the U.K. Labour Party convention in September. Bono used the occasion to dub Blair and Brown the "John and Paul of the global development stage," and added, "Lennon and McCartney changed my interior world – Blair and Brown can change the real world."⁵⁶⁸ Blair made the next move at an October Commission for Africa meeting when he vowed to put Africa at the top of the agenda at the 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland – which Tony Blair would be chairing. It was a proclamation that matched Jean Chrétien's 2002 Canadian plan.⁵⁶⁹ Blair called the summit "a tremendous opportunity to put before the international community a plan for Africa," and cautioned that "the time for excuses will be over" when his Africa Commission report is delivered, and added that it was "time to turn international attention into international action."⁵⁷⁰

In a December 2004 World AIDS day speech, Chancellor Brown announced that the U.K. would work with other countries to help speed development of an AIDS vaccine.⁵⁷¹ December also provided Brown the opportunity to join Bono on the BBC's Radio Four morning show, *Today*, which the rock star was guest editing. Bono also invited former U.S. President Bill Clinton. Brown used the December 28th appearance to "renew his call for a

⁵⁶⁷ *DATA Responds to New U.K. AIDS Strategy*, DATA Press Release, 21 July 2004.

⁵⁶⁸ *Bono's Speech to Labour Party Conference*, Brighton, U.K., 29 September 2004, Available [Online]: <http://www.data.org/archives/000605.php>

⁵⁶⁹ *Blair Calls for Action on Africa*, BBC News, 7 October 2004.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷¹ *Britain Backs HIV Vaccine Studies*, BBC News, 1 December 2004.

change in the way rich countries tackle poverty."⁵⁷² Brown told listeners: "We shouldn't have to choose, as we are at the moment, between the temporary emergency relief that we are giving and the long-term tackling of the underlying causes of poverty," and noted that "We should be able to do both." He then called for "something akin" to the Marshall Plan, which he called "a bold effort at reconstruction, a very substantial increase in resources." Clinton admitted on the program that it is "easier for world leaders to talk about Africa after leaving office," because of the political unpopularity of asking for billions in charity.⁵⁷³ He also added that he agreed to the BBC interview with Bono because he felt Tony Blair is "genuinely committed to this."

In January 2005, Brown revealed the details of his new Marshall Plan as he again championed the International Finance Facility (IFF), which would borrow against future rich country aid budgets to significantly increase immediate aid spending.⁵⁷⁴ The plan received backing from the European Union, China, India, and Brazil, but was rejected by United States Treasury Under Secretary John Taylor, who claimed the U.S. already had bold proposals for debt relief, "which included channeling more aid through grants as opposed to loans."⁵⁷⁵ Brown offered his rationale for the IFF when he explained: "If we front-load and raise the extra \$4 billion now, 10 million lives would be saved over the next 20 years." He then candidly admitted, "The truth is, unless we front-load resources there is no way we are

⁵⁷² Wall, 2005, 314.

⁵⁷³ Ibid, 315.

⁵⁷⁴ Jeremy Warner, "Germans Back Brown Plan to Tackle Global Poverty," *The Independent*, 29 January 2005, 49.

⁵⁷⁵ Michael Harrison, "Brown's Crusade on Debt Knocked Off Course by the US," *The Independent*, 5 February, 2005.

going to meet the Millennium Development Goals. If we're not going to meet them, why did we sign up to them only a few years ago?"⁵⁷⁶

Tony Blair's Commission for Africa released its report on March 11, 2005, and featured five key foci including *Governance and Capacity-Building*, which called for improvements in Africa's higher education system and pan-African organizations such as the African Union, and exhorted both rich countries and African leadership to take greater responsibility and offer more transparency.⁵⁷⁷ Second, it noted *The Need for Peace and Security*, explaining that Africa "has experienced more violent conflict than any other continent in the last four decades," and called for "controlling the trade in small arms." Thirdly, it called for *Investing in People*, or rebuilding African health and education systems. Fourth, it cited the twin goals of *Going for Growth and Poverty Reduction*, which would benefit from the public and private sectors working together, and would "require a massive investment in infrastructure to break down the internal barriers that hold Africa back." Lastly it noted the need for *More and Fairer Trade*, citing the problems of trade barriers and the lack of commodities. The report noted that its recommendations would require an extra \$25 billion per year in aid by 2010, which should be doubled to \$50 billion per year by 2015, and also stipulated continued growth in good governance and the quality of aid delivery from aid donors. It further requested the oft-repeated aid figure of 0.7% GDP

⁵⁷⁶ "No Child Should Die if it's Avoidable," Interview with Gordon Brown, Time Europe, (14 March 2005), 165, no. 11.

⁵⁷⁷ *The Report of the Commission for Africa*, 11 March 2005, Available [Online]: <http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html#report>

from rich nations, Gordon Brown's goal of front-loading the aid monies through the IFF, and 100 per cent debt cancellation "as soon as possible."

Summer 2005 provided several campaign opportunities for African activists, including the G8 Summit that was chaired by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and held at the Gleneagles Hotel and golf course in Perthshire, Scotland on July 6-8. In addition, the 25th anniversary of Live Aid was being remembered with a last minute July 2 African-awareness concert dubbed Live 8 that would coincide with the G8 summit. Bono began his summer politicking by securing May meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and White House staffers Joshua Bolten and Karl Rove.⁵⁷⁸ The G8's first move occurred in late May when the European Union Development Ministers agreed to increase foreign aid spending to 0.51% of GDP by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015, a position World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz also embraced in June.⁵⁷⁹ DATA's Jamie Drummond noted that the announcement would "help ONE and the other campaigns to make poverty history put healthy pressure on the U.S., Japan, and Canada to increase their effective aid commitments." Bono met with EU president Jose Manuel Barroso on June 9 in Brussels to discuss Africa, and afterwards urged EU leadership to do more than "just pay lip-service to the issue."⁵⁸⁰ Bono also called for G8 protesters to "turn up en masse at this golf course," an

⁵⁷⁸ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid and *Reaction from Sir Bob Geldof and ONE Campaign on European Move to Boost Assistance to the Poorest*, DATA Press Release, 24 May 2005.

⁵⁸⁰ Jonathan Cohen, "Bono Stumps for African Aid in Brussels," Billboard Online; http://www.billboard.com/bbcom/search/google/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000954211

apparent follow-up to fellow-campaigner Bob Geldof's call for one million protestors to show.⁵⁸¹

Bono's challenge to the G8 leadership was honored by the G7 finance ministers in a June 11 \$40 billion debt relief deal for 18 poor countries – most of which were in Africa – and covered monies owed to the World Bank, the IMF, and the African Development Bank; and offered the potential to include 27 countries and \$55 billion within 18 months.⁵⁸² The G8 leaders also committed to an additional \$25 billion in African aid, and universal access to HIV drugs, both by 2010.⁵⁸³ The financing for the new debt-deal would come from numerous sources including reshuffled current funds, new monies and a "previously unknown" reserve IMF fund, that Stephen Rand from the Jubilee Debt Campaign likened to "finding grandma's forgotten Post Office savings account."⁵⁸⁴ *The Christian Science Monitor* credited the "long campaign of persistent persuasion by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish rock star Bono," and added, "They won a victory for the world's poorest continent."⁵⁸⁵ *The Financial Times* reported that Germany and Japan initially wanted to write-off a smaller portion of debt if certain criteria weren't met, but "bowed in the end to the political reality of strong public support for the deal."⁵⁸⁶ *The New York Times* reported

⁵⁸¹ Michael Settle, "'Descend on Gleneagles', Bono Tells Protesters," *The Herald*, 13 June 2005, Web Issue 2287, Available [Online]: <http://www.theherald.co.U.K./politics/41081-print.shtml>

⁵⁸² Owen Bowcott, "Deal Praised But More Help Wanted," *The Guardian*, 13 June 2005.

⁵⁸³ *G8 Leaders Agree \$50bn Aid Boost*, BBC News, 8 July 2005, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/business/4662297.stm>

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ *Blair, Bono Win One for Africa*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 June 2005.

⁵⁸⁶ Chris Giles and Friederike Tiesenhausen Cave, "Caution Over G8 Plan for Debt Relief," *The Financial Times*, 13 June 2005.

that Bono had met with Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor at the World Economic Forum "to try and move the Bush Administration's position" on the debt issue.⁵⁸⁷

The Live 8 concerts were announced only one month before on May 31, but were quickly organized and easily rivaled its predecessor 20 years earlier. The July 2 concerts were held in 10 cities including Philadelphia, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Johannesburg, Tokyo, and Moscow; and featured a July 6 finale in Edinburgh, Scotland to coincide with the G8. Dozens of acts performed at the various venues including U2, Paul McCartney, Elton John, R.E.M., Sting, Madonna, the Dave Matthews Band, Stevie Wonder, Jay-Z, Andrea Bocelli, Brian Wilson, and the highly-anticipated Pink Floyd reunion – who played together for the first time in 24 years.⁵⁸⁸ The concerts were free, and instead of raising dollars for Africa they sought to raise political awareness and pressure G8 leadership in the run-up to the Gleneagles summit. Nelson Mandela spoke via video to the 60,000 concertgoers at the Live 8's Final Push Gig in Edinburgh, and asked the crowd to "work together to make poverty history this year."⁵⁸⁹ The spectacular event was broadcast worldwide on more than 140 TV channels to an audience of several hundred million, was heard on nearly 400 radio stations, and watched by more than 5 million viewers through live internet streams on America Online – which was an internet record.⁵⁹⁰ The Philadelphia show attracted more

⁵⁸⁷ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁵⁸⁸ Richard Harrington, "Live 8 Concerts to Amplify Problem of Global Poverty," *The Washington Post*, 1 June 2005, C01.

⁵⁸⁹ *Mandela Addresses Live 8 Finale*, BBC News, 7 July 2005, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/entertainment/4653511.stm>

⁵⁹⁰ *Millions Rock to Live 8 Message*, BBC News, 3 July 2005, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/entertainment/4641999.stm>; *Media Spread Live 8 Around the Globe*, BBC News,

than 800,000 fans, and the London, Berlin, and Rome shows all drew 200,000 each. Live 8 also received a record 26.4 million text messages in support of the campaign. The concerts also unintentionally provided \$12 million in surplus earnings generated from sponsors, merchandising, TV and DVD rights, and was subsequently slated for relief projects in Africa.⁵⁹¹

Blair and Bono spoke regularly the week before the G8 summit, and “while having a beer,” they devised a plan for a Bono stop-by during a 10 Downing Street meeting with the assistants to the G8 heads of state – whom the rock star called “the eight sherpas.”⁵⁹² Blair explained they decided to talk to the people “who’d done an incredible amount of work, to give them a sense of the importance of this.”⁵⁹³ *The New York Times* candidly noted that “Lobbying sherpas is simply not done,” but “Bono dropped in on their meeting as he just happened to be in the neighborhood.” After introducing himself, Bono asked them “to please go a bit further” on the G8 aid deals, and reasoned, “In 20 years, this week will be one of the things you’ll be most proud of in your lives.”⁵⁹⁴

With the onset of the G8 approaching, Bono was stationed at a DATA war room in a Scotland hotel, along with key aides, and Bob Geldof. On the first day of the summit Bono and his cronies took a helicopter to Gleneagles, where Bono spoke with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair about issues that were “still up in the air” including

3 July 2005, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/entertainment/4645097.stm>; Brian Hiatt, Austin Scaggs and David Sinclair, “Live 8’s Global Uprising,” *Rolling Stone*, (28 July 2005) 979, 32-34.

⁵⁹¹ Emmanuel Legrand, “Live 8 Yields a Windfall,” *Billboard*, (5 November 2005): 117, no. 45, 9-10.

⁵⁹² James Traub, 18 September 2005; Josh Tyrangiel, “The Constant Charmer,” *Time*, (26 December 2005): 166, no. 26, 46-62.

⁵⁹³ Josh Tyrangiel, “The Constant Charmer,” *Time*, (26 December 2005): 166, no. 26, 46-62.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

finance mechanisms and trade reform. The rock star also got more time with Bush when "he dropped by his suite for a final nudge," and told the president, "On so many issues it's difficult to know what God wants from us, but on this issue, helping the desperately poor, we know God will bless it."⁵⁹⁵ G8 leaders held a formal signing ceremony for the African commitments on the final day of the summit – a formality that was "against G8 tradition" – but pushed by Blair after Bono had presented the idea.⁵⁹⁶

John Kirton of the University of Toronto G8 research group said that the 2005 G8 summit "was the single most successful in the 30-year history of the event and claimed that strong public support was not accidental – a claim also cited by German and Japanese officials."⁵⁹⁷ Kirton explained that a key part of the summit was the involvement that civil society had during central deliberations, what he called an "unprecedented opportunity." He specifically cited the *Make Poverty History* and Live 8 campaigns that showed "how civil society can exert real pressure and influence the agenda and outcome." Sir Michael Jay, a British "sherpa," credited Live 8 for the African initiatives, and admitted that without the concerts "there could have been no deal."⁵⁹⁸ Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin credited Bono: "It's difficult to imagine much of it would have been done without him."⁵⁹⁹

Doubts surrounding the finalization of the G8 debt-deal surfaced in September when several Northern European countries and the World Bank admitted to having reservations

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ James Traub, 18 September 2005.

⁵⁹⁷ Steve Schifferes, "Can G8 be Considered a Success?," *BBC News Online*, 8 July 2005, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/business/4663659.stm>

⁵⁹⁸ *Geldof's Year*, *The Guardian*, 28 December 2005.

⁵⁹⁹ Josh Tyrangiel, "The Constant Charmer," *Time*, (26 December 2005): 166, no. 26, 46-62.

about the plan.⁶⁰⁰ The aid community was relieved when the deal received an important approval from the World Bank and the IMF on September 25.⁶⁰¹ Bono issued a statement though DATA hailing victory for "the greatest protest movement since anti-apartheid in the 80s and civil rights in the 60s." He also credited the diverse coalition that was involved: "The politicians have had to listen. Their consciences have been pricked from every imaginable corner – by the church, student groups, the NGO community, musicians, movie stars and soccer moms."⁶⁰²

Bono also targeted the next piece of his African crusade: "The next injustice to be torn down is the bullying tactics at the WTO" (World Trade Organization). Jamie Drummond expounded on DATA's latest strategy, which were focused on the December 2005 Hong Kong WTO talks: "To be clear, DATA has been lobbying hard, both USTR [United States Office of the Trade Representative], the White House, Brussels, Number 10 Downing Street, the Irish government, the French government – we've been working with all the G8 leaders to try and get the best possible outcome."⁶⁰³ In late November DATA was rewarded for its efforts as U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman sought Bono and DATA's assistance in securing a trade deal at the December WTO meetings, after earlier that month his office had "briefed the Irish singer and top staffers... on the U.S.

⁶⁰⁰ Paul Blustein, "Objections Emerge to G-8 Debt relief Plan; One Time Cancellation for 18 Nations Seen by Some as Damaging Institutional Capacity," *The Washington Post*, 13 September 2005, A14.

⁶⁰¹ *DATA Reaction to IMF-World Bank Debt Cancellation*, DATA Press Release, 25 September 2005.

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ *Rockin' in the Free Trade World*, Marketplace Radio Program, American Public Media, 23 November 2005, p.m. edition, Available [Online]: Available [Online]: <http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2005/11/23/PM200511232.html>

agenda..."⁶⁰⁴ A Portman spokesman admitted, "We just want [DATA and Bono] to be involved. That's our objective." The Canadian International Trade Minister also approached Bono about attending the Hong Kong talks, and even gave the rock star a letter about the benefits of free trade for developing countries.⁶⁰⁵ Bono did not attend the WTO Hong Kong trade talks because of his touring commitments with U2, as reported to the author in a brief pre-concert discussion on December 14, 2005 in St. Louis, Missouri – the week of the Hong Kong WTO meetings.

⁶⁰⁴ Greg Hitt, "Wanted: Rocker-Activist's Support," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 November 2005, A4.

⁶⁰⁵ Stephen Thorne, "Bono Says Martin Mystifies Him," *the Toronto Star*, 25 November 2005.

Section IV

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

I've never been keen on celebrities in politics. But Arnold [Schwarzenegger] told me Bono knew what he was talking about. As it turned out, Bono really did know what he was talking about.

- Former U.S. Representative John Kasich (R-Ohio), in interview with Cleveland Plain Dealer Music Critic John Soeder

I can't figure out why President Bush keeps asking me back, but he does. I scratch my head going, 'He's a Republican. I'm a rock star, uuhhh.'

- Bono in an Interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network

After reading the preceding historical analysis there should be no doubt that Bono has engaged in a lifelong pursuit of social and political activism, and has indeed secured considerable influence and political achievements during his career as front-man for rock band U2. It should also be obvious that Bono's influence and political successes increased significantly in the late 1990s and the early 2000s when his political activist strategy deliberately shifted upon joining the Jubilee 2000 campaign. This led to the eventual formation of his think tank/lobbying firm DATA, and the related grassroots organization the ONE Campaign. These three organizations also focus solely on issues related to reducing abject poverty on the African continent. Figure Three summarizes the numerous documented political activities in which Bono has participated and that this work has

investigated. A quick glance should provide ample evidence of Bono's substantial political involvement.

Fig. 3 Timeline of Bono's Political Activism

1982

- Bono befriends Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald in Heathrow airport. The PM visits U2 in the studio on the last day of his reelection campaign. The U2-FitzGerald connection is featured "heavily" in the Irish press. The PM wins reelection and later admits: "Bono spoke favorably about my party during the election and that was politically helpful."

1992

- U2 spends time with Bill Clinton in the run-up to the 1992 presidential election. Bono also harasses presidential incumbent George Bush nightly from stage. Clinton wins presidential election and tells Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds that U2 played a big part in getting him elected.

1998

- U2 endorses the Irish Good Friday peace agreement. Political opposition leaders John Hume (Ulster Unionist Party) and David Trimble (Social Democratic and Labor Party) publicly shake hands a pre-referendum U2 benefit gig. Referendum passes by a landslide.

1999

- **February:** Bono endorses Jubilee 2000 at the Brit Awards and in a Guardian newspaper op-ed. U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown announces **£50 million** debt relief package a few days later.
- Bono lobbies Bill Clinton to cancel 100% of HIPC debt owed to the United States instead of Clinton's previous 67% offer.
- **September:** Clinton announces 100% bilateral debt relief and seeks the funding from Congress over four years. Clinton publicly praises Bono's efforts representing Jubilee 2000.
- Bono asks the Pope to publicly support Jubilee 2000. After the Bono meeting, the Pope publicly embraces Jubilee 2000 and then appeals to world leaders on behalf of the campaign.
- Bono lobbies Dick Armev about IMF gold revaluation to pay for debt relief. In **November** Armev eventually supports IMF gold revaluation and Congress passes a **\$123 million** bilateral debt-deal.
- Bono helps convince U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers to back debt relief. Summers pens a Washington Post op-ed backing debt relief and becomes a key Bono-ally in the Clinton Administration.
- **1999-2002:** Bono lobbies Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Foreign Minister Paul Martin about Africa. The Toronto Sun credits Bono with Paul Martin's fall 2000 **\$1 billion** African debt cancellation. Chrétien makes Africa the focus of the Canadian-hosted 2002 G8 Summit, and secures **\$1 billion** in African aid.

2000

- **July:** Bono "ginned up" clergy constituents of House debt relief holdout Sonny Callahan (R-AL). Callahan admits that "he gave in" to the debt relief lobbying and subsequently backs the House bill which provides **\$225 million** in multilateral debt relief.
- Bono meets with noted conservative Jesse Helms about debt relief. Helms is brought to tears and admits Bono "changed his mind about debt relief." He offers to do anything he can to help Bono. Helms later pushes a **\$435 million** bilateral debt relief bill through the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, which Congress passes. The bill also provides an additional **\$800 million** from IMF gold sales.

2001

- **June 2001:** Bono again meets with Jesse Helms, this time about the African HIV/AIDS emergency. Helms is again reduced to tears and publicly repents for his previous HIV/AIDS stance. Helms convinces U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney to "listen to Bono's ideas." Helms pens Washington Post op-ed about tackling African HIV/AIDS. Helms

adds **\$500 million** in African AIDS funding to 2002 supplemental appropriations bill, which is eventually killed by the White House.

- **2001-2003:** Persistent lobbying of Bush Administration officials about African HIV/AIDS and responsible African aid monies. In **2002** Bush relies on DATA to help draft Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) legislation, a new foreign aid bill. Bush Administration requires Bono to publicly endorse the MCA legislation. Bono travels to Africa with Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. Bush announces a \$15 billion AIDS relief plan in **2003**, which was also drafted with help from DATA staffers.

2003

- **September:** DATA places ads in Ohio, home of Senator Mike DeWine, urging constituents to request full funding of the FY 2004 AIDS bill appropriation. In **October** DeWine proposes \$289 million amendment to FY 2004 AIDS bill. Final appropriation for FY 2004 AIDS spending: **\$2.4 billion**. Final FY 2004 appropriation for MCA: **\$1 billion**.
- **2003-2005:** In **November 2003** Bono lobbies Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin about generic HIV/AIDS drugs for Africa. In **March 2004** DATA and Bono attack Paul Martin's generic AIDS drugs legislation, which was partial to pharmaceutical manufacturers. In **April 2004** Paul Martin removes language from legislation favoring manufacturers. In **May 2004** Paul Martin commits **\$100 million** to an upstart WHO HIV/AIDS program. Martin creates the Canada Corps, which recruits young people to help build democratic institutions in failing states. Martin doubles Canada's contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS to **\$70 million**. Finance Minister Ralph Goodale announces **\$9 million** in debt relief for Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia. In **April 2005** Bono attacks the Martin government because it did not endorse the target foreign aid rate of 0.7% of GDP. In **May 2005** Martin bumbles, stumbles, and backtracks, but acknowledges Canada will work toward the 0.7% target foreign aid rate.

2004

- **March:** DATA places ads and mobilizes constituents in House Republican Jim Nussle's Iowa district attacking his proposed \$4.7 billion cut to foreign aid spending, which also removes any promises for AIDS funding. In **May** Nussle adds an additional \$2.8 billion to the foreign aid budget – the exact amount Bush requested for the AIDS bill. Nussle admits buckling to his Iowa constituents. Final appropriation for FY 2005 AIDS spending: **\$2.8 billion**. Final FY 2005 appropriation for MCA: **\$1.5 billion**.
- **April:** Bono meets with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to lobby for a German aid commitment of 0.7% of GDP. In **January 2005** Gerhard Schröder privately assures Bono he supports the 0.7% target, which was then publicly announced in **May 2005**.
- **May:** During Bono's Congressional testimony, Senator Mitch McConnell asks him to contact EU leadership about increasing Burmese sanctions. Bono promises to contact EU president Romano Prodi. In **October** the EU intensifies Burmese sanctions.
- **June:** Bono and DATA press U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown to increase African aid funding. **July:** Blair and Brown increase African aid funding by **£750 million** over three years. They also double U.K. yearly contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS.

2005

- **May:** Bono lobbies members of Bush Administration about African Malaria funding. In **June** Bush announces **\$674 million** in additional FY 2005 emergency African Aid. Bush also announces **\$1.7 billion** in additional African aid funding, the majority of which supports anti-malaria efforts.
- **July:** The ONE Campaign urges supporters to contact their Congressmen about a \$100 million AIDS and malaria amendment. In **October** Senators receive 25,000 calls about the amendment, which then passes.
- Bono and DATA lobby G8 governments for historic deal at 2005 G8 summit being hosted by the U.K. In **May** EU development ministers agree to 0.51% of GDP aid budget by 2010, and 0.7% by 2015. In **June** G7 finance ministers

announce **\$40-55 billion** African debt relief plan, and in **July** the G8 announces **\$50 billion** extra in foreign aid by 2010, half of which will go to Africa.

This section will use social science literature to fully explain the efficacy of the Bono-model of celebrity activism. It will also provide a deeper case for Bono's political successes using the academic literature on celebrity activism, think tanks, interest groups, coalition building, and transnational civil society. The first step in explaining and assessing Bono's political success is definitional. One issue when analyzing Bono's political forays relates to their transnational nature – as he targets both the domestic and international arena – both of which include various structural political entities. In addition, Bono uses his influence in numerous ways including as front man of U2, where he promotes issue awareness and requests fans to join the ONE Campaign; and as a political lobbyist in his role with DATA and the ONE Campaign. This work has primarily focused on Bono's domestic activities within the United States, but has also briefly examined his international political efforts as they relate to the G8 countries. For this reason, the utilized academic literature on celebrity activism, think tanks, and interest groups will be primarily contextualized on situations within the United States.

17. Limitations

It is important to acknowledge several limitations to this work, which given more time and resources could have been further explored. These issues provide fertile research ground for others. The first issue concerns Bono's actual influence. The humanitarian issues that Bono has tackled are numerous and complex, and also feature many other actors with varying agendas. Bono is only one of many international actors, which include thousands of NGOs, academics, bureaucrats, clergy, businessmen, volunteers, and citizens that have been actively involved with issues and policy related to Africa. It is also probable that there are other powerbrokers and groups that have been equally and/or more politically influential than Bono.

There is also the issue of political motivation. Were the policy shifts and personal political breakthroughs the result of Bono's influence and persuasion, or were there other reasons for these shifts? For example, the security ramifications of a post 9/11 mentality that have been mentioned by numerous politicians and African advocates provide one possible alternate explanation for the policy shifts explored in this work. For example, some in the development community see the increased concern for African being motivated "by calculations of Africa's geo-strategic significance, with the U.S. seeking to foster military and security relationships which advance its own agenda," or even by the quest for African

natural resources, such as oil.⁶⁰⁶ These issues concern an entirely different set of pressure groups and actors whom extend beyond the international development community, and politicians might simply be responding to their behind-the-scenes pressure.

It is also important to discuss the difference between political promises and policy, and further, policy enactments and actual policy results. This work did not completely examine the final results of each political promise, especially where arcane and pliable items such as budgets and financial commitments are concerned. For example, this work reported that in March 2002 Jesse Helms proposed an increase in Congressional African AIDS funding of \$500 million. *The American Prospect* reported that the \$500 million was later whittled down to \$200 million by the White House while Helms was in the hospital, and further, Bush never even disbursed this reduced amount.⁶⁰⁷ This is just one example of the discrepancies that can exist between political posturing and final results.

In addition, while this work has provided evidence that suggests Bono has been politically successful in securing new African policy, this does not guarantee similar successful results for the citizens of Africa. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to thoroughly assess the results of the African policy of which Bono has been a part, preliminary evidence and dissenting voices can be provided. Debt relief was the first major task that Bono undertook, and in gross dollar terms, probably his most successful. *Jubilee Research*, a spin-off from the Jubilee 2000 campaign and a part of the U.K.-based "think-

⁶⁰⁶ Ann-Louise Colgan, "Policy Report: Africa Policy Outlook 2005," *Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)*, January 2005.

⁶⁰⁷ Erika Casriel, "Promises, Promise; Big Talk Aside, Bush's Go-It-Alone Global AIDS Strategy is Hurting More than It's Helping," *The American Prospect*, August 2004.

and-do-tank" New Economics Foundation, reports that presently nearly \$30 billion in debt has been cancelled for HIPC countries in net present value.⁶⁰⁸ An August 2005 joint IMF-World Bank report indicates that the total cost of debt relief for the 28 countries that have met HIPC requirements is \$38.2 billion in 2004 net present value.⁶⁰⁹ But there are several critics who claim that the debt relief proposals are neither deep nor broad enough, and are being delivered too slow.⁶¹⁰ In addition, these critics contend that HIPC eligibility conditions exacerbate the aforementioned issues.

There are also critics on the right who are opposed to the very concept of aid, citing the development of a "culture of dependency... which will impede rather than accelerate the positive changes needed to haul Africa into the 21st Century."⁶¹¹ These critics continually point to the political corruption that has lent to aid enriching political elites. *Foreign Affairs* contributor Stephen Ellis claims, "Many on the continent have come to see foreign aid as nothing more than a cow to be milked."⁶¹² Less callous critics note that aid thinking is "confused," as it ignores the "central role of politics and the state in Africa's development

⁶⁰⁸ Taken from Jubilee Research website on 29 November 2005, Available [Online]: <http://www.jubilee2000U.K..org/>

⁶⁰⁹ *Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative – Status of Implementation*, Prepared by the Staffs of the IMF and World Bank, 19 August 2005, Available [Online]: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/081905.pdf>

⁶¹⁰ See Fantu Cheru, "Debt, Adjustment and the Politics of Effective Response to HIV/AIDS in Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2002): 299-313; Walden Bello and Guttal Shalmali, "Programmed to Fail: The World Bank Clings to a Bankrupt Development Model," *Multinational Monitor* (July/August 2005): 23-29; Stephen Ellis, "How to Rebuild Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005): 135-148; *Deadly Delays: How IMF and World Bank Economic Conditions Undermine Debt Cancellation*, Jubilee USA Report, November 2005, Available [Online]: http://www.jubileeusa.org/resources/reports/deadly_delays.pdf

⁶¹¹ Nile Gardiner, "The Bush/Blair Pre-G-8 Meeting: Tensions in the Anglo-U.S. Alliance?," *Web Memo #754*, *The Heritage Foundation*, Available [Online]: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm754.cfm>

⁶¹² Stephen Ellis, "How to Rebuild Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005): 135-148.

problems."⁶¹³ In assessing the prudence of the G8's summer 2005 agreement to double African aid assistance by 2010, *Journal of International Development* contributor Matthew Lockwood cites the 130% increase in African aid between 1980 and 1990 – a decade which also saw African per capita incomes fall and poverty increase. Lockwood blames aid that has been "tied to donor country commercial interests, and poorly targeted, coordinated, and harmonized." In addition, Lockwood explains that recipient governments that "have been bombarded with conflicting advice and schemes from many donors, the international agencies, and NGOs."

It is also premature to offer thorough assessments of the two major U.S. foreign aid programs in which Bono has been integral, the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA), which later became the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This work previously mentioned criticisms surrounding the MCC's late deployment – a program that is fiscally lagging and still in its development phase. To its credit, as a new agency outside of traditional U.S. foreign aid hubs such as the State Department and USAID, the MCC has had inordinate bureaucratic implementation hurdles. As of January 2005, there have been 23 recipient countries identified and five country compacts signed. It is premature to even begin to assess the on-the-ground results of the MCC. PEPFAR has had more initial success than the MCC, with its First Annual Report to Congress providing a plethora of positive statistics. The report starts by boasting that PEPFAR is "the largest international health initiative in history

⁶¹³ Matthew Lockwood, "Will A Marshall Plan for Africa Make Poverty History?," *Journal of International Development*, 2005, 17, 775-89.

initiated by one nation to address a single disease."⁶¹⁴ The report claims that PEPFAR has put 155,000 HIV-positive adults and children on antiretroviral therapy, supported care for more than 1,727,000 adults and children with HIV/AIDS, provided 1.2 million women with mother-to-child prevention services, trained more than 6,000 in injection and blood safety, trained 312,000 health care providers (this includes training in basic prevention services, mother-to-child prevention, antiretroviral therapy, palliative care, counseling and testing, and orphan care). In addition, PEPFAR proudly reported that 80 percent of their 1200 partner organizations were indigenous as opposed to Western-operated. PEPFAR also voraciously promoted its controversial ABC approach to HIV prevention (Abstinence, Being Faithful, and, as appropriate, correct and consistent use of Condoms) by supporting national strategies that sent ABC messages to over 120 million people through mass media campaigns and other interventions. It is also beyond the scope of this work to determine if PEPFAR's results are satisfactory given the allocated resources.

⁶¹⁴ *Engendering Bold Leadership: The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*, First Annual Report to Congress, March 2005.

18. Charisma and Issue-Knowledge

Boston College sociologist and philanthropy expert Paul Schervish categorizes Bono as one of a few celebrity "hyper-agents" – those "with the wealth and time to dedicate to finding new ways of addressing age-old problems, as well as the *charisma* to motivate others," and who Schervish claims has partially spurred "the first roots of a dramatic change in philanthropy that we're going to see emerge and become a regular part of our culture in the next 10 years (emphasis added)."⁶¹⁵ This is a bold prediction, and the subject of philanthropy is not one that this work has analyzed, but Schervish's application of the term "charisma" to the person of Bono is important as it relates to the Bono-model of celebrity political engagement. In *Charisma in Politics, Religion, and the Media*, Aberbach calls the term charisma "the most enduring, abused and controversial legacy of the German sociologist Max Weber."⁶¹⁶ This controversy stemmed from Weber's application of charisma to secular phenomena such as politics, where as before it was purely a theological term. Marshall also discusses Weber's contributions to the study of charisma, and notes that Weber drew from the original Greek definition, that "identifies charisma as a 'gift' from the Grace of God," and further explains that charismatic power "is *ultra vires* of institutional

⁶¹⁵ Alexandra Marks, "Celebrity 'Hyper-Agents' Transform Philanthropy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 2005.

⁶¹⁶ David Aberbach, *Charisma in Politics, Religion and the Media*, New York: New York University Press, 1996, ix.

and economic forms of legitimation."⁶¹⁷ In addition, "pure charismatic authority" is characterized by a leader who "is entirely independent of the status of an office, position, or rank," which fits Bono's case. Aberbach also notes that *charisma* "is now commonly applied to individuals who have for good or bad left their mark on society, particularly through politics or the media..."

These descriptions of charisma all fit Bono, as he has surpassed traditional institutional celebrity boundaries, and has left significant marks on both politics and media through his activism and his musical career, although he likely falls within Aberbach's "exceptional" category. Interestingly enough, Aberbach compares the greatest political charismatics to artists, claiming that they "use their followers as 'material' to raise politics to the level of art."⁶¹⁸

Aberbach also explores a continuing debate regarding the structural forces at work outside of the charismatic, and claims that "Crisis creates the need for heroic leadership," but also finds it difficult to imagine counterfactuals that include a French Revolution without Robespierre or an American Civil War without Abraham Lincoln. Aberbach asks, "And yet, does crisis create charisma? Is it not also true that charisma provokes crisis?"⁶¹⁹ Aberbach resolves this chicken-in-the-egg puzzle noting it is within "this paradox that the dynamic nature of charisma lies." Aberbach also maintains that "Charisma and crisis are dynamic, interlocking forces, feeding on and manipulating each other." Bono is certainly the leading

⁶¹⁷ David P. Marshall, *Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 20.

⁶¹⁸ Aberbach, 1996, 1.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid, 5.

Western spokesman for the African crisis – what he continually refers to as an emergency. Currently it seems that most of Western society does not consider the ills of Africa a crisis, but it is probable that history will portray it as such. Bono addressed this subject in a 2005 interview with *60 Minutes* correspondent Ed Bradley, and explained that he thinks his activism will be forgotten, because the problems of Africa “will have gone away.”⁶²⁰

Aberbach also claims that the modern media, “especially film and radio,” has “enormously expanded the possibilities and meaning of charisma,” and that several 20th century charismatics used modern mediums to their advantage including Charlie Chaplin, Adolph Hitler, John F. Kennedy, and Charles de Gaulle.⁶²¹ Aberbach explains that the media has also “magnified as never before the public view of charismatics,” and uncovered what was previously hidden about charisma in its traditional forms and enhanced the possibilities for charismatic religious expression in popular culture,” a telling observation that fits Bono’s case.⁶²² Aberbach cites Charles Lindbergh’s “semi-religious charismatic authority” after his 1927 cross-Atlantic flight. Bono also arguably commands a “semi-religious charismatic authority,” most notably at U2 concerts where thousands of fans revel in a worship-like atmosphere, while Bono commands the spotlight. Smyth discusses how U2 concerts were from the outset meant to create a feeling of intimacy, a large part of which depended upon

⁶²⁰ *Bono and the Christian Right*, CBS News Online, 20 November 2005, Available [Online]: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/17/60minutes/main1053542.shtml>

⁶²¹ Aberbach, 1996, 75.

⁶²² Ibid, 79

"the energy and charisma of Bono."⁶²³ Smyth further explained how U2 audiences could be seduced by Bono's charisma and the band's music:

[Bono's] stage antics, which frequently included climbing on sets and interacting with members of the audience, amounted to an assault on the artificial space of the stage so that concert-goers would feel they had been a part of, rather than merely witness to, an event... Also at this time, the kind of music U2 produced seemed especially geared to work in the context of live performance. As their popularity grew and the venues got larger, so the music itself seemed to grow in terms of the sonic evocation of space and the characteristic themes of the lyrics...

Neil McCormick, Bono's high school buddy and author of the satirical Bono memoir, *Killing Bono*, claimed that Bono has "always had that messianic glint about him."⁶²⁴

McCormick added: "Everybody loved Bono. He was such a charismatic force and he always seemed to have so much love to give, enveloping everyone in the room around him, whether it was a small photo studio or a huge rock venue."⁶²⁵ In addition, it appears that Bono's charismatic appeal to the masses has increased proportionally with his fame as a humanitarian. *Time* named Bono co-person of the year along with the Bill and Melinda Gates in December 2005, and claimed that Bono "commands attention like no other cultural

⁶²³ Gerry Smyth, *Space and the Irish Cultural Imagination*, New York, New York: Palgrave, 2001, 167-8.

⁶²⁴ John Soeder, "Rocker with a Cause Has Leaders' Ears," *The Plain Dealer*, 10 December 2005.

⁶²⁵ Neil McCormick, *Killing Bono*, New York: Pocket Books, 2004, 135.

figure alive."⁶²⁶ U2 biographer Bill Flanagan spoke of Bono's escalating VIP status in a 2005 interview with a U2 fan website (emphasis added):⁶²⁷

I have known Bono for 25 years and he has been a big star for almost 20, *but lately when I'm with him I notice a real change in the way people react to him. It's like going out with Gandhi or something.* In a sort of hopeless time, he is a real beacon... A couple of weeks ago I took a flight with him. It was pretty late at night and we went to the airport and I noticed that the crew on the airplane was acting really whacky. They all seemed to be kind of wired and falling over themselves. I couldn't figure out what was going on. We got on the plane and sat down and we were talking and the flight attendant kept interrupting to ask us silly questions and offer us all kinds of treats and drinks and pillows and magazines and about the fifth time I thought, 'What's wrong with this woman? Why is she so hopped up?' And then it dawned on me, it was because of Bono. She and the whole flight crew were flipping out because Bono was on the plane. *It was not how professional people normally react to a rock star or any other kind of celebrity. This was something a lot more intense. I've seen people react a little like that to Paul McCartney, Muhammad Ali and Bill Clinton, but I'd have to say that this is even stronger.* It's like Bono has absorbed the energy that's been looking for a place to land since the sixties.

It is also fair to ask what marks a charismatic beyond the nebulous term "semi-religious authority" – or what are the characteristics of a charismatic? Conger sought to answer this question in *The Charismatic Leader*, and claims that charismatic leaders

⁶²⁶ Josh Tyrangiel, 26 December 2005.

⁶²⁷ Angela Pancella, *The @U2 Interview: Bill Flanagan*, 13 December 2005, Available [Online]: <http://www.atu2.com/news/article.src?ID=4171&Key=&Year=&Cat=>

historically have always “personified the forces of change, unconventionality, vision, and an entrepreneurial spirit” – characteristics that typify Bono.⁶²⁸ Conger simplifies the point noting that charismatic leaders “are by vocation change agents,” and explains that they seem “forever discontent and are in search of new opportunities.” Conger also notes that charismatic leaders “motivate change through a strategic vision,” which “becomes a beacon for subordinates... [and] provides a certain clarity at a time when things may not be very clear.”⁶²⁹ Bono’s vision to eradicate African poverty is a crusade that has drawn thousands of supporters, and he seems to be the one unifying beacon beyond the vision that he has helped to create. Charismatic leaders are also seen as exemplary communicators as it relates to their vision as well as building-trust and motivating others – traits also exhibited by Bono. Conger concludes that it is insufficient to only have one or two of these skills, explaining, “When leaders possess the full complement of these skills, the odds are high that they will be perceived as charismatic.”⁶³⁰

The historical sections of this work have demonstrated how Bono’s charisma has aided him in numerous successful endeavors including in his role as U2 front-man, and as a political activist. His charisma is also the partial second step in the Bono-model of celebrity activism. But in a democratic, pluralistic system, where political matters are argued and debated at every turn, issue-knowledge is also critical. Issue-knowledge has been the bookend to Bono’s natural and growing charismatic appeal, and a crucial piece of the Bono-

⁶²⁸ Jay Conger, *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, 17.

⁶²⁹ Ibid, 4-5.

⁶³⁰ Ibid, 36.

model as it confers legitimacy with politicians. As Republican Senator Rick Santorum explained, "If you really want to be effective, you have to bring something to the table beyond just charisma. The important thing is, Bono understands his issues better than 99% of members of Congress."⁶³¹ Jeffery Sachs also testified to Bono's dual-attack of charisma and issue-knowledge: "Celebrities open doors, without question – everyone wants to meet Bono – but the amazing thing about Bono is that they want to meet him again and again because he's not only a celebrity but knows far more about the subject under discussion than the politicians do."⁶³² One example of Bono's potent blend of charisma and issue-knowledge occurred at a meeting with M.I.T.'s Poverty Action Lab that included economists, mathematicians, and policy experts. Bono excitedly began verbally contemplating the possibilities of objective modeling: "Do you know we've been chased down hallways with the words 'measurable results?' What you have here is the stuff that can change the world!" A brief silence ensued when his impromptu speech ended, which was immediately followed by laughter - "as if everyone had just got off an amusement park ride."⁶³³

Meyer and Gamson discuss issue-knowledge or expertise as it relates to celebrity activism in social movements, but instead use the term *standing*, which derives from legal theory and "allows that only certain agents have recognized interest in making claims before a court." Meyer and Gamson apply *standing* in defining celebrities who claim "a

⁶³¹ Josh Tyrangiel, 26 December 2005.

⁶³² Jonathan Curiel, "Star Power: When Celebrities Support Causes, Who Really Winds Up Benefiting?," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 5 June 2005.

⁶³³ Ibid.

recognizable legitimate interest in the outcome of a political question or movement."⁶³⁴

When applied to social movements, Meyer and Gamson note that standing is a "socially constructed legitimacy to engage publicly in a particular issue."⁶³⁵ In addition, they note that gaining standing is "especially tricky" for celebrities because their elite "status is especially tenuous – as it is based on consumption rather than votes, and on 'personality' rather than action." This was the state of Bono's standing pre-1999. Bono did not have standing with politicians on international political issues, especially regarding Africa, until after his 1999 involvement with the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, his subsequent going "back to school" with Professor Jeffery Sachs, and his continual study of the issues, which has included "discussions with academics and development experts at Harvard and M.I.T."⁶³⁶ Bono's standing grew with each of these developments and resulted in politicians increasingly noticing his expertise. In addition, in helping found DATA and the ONE Campaign, Bono created organizations that specifically use issue-knowledge to inform the public and lobby politicians.

DATA and the ONE Campaign are not easily categorized based upon the academic literature. This work has referred to DATA as a think tank/lobbying firm, which may be the most accurate description of their activities. Stone discusses the difficulty of categorizing think tanks into general categories, noting that they "vary considerably in size, structure,

⁶³⁴ David S. Meyer and Joshua Gamson, "The Challenge of Cultural Elites: Celebrities and Social Movements." *Sociological Inquiry* 65, no 2 (1995): 189-90.

⁶³⁵ Ibid, 190.

⁶³⁶ Jonathan Curiel, "Star Power: When Celebrities Support Causes, Who Really Winds Up Benefiting?," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 5 June 2005.

policy ambit and significance."⁶³⁷ Stone explains that "As a consequence of this diversity, alongside cultural variations in comprehending the role of these organizations, there are considerable difficulties in defining 'think tank,'" and notes the academic consensus surrounding this conclusion. Abelson agrees noting, "Defining a think tank has long posed problems for those seeking to accurately describe what has increasingly become a diverse set of organizations."⁶³⁸ Rich points to a dearth of scholarly research noting that there are "Fewer than a dozen books published since 1970 [that] focus on American think tanks."⁶³⁹ Stone does note a general Anglo-American understanding of think tanks that see them as "relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the analysis of policy issues independent of government, political parties and pressure groups." This definition partially fits DATA, but then Stone claims that think tanks "try to influence or inform policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying." This definition does not fit DATA, as lobbying is imperative to their tactics. Abelson cites several commonalities among think tanks including their nonprofit, nonpartisan status, and their engagement "in the study of public policy."⁶⁴⁰ Rich defines think tanks as "independent, non-interest based, nonprofit organizations that produce or principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to

⁶³⁷ Diane Stone, "Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance," in *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas*, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham. New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2004, 3.

⁶³⁸ Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, 8.

⁶³⁹ Rich, Andrew. *Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 6.

⁶⁴⁰ Abelson, 2002, 9.

influence the policymaking process."⁶⁴¹ Although Abelson notes that think tanks are mostly nonpartisan, it is important to mention that it has been found that they are also consistently ideological in their philosophy and thus their viewpoints. Rich sees a growing tendency for think tanks to associate with identifiable ideologies, and notes the predominance of conservative ideologies, but admits the difficulty in making "clear judgments about the presence and nature of organizational ideologies," because they wish "to avoid the risk of jeopardizing their tax exempt status."⁶⁴² The tax code allows think tanks to "produce ideologically consistent work," but they are prohibited to spend more than an insubstantial part of their activities on behalf or in opposition to any particular candidate or party. In sum, think tanks are usually only nonpartisan to the extent that the tax code requires.

The role of providing information, or issue-knowledge, is the primary and ubiquitous characteristic of U.S. think tanks, hence the nickname. As the previous definitions attest, this is accomplished through educating politicians, the public, bureaucrats, private companies, and academics. Think tanks use "publications, interviews with the media, appearances before legislative committees, and participation in conferences and seminars," several techniques of which DATA and The ONE Campaign have used.⁶⁴³ Abelson also credits "the highly decentralized and fragmented political system of the United States, combined with the weak party system," as to why U.S. think tanks assign a "high priority to sharing their

⁶⁴¹ Rich, 2004, 11.

⁶⁴² Ibid, 18.

⁶⁴³ Abelson, 2002, 162.

ideas with members of Congress," something that Bono has done in numerous documented meetings with members of Congress.

Abelson also points to the problematic nature of assessing the influence of think tanks, because of the major barrier of determining how to measure policy influence.⁶⁴⁴ Abelson does note that there are several factors which "may influence how much or how little impact think tanks have" including "their financial resources, the number and quality of their staff, the strong connections some think tank directors have to policymakers, and their ability to convey their ideas to multiple audiences." In addition, think tank visibility is affected by "the willingness of office holders to embrace" their ideas.

By these measures alone DATA has had significant impacts, as their financial backing has been steady and readily obtained, and have an obvious link to policymakers through the person of Bono. In addition, the many documented cases of policymakers who have publicly embraced DATA and Bono's ideas have also propelled their visibility. But Abelson is explicit in the fact that "it is virtually impossible to assign a numerical value to the amount of influence think tanks wield."⁶⁴⁵ Abelson suggests the best method may be by "assessing their involvement in specific policy areas," which can help present "a better sense of how relevant or irrelevant they were." This method is also difficult because of the challenge in "determining how to isolate the views of think tanks from dozens of other individuals and governmental and nongovernmental organizations that actively seek to influence public policy." This work has documented how Bono and DATA have been

⁶⁴⁴ Abelson, 2002, 163.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid, 164.

significantly involved in U.S. foreign policy towards Africa from 2000 onward, a sure sign of influence according to Abelson's definition.

But according to the academic literature, DATA is only partially a think tank. The study of and/or promotion of public policy is only one piece of what they do. The lobbying of bureaucrats and politicians is also a major part of their mission, especially in the United States. This is an area that has traditionally been associated with think tanks. Shaiko notes "The most effective organized interests in American politics are the permanent interests – those entities with the financial wherewithal to maintain full-time offices in Washington D.C."⁶⁴⁶ DATA would fall within this category along with the ONE Campaign, both of which would be defined by Shaiko as a special or public interest group. Shaiko explains, "Individuals may join membership organizations to advance their non-economic goals in a collective fashion." Shaiko also notes that their "collective strength lies in their ability to mobilize and activate the hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions, of citizens who support their goals." These definitions would fit both DATA, which has mobilized constituents through organizational connections such as religious groups and the ONE Campaign – which has a rapidly expanding and organized base.

Wilcox and Kim discuss tactics used to lobby Congress, which include both inside and outside strategies. Inside strategies refer to the use of meetings to quietly persuade

⁶⁴⁶ Ronald G. Shaiko, "Making the Connection: Organized Interests, Political Representation, and the Changing Rules of the Game in Washington Politics," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 10.

Congress to "to act or vote in a particular way."⁶⁴⁷ Wilcox and Kim note that lobbyists "usually present information in these meetings – probably some combination of technical information about the likely impact of legislation and political information about the constellation of actors who might support and oppose a bill." It is also important to remember that "insider strategies work only for groups that are able to gain access to members and key congressional staffers" – a group that would include Bono and DATA. Wilcox and Kim explain that outside lobbying "involves using interest group members (or the general public) to pressure congressional lawmakers to support the group's agenda." In addition, outside lobbying "brings with it an implicit or explicit threat that group members will work to defeat the targeted member of Congress if he or she refuses to support the group's policies." DATA and The ONE Campaign have used both inside and outside lobbying tactics effectively. Inside lobbying appears to be their most common method, especially considering Bono's numerous Congressional meetings. DATA and the ONE Campaign have also used members and political constituents to lobby Congress – the most notable being DATA's media campaign in Jim Nussle's home district that produced considerable public interest and led to an eventual policy reversal by the Iowa Representative, which he publicly attributed to constituent concerns, and presumably aroused by DATA.

⁶⁴⁷ Clyde Wilcox and Kim Dong-Young, "Continuity and Change in the Congressional Connection," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 130-9.

Rich discusses the political role of expertise, noting that it "plays a substantial role in American policymaking," as "members of Congress and their staffs depend on expertise... for insights into new policy directions."⁶⁴⁸ Wilcox and Kim also discuss the importance of information, or issue-knowledge, for interest groups that lobby Congress, noting that "members must frequently make decisions on several very large, highly technical pieces of legislation in a single day, especially at the end of the legislative session."⁶⁴⁹ Wilcox and Kim deftly remark on the salience of Congressional voting records during a reelection campaign. Wilcox and Kim further note that lobbyist arguments and information "do not always carry the day... but they do so often enough..." The technique of lobbying Congressional committee staffers is also common for interest groups, "because these staffers often play a major role in drafting technical legislation," and can utilize the information that lobbyists provide. Lobbyists also commonly target Congressional office staffs – a technique employed by Bono and DATA – because they "are involved in meetings in which members are deciding key votes or discussing possible legislative initiatives." Wilcox and Kim conclude that, "it is clear that the information provided by interests groups does influence legislation." White explains the importance of "understanding" in Congressional lobbying: "Lobbying involves skills of persuasion, a willingness to be insistent, an understanding of the targets, and an understanding of the budget accounts, all of which specialists possess to a

⁶⁴⁸ Andrew Rich, "The Politics of Expertise in Congress and the News Media," *Social Science Quarterly* (2001): 82, no. 3, 583.

⁶⁴⁹ Wilcox and Kim, 2005, 129-31

far greater extent than do their clients and even some members of Congress."⁶⁵⁰ This work has thoroughly demonstrated Bono's use of information, or issue-knowledge, in his lobbying endeavors.

Bono did not just lobby members of Congress – he also spent considerable time lobbying presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Tenpas discusses the significance of presidential lobbying, noting the "deeper involvement of the White House in the legislative drafting stage and the president's power to set the legislative agenda."⁶⁵¹ Tenpas also examines "reverse lobbying," or the presidential pursuit of lobbyist expertise, and admits that the "presidency actively seeks support from pivotal interest groups," which "requires substantial time and effort on behalf of the Administration." This phenomenon of reverse lobbying was utilized by one executive branch office – the Office of the United States Trade Representative – in its pursuit of Bono and DATA's mediation for December 2005 WTO talks. The Office of the Trade Representative even included a Bono quote in a pre-WTO meeting publicity piece on its website called *Trade Facts*.⁶⁵² Furlong also discusses the significance of information in executive branch lobbying: "Perhaps more so in the executive branch than in the legislature, access is gained through interest group knowledge of public

⁶⁵⁰ Joseph White, "Making Connections to the Appropriations Process," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 176.

⁶⁵¹ Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, "Lobbying the Executive Branch: Outside-in and Inside-out," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 250-6.

⁶⁵² Bono's quote read: "We welcome the United States' proposal as a first and important step to jump-start trade negotiations. We hope other nations will engage thoughtfully and arrive at a trade deal for development that boldly breaks down trade-distorting subsidies and market access barriers in rich countries that, at the moment, rob poor countries of their dignity by preventing them from trading their way out of poverty." *Trade Facts*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 9 November 2005.

policies, alternatives, solutions, impacts, and processes" – in short, issue-knowledge.⁶⁵³

Furlong also mentions increases in both executive branch lobbying and executive branch involvement in the legislative process.

⁶⁵³ Scott R. Furlong, "Exploring Interest Groups Participation in Executive Policymaking," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 285.

19. Coalition Building

In discussing the role of coalition building in American politics, Hula explains that "the size and complexity of government, the number of legislators and executive branch officials in decision-making roles, and the number of competing voices in the public arena," have lent to an environment where "leaders of organized interests often find it beneficial to work together as they pursue their policy goals."⁶⁵⁴ Hula defines a coalition as "purposive groups of organizations united behind a symbiotic set of legislative or regulatory goals." Hula also notes that coalitions allow "organizations to gather information efficiently about developments in the public policy process and gives them an opportunity to have a voice in framing debates or shaping a compromise position on an issue," and "allows group leaders to combine their resources and divide the workload." Hula sees the tendency of "most groups to find their allies within their own organizational category or issue commodity." In Hula's framework, Bono would be considered a coalition broker "in the business of building bridges." These bridges are most difficult to build in times of partisan division and require an individual that has the trust of all concerned parties.

Bono has consistently sought to learn from and potentially convert those who might oppose his political aspirations for the continent of Africa. It began when he deliberately met with conservative academics and politicians such as Robert Barro and Jesse Helms. It

⁶⁵⁴ Kevin. W. Hula, "Coalitions, Cloning and Trust," in *The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington*, ed. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005, 229-46.

continued during DATA's first public foray, the Heart of America tour, in which Bono worked with Christian Evangelicals, and in his involvement with the conservative Bush Administration. In addition, Bono and DATA have purposely pursued bipartisan strategies, demonstrated by Bono's meetings with both Democrats and Republicans, and the organization of bipartisan dinner parties by Bobby Shriver, and DATA lobbyists Tom Sheridan and Scott Hatch, that were organized to "cement relationships and encourage the sense that at least on one issue, everyone could break bread."⁶⁵⁵ This is a remarkable strategy in an era where interest group politics are more partisan-focused, and feature tightly linked groups aligned across and in the two major parties.⁶⁵⁶ This bipartisanship and coalition building has likely lent to the successes of Bono and DATA, and supported by Rich, who found that "think tanks of no identifiable ideology have some advantage in gaining congressional and media visibility overall," and are "slightly favored by congressional staff members and journalists to provide guidance on issues and news stories."⁶⁵⁷

Bono's courting of Evangelical Christians may have also prompted a broader pattern from Evangelical leadership that is pursuing ideological unity rather than division. A June 2005 *Washington Post* article profiled a new trend among the religious leadership that seeks to find common ground between religious conservatives and liberals on moral issues, and quoted Rabbi David Saperstein, a leader of the "religious left" who credits the seeds of this

⁶⁵⁵ Josh Tyrangiel, 26 December 2005.

⁶⁵⁶ White, 2005, 177.

⁶⁵⁷ Rich, 2001, 583.

"phenomenon of strange bedfellows" to Bono's efforts during the Clinton Administration, where "religious leaders across the political spectrum teamed up to champion debt relief for Africa."⁶⁵⁸ Conservative *New York Times* columnist David Brooks also conferred this opinion when he wrote that Bono "is at the nexus of a vast alliance between socially conservative evangelicals and socially liberal N.G.O.'s."⁶⁵⁹ *The Washington Times* also observed this phenomenon and partially credited Bono when it reported that "Washington-area and other Christian groups are deeply involved in a wide-ranging coalition that is pushing world leaders to do more to address AIDS and poverty in Africa."⁶⁶⁰ A 2004 *Foreign Affairs* article credited "recent activism by conservative political and religious groups" for AIDS "finally [gaining] foreign policy attention commensurate with its substantive importance," which was also duly documented in the discussion of the PEPFAR HIV/AIDS bill discussed in this work.⁶⁶¹

Bono discussed his strategy of coalition building in an interview with *the San Francisco Chronicle*:⁶⁶²

We have an emergency as they say – we can't really afford to divide the country in two – that's probably the only original idea I had, and it doesn't sound that original, but it just made a lot of common sense to me. The vulnerability of these people

⁶⁵⁸ Alan Cooperman, "Religious Right, Left Meet in Middle; Clergy Aim to Show that Faith Unifies," *The Washington Post*, 15 June 2005, A01.

⁶⁵⁹ David Brooks, "A Natural Alliance," *The New York Times*, 26 May 2005, A5.

⁶⁶⁰ Jen Waters, "Christian Groups Unite Against Worst African Ills," *The Washington Times*, 6 July 2005.

⁶⁶¹ Holly Burkhalter, "The Politics of AIDS: Engaging Conservative Activists," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2004), 83, no. 1, 8-14.

⁶⁶² From a November 2005 San Francisco Chronicle interview with Bono posted as a podcast on the San Francisco Chronicle's website, Available [Online]: <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/indexn?blogid=5>

whom we represent, is such that we cannot afford to divide the country – we have to find a way of working with the right on this – I knew that always. I mean it's just from growing up in the street by the way – in Dublin, North side of Dublin – you know, you find the tough guy, make him your friend – if you're my height. So I've always gone to the people who are the biggest problem and try to get them on side. The way to get to the right, as it happens, is through their religiosity.

In Meyer and Gamson's discussion about the importance of *standing* in social movements, they conclude that celebrities "may also redefine the movements in which they engage such that their standing is viewed as legitimate."⁶⁶³ It may be plausible that the ecumenical Bono is helping to refocus, if not redefine, the priorities of the American religious right, and potentially the entirety of America's religious network, through his efforts as a coalition broker. Bono's work as a coalition broker was the crucial third step in the Bono-model of celebrity activism. It was again a unique celebrity foray by the left-leaning rock star to pursue the religious and political right, while strategically encircling the African issues for which he fought. As Bono told *Rolling Stone* editor Jann Wenner, "...bipartisanship may take longer but it will get you a lot further."⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶³ Meyer and Gamson, 1995, 189-90.

⁶⁶⁴ Jann S. Wenner, 3 November 2005.

20. International Political Structures

A discussion of the Bono-model of celebrity political activism is not complete without analyzing the condition of the larger structures in which it has resided. Section Two exhibited that Bono's role as a coalition broker was not limited to the political structures in the United States. His work is also part of a larger international network that has coalesced into the enormous Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP), which includes hundreds of organizations, and what is considered a transnational advocacy coalition. Hudson notes that advocacy "has a wide range of meanings for NGOs, but it is most commonly seen as involving efforts to change institutions' policies in ways that are expected to favour the poor and marginalized Southern communities whose interests NGOs aim to promote."⁶⁶⁵ Similar to the think tank/interest group activities of DATA, NGO advocacy involves policy analysis, research, and the channeling of information; and include activities such as raising awareness through education, capacity building, lobbying, campaigning, and direct action.

The GCAP network has developed during a shift in the global political landscape that has seen an increase in transnational civil society advocacy and the academic study of this phenomenon. Price notes the "plethora of... recent works by international relations scholars examining the flowering of transnational advocacy."⁶⁶⁶ Khagram, Riker and Sikkink note the increase in transnational advocacy during the last two decades, and purport

⁶⁶⁵ Alan Hudson, "NGOs' Transnational Advocacy Networks: from 'Legitimacy' to 'Political Responsibility,'" *Global Networks* (2001): 1, no 4, 333.

⁶⁶⁶ Richard Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics," *World Politics* (July 2003): 55, 579.

that international nongovernmental organizations and transnational social movements are “emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices.”⁶⁶⁷ In addition, they see a phenomenon that includes an “increase in new nonstate actors, new arenas for action, and the blurring of the distinctions between domestic and global levels of politics.” Florini calls transnational civil society networks “the emerging third force” in global politics, and asserts that the world has seen “a real, and considerable, increase in the number and effectiveness of transnational nongovernmental networks.”⁶⁶⁸ Price explains that civil society “is commonly employed to refer to a ‘third system’ of agents, namely, privately organized citizens as distinguished from government or profit-seeking actors.”⁶⁶⁹ Edwards has seen the pragmatic effects of this “radical change” in international relations, and notes, “Ten years ago, there was little talk of civil society in the corridors of power, but now the walls reverberate with at least the rhetoric of partnership, participation, and the role of citizens’ groups in promoting sustainable development.”⁶⁷⁰

Scholte and Florini partially attribute this growth to improving information and communications technologies, including inexpensive telecommunications and the internet, which make it easier for “new groups to form and maintain bonds, even across boundaries,

⁶⁶⁷ S. Khagram, J.V. Riker and K. Sikkink, “From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics,” in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkink, and James V. Riker. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 3-4.

⁶⁶⁸ Ann M. Florini, “Lessons Learned,” in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Nihon Kokusai Koryu Senta and Ann Florini. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, 7 and 211.

⁶⁶⁹ Price, 2003, 580.

⁶⁷⁰ Michael Edwards, “Introduction,” in *Global Citizen Action*, ed. Michael Edwards and John Gaventa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 1.

and to act as collective entities."⁶⁷¹ Florini also credits the rise of coalitions in the 1960s, which relied on coordination at strategic places and times rather than a "large permanent base of grassroots activists." Scholte also sees structural issues at work, notably the "altered contours of governance in the wake of globalization," and "the spread of liberal, pluralist democracy and the decline of colonial rule and one party states," which has "created an environment that is conducive to the growth of formally organized civil society." Finally, Scholte credits "a more reflexive modernity," that has engendered a "heightened awareness of the limitations – if not fundamental flaws – of the cornerstones modernity," including "rationalist knowledge, capitalist production, bureaucratic administration and mass urban life," and explains that people are instead "gripped with concerns about ecological degradation, runaway markets, persistent social injustices, democratic deficits, the deterioration of community, and the loss of spirituality."

Price provides an excellent overview of recent transnational civil society literature, and reports the numerous names being applied to these networks including nonstate actors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational advocacy networks, and transnational or global civil society.⁶⁷² Florini and Simmons define transnational civil society in three parts, noting that it first includes "only groups that are not governments or profit seeking entities," secondly it "involves linkages across national borders," and thirdly "it takes a

⁶⁷¹ Jan Aart Scholte, "Civil Society and Governance in the Global Polity," in *Towards a Global Polity*. New York: Routledge, 2002, 150; and Ann M. Florini, *The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003, 39.

⁶⁷² Price, 2003, 580.

variety of forms."⁶⁷³ Price provides a helpful summation of the term "transnational civil society" based upon its numerous definitions noting that it refers to "self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest."

In addition, Price mentions the categories of transnational collective action delineated by Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, who further provide distinctions between transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements, which "can be viewed as ascending levels of transnational collective action."⁶⁷⁴ Transnational advocacy networks "are the most informal configuration of nonstate actors," and are "linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses," with "the essence of network activity" being "the exchange and use of information." Transnational coalitions are more formal and "involve a greater level of transnational coordination," which is characterized by cross-country sharing of strategies or tactics "to publicly influence social change," of which these strategies and/or tactics are referred to as transnational campaigns. Finally, transnational social movements "are sets of actors with common purposes and solidarities linked across country boundaries that have the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilization in more than one country to publicly influence social

⁶⁷³ Ann M. Florini and P.J. Simmons, "What the World Needs Now?" in *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, ed. Nihon Kokusai Koryu Senta and Ann Florini. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, 7.

⁶⁷⁴ Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002, 6-9.

change," and are characterized by collective action that "often" utilizes "protest or disruptive action."

Using these definitions, DATA, the ONE Campaign, Make Poverty History – as members of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty – would currently be considered the mid-tiered transnational coalition per Khagram, Riker and Sikkink's definition, as they are formally united across countries and share not only information, but strategies and tactics.

Price also summarizes the major kinds of activities that transnational coalitions undertake, including (1) agenda setting, where problems of international concern are identified and informational campaigns occur, (2) developing solutions, which involves norm creation and policy recommendations, (3) building networks and coalitions of allies, and (4) implementing solutions – "employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms."⁶⁷⁵ Agenda setting may be the most important of these functions, because governments and corporations often ignore the highlighted issues. Donnelly explains how the Jubilee 2000 Campaign used agenda setting, noting that the debt issues "would simply not have been on the agenda had it not been for the work of these diverse networks."⁶⁷⁶ Florini agrees, noting that "Bono is the famous face, but it has taken the combined efforts of thousands of people in many countries, working through Jubilee 2000, to force the rich countries and the international financial institutions to pay serious attention to the world's highly indebted poor countries."⁶⁷⁷ Ciara Gaynor, Co-Chair

⁶⁷⁵ Price, 2003, 584.

⁶⁷⁶ Donnelly, 2002, 169.

⁶⁷⁷ Price, 2003, 166.

of the GCAP Media Group explained how in her view how the transnational campaign and its associated celebrity involvement have affected the campaign's political and public standing:⁶⁷⁸

...civil society and the campaigning that was done in 2005 has pushed the whole issue of poverty, poverty eradication, the issue of debt, much higher up on to the political agenda. Governments now know that they are being watched, not just by NGOs, and by people that have worked in this sphere many years – the social watchers – but now it's becoming a much broader issue that the general public are now becoming educated and aware... And there is so much more being written about it as well, and even the media as well, because I'd say apart from media that would cover those issues traditionally, a lot of the mainstream media wouldn't necessarily have known about this. But now because of celebrity involvement, they're actually having to read about it and get informed...

It is somewhat difficult to measure the extent to which Bono actually set the political agenda, or even influenced it, but spurious or not, and as Ciara Gaynor attested, the African issues on which he has focused since 1999 have surely increased in importance on the agendas of several countries, as well as internationally.

Donnelly also details how debt activists "created and expanded diverse networks in all parts of the globe and engaged in far-reaching efforts to educate publics on issues," which would fall under building networks and coalitions of allies according to Price. The Jubilee 2000 Campaign also witnessed reverse lobbying, where the network was approached

⁶⁷⁸ Personal Interview with Ciara Gaynor, Co-Chair GCAP Media Group, 19 January 2006.

for either the support or technical expertise of its members – the point being that Jubilee’s solutions were used. It could also be argued based upon the historical data presented in this work, that all the organizations in which Bono is affiliated – as members of the transnational coalition Global Call to Action Against Poverty – have performed all four of the major kinds of activities that Price cites, especially in the United States. Bono explained his coalition’s tactics surrounding developing and implementing solutions in an interview with the *San Francisco Chronicle*.⁶⁷⁹

We generally arrive with solutions more than problems. So it’s not like if you take a meeting with us, we’re just going to tell you all the things you’re not doing. We tend to have meetings and point people in the direction of things they could be doing – and how maybe we can help them there.

Price also provides an academic synthesis that explains why transnational advocacy actors have the authority to engage in their respective issues, and lists three principal sources including expertise, moral influence, and political legitimacy.⁶⁸⁰ It is Bono’s expertise, as part of his charisma, that has been constantly present in his political activities, and which has also lent to his legitimacy. Price notes that expert influence is often most pronounced in the "prenegotiation stage of an emergent norm," and "revolves around the genesis and circulation of new ideas that later become embedded in policy or institutional change." This was witnessed firsthand in the United States by DATA when their policy experts were "summoned" to the White House to help draft the MCA legislation, which was based upon

⁶⁷⁹ From a November 2005 San Francisco Chronicle interview with Bono posted as a podcast on the San Francisco Chronicle’s website, Available [Online]: <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/indexn?blogid=5>

⁶⁸⁰ Price, 2003, 587.

ideas, or possibly norms, that were in their infancy policy-wise, and were developed by members of the emerging transnational advocacy coalition. Price also explains that moral authority can be a form of power, and is utilized when "decision-makers and/or citizens often believe that activists are not only (objectively) right in the sense of providing accurate information but also morally right in the purposes for which such knowledge is harnessed."⁶⁸¹ Khagram, Riker and Sikkink note the importance of key individuals acting as moral entrepreneurs – a role that Bono has fulfilled.⁶⁸² In discussing the source of actor legitimacy, Price could be quoting Bono in noting that it can often "derive from claims to represent affected communities" – a statement Bono consistently makes about Africa's impoverished.⁶⁸³

In sum, the Bono-model of celebrity political activism did not occur in a vacuum. The changing structure of global politics, expressed through an increase in transnational activism, was the stage on which Bono acted. It is not coincidental that the Bono-model, piqued initially through the transnational coalition Jubilee 2000, and further expressed through the transnational coalition Global Call to Action Against Poverty, evolved alongside the emergence of a new global reality. This new global political reality is the last piece to the Bono-model. Bono and his affiliated transnational networks have also utilized the methods, and garnered their authority, from traditions normally associated with transnational advocacy coalitions as described in the academic literature.

⁶⁸¹ Price, Ibid, 589.

⁶⁸² Khagram Riker and Sikkink, 2002, 11.

⁶⁸³ Price, 2003, 590.

21. Conclusion

Bono was named *Time Magazine's* annual "person of the year" in December 2005, along with Bill and Melinda Gates, for "being shrewd about doing good, for rewriting politics and re-engineering justice, for making mercy smarter and hope strategic and then daring the rest of us to follow..."⁶⁸⁴ In explaining these accomplishments *Time* attributes Bono's celebrity – "just about everyone in the world wants to meet him;" his charisma and issue-knowledge – "Bono moves in political circles like a very charming shark;" and his coalition building – "He gets Pat Robertson and Susan Sarandon to do a commercial together..." *Time* is not the first publication to note the innovational celebrity political tactics Bono that has pioneered. The central premise of this work is that Bono has reinvented celebrity activism through his commitment to ending African poverty, thus creating the Bono-model of celebrity politics. The model has evolved alongside Bono's expanding political activism during his career as front-man for U2, and was fully realized through the strategies he developed as an African activist. These strategies include using pre-established political methods such as lobbying, the creation of a policy organization, and grassroots mobilization in conjunction with the traditional routes available to a rock star celebrity such as political music, without actually becoming a politician. The Bono-model has proven the most effective in pluralist, democratic countries with multiple political access points such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and their corresponding arms of international

⁶⁸⁴ Nancy Gibbs, "The Good Samaritans," *Time*, (26 December 2005), 166, no. 26, 8.

control – the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization).

Two questions remain. Will celebrity activists begin to emulate the Bono-model? And will they be effective? There is already evidence that other celebrities are learning from Bono's model. DATA director Jamie Drummond admitted that actors Brad Pitt and George Clooney are closely studying "how Bono works."⁶⁸⁵ The answer to this question lies in the one area that the *Time* article did not analyze – the global political structure. The global power and influence of transnational civil society has rapidly expanded during the last two decades. In addition, this community has been the driving force behind Bono's issues – from African debt relief to HIV/AIDS. They have coalesced and formed a transnational alliance that has been crucial in achieving all of the political successes of which Bono has been a part, including the placement of these issues on the international agenda. If celebrity activists hope to effectively utilize Bono's model, the said political issue must also reflect the concerns of the transnational civil society community.

⁶⁸⁵ Donna Cassata, 7 June 2005.

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